Mike
7 September 2000, 17:52
Armed Forces Journal International
August 2000
Pg. 12
Family Business
Cost Growth In Two Major Procurements Squeezes Special Operations Command’s Limited Investment Budget
By Bill Gregory
The United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), headquartered at MacDill AFB near Tampa, FL, has its own budget‹separate from those of the military services and controls its own (relatively small) procurement ($729 million this fiscal year) and research and development ($238 million) accounts. Unfortunately, cost growth in two flagship programs has forced SOCOM to scale back on other acquisition programs in its FY2002-2007 long-range budget plan.
The flagship programs are the CV-22 Special Operations Forces (SOF) variant of the Marine Corps’ Bell-Boeing MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) developed by Northrop Grumman. SOCOM must fund the SOF-unique modifications for each of 50 V-22 airframes, which are being purchased by the USAF for Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The ASDS is a small submarine totally funded by SOCOM that will be used to insert and extract Navy SEALs along hostile shores.
Costs for the first ASDS, which is in deep-water testing at Pearl Harbor, HI, escalated 200 percent from $78 million to $234 million. SOCOM realigned the funding for support equipment and trimmed the original six-vehicle program to three to hold the top line more or less steady. The CV-22's $500-million cost growth over the five-year budget plan, though not so steep in percentage terms, did plenty to skewer SOCOM's acquisition funding plans. Air Force Lt. Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, SOCOM’s deputy commander-in-chief, compared a near $700 million tab for both programs over the five-year plan with the roughly $950 million the command expects to spend annually on assets unique to special forces. While the cost growth is spread over several years, the bill was a shock. SOCOM was forced to slip delivery of 17 aircraft beyond the five-year plan to save $350 million.
While the Marine Corps was also hit by cost growth on its MV-22 version, development problems with SOF-unique systems compounded the cost problem for the CV-22, Schwartz told AFJI. These systems included ITT's Single Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures System (SIRFC) and other penetration aids, such as the terrain avoidance radar, navigation systems, and self-protection equipment. The SIRFC problem did not occur in isolation; the system was originally an Army-led program for the Apache and other helicopters but SOCOM wound up as the lead to try to maintain its delivery schedule for the CV-22 to meet the aircraft¹s planned FY2004 initial operational capability.
Despite the 17-aircraft slip, SOCOM has not backed off its 50-aircraft requirement. The CV-22’s C-130-like range and speed and helicopter-like takeoff and landing capability will be prized SOF capabilities; the 50 aircraft will also replace all of AFSOC’s helicopters, resulting in substantial operations and maintenance savings. "All our MH-53J Pave Low helicopters ultimately will leave the [AFSOC] inventory," Schwartz said. "The MH-60G Pave Hawks have already left the inventory. So there is a transition plan to accommodate the CV-22 that reflects the command's strategy of going after leap-ahead technology like the CV-22 and migrating away from legacy systems."
It’s possible that SOCOM can restore funding for the 17 aircraft in the five-year plan. Furthermore, the command left itself options by dividing CV-22 equipment into two groups. Group A, the plumbing, cooling, wiring, and such to support all the special avionics, goes in first. Group B includes the avionics black boxes themselves, which can be traded in or out for specific CV-22s over time to stay under the budget top line. If they can't go in one year, the aircraft is ready to take them the next year without any modifications if the funding is available.
To cover the remaining $150-million CV-22 deficit, SOCOM had to make some hard choices in its draft FY2002 budget request submitted to DoD in May and in its out-year funding plans. Given the CV-22's importance, Schwartz said, "We're going to sacrifice other things to keep it healthy."
Schwartz made clear the command¹s frustrations over cost growth and schedule slips in these flagship programs that have left a smaller pie for other deserving programs due to SOCOM’s limited budget. Rapid acquisition of new SOF equipment has been the advantage of SOCOM’s control over its own investment funds, although the command leverages new equipment programs funded by the military services whenever possible.
Schwartz has no doubts that SOF warfighters in the field know what they need. "That's the way we do business around here," he said. "This isn't a case of the folks here in Tampa dictating to the field what they get. It's a family business and, at least for us, it seems to work." He noted, "If you have operators field their own equipment, you end up with very good capability but no way to sustain it. On the other hand, you will have very complete programs if they are left in the hands of the traditional acquirers. So there are plusses and minuses. By staying small, as we are able to do here, perhaps we have the benefit of both.
"We have many more valid [equipment] requirements than our funding can support. The result is that problems in one program create ricochets. There are examples where we have produced superb equipment with all the right kind of sustaining support. What we need to do is take those smaller programs, not as complex as the CV-22 or the ASDS, and scale up that success. That's easier said than done."
August 2000
Pg. 12
Family Business
Cost Growth In Two Major Procurements Squeezes Special Operations Command’s Limited Investment Budget
By Bill Gregory
The United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), headquartered at MacDill AFB near Tampa, FL, has its own budget‹separate from those of the military services and controls its own (relatively small) procurement ($729 million this fiscal year) and research and development ($238 million) accounts. Unfortunately, cost growth in two flagship programs has forced SOCOM to scale back on other acquisition programs in its FY2002-2007 long-range budget plan.
The flagship programs are the CV-22 Special Operations Forces (SOF) variant of the Marine Corps’ Bell-Boeing MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) developed by Northrop Grumman. SOCOM must fund the SOF-unique modifications for each of 50 V-22 airframes, which are being purchased by the USAF for Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The ASDS is a small submarine totally funded by SOCOM that will be used to insert and extract Navy SEALs along hostile shores.
Costs for the first ASDS, which is in deep-water testing at Pearl Harbor, HI, escalated 200 percent from $78 million to $234 million. SOCOM realigned the funding for support equipment and trimmed the original six-vehicle program to three to hold the top line more or less steady. The CV-22's $500-million cost growth over the five-year budget plan, though not so steep in percentage terms, did plenty to skewer SOCOM's acquisition funding plans. Air Force Lt. Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, SOCOM’s deputy commander-in-chief, compared a near $700 million tab for both programs over the five-year plan with the roughly $950 million the command expects to spend annually on assets unique to special forces. While the cost growth is spread over several years, the bill was a shock. SOCOM was forced to slip delivery of 17 aircraft beyond the five-year plan to save $350 million.
While the Marine Corps was also hit by cost growth on its MV-22 version, development problems with SOF-unique systems compounded the cost problem for the CV-22, Schwartz told AFJI. These systems included ITT's Single Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures System (SIRFC) and other penetration aids, such as the terrain avoidance radar, navigation systems, and self-protection equipment. The SIRFC problem did not occur in isolation; the system was originally an Army-led program for the Apache and other helicopters but SOCOM wound up as the lead to try to maintain its delivery schedule for the CV-22 to meet the aircraft¹s planned FY2004 initial operational capability.
Despite the 17-aircraft slip, SOCOM has not backed off its 50-aircraft requirement. The CV-22’s C-130-like range and speed and helicopter-like takeoff and landing capability will be prized SOF capabilities; the 50 aircraft will also replace all of AFSOC’s helicopters, resulting in substantial operations and maintenance savings. "All our MH-53J Pave Low helicopters ultimately will leave the [AFSOC] inventory," Schwartz said. "The MH-60G Pave Hawks have already left the inventory. So there is a transition plan to accommodate the CV-22 that reflects the command's strategy of going after leap-ahead technology like the CV-22 and migrating away from legacy systems."
It’s possible that SOCOM can restore funding for the 17 aircraft in the five-year plan. Furthermore, the command left itself options by dividing CV-22 equipment into two groups. Group A, the plumbing, cooling, wiring, and such to support all the special avionics, goes in first. Group B includes the avionics black boxes themselves, which can be traded in or out for specific CV-22s over time to stay under the budget top line. If they can't go in one year, the aircraft is ready to take them the next year without any modifications if the funding is available.
To cover the remaining $150-million CV-22 deficit, SOCOM had to make some hard choices in its draft FY2002 budget request submitted to DoD in May and in its out-year funding plans. Given the CV-22's importance, Schwartz said, "We're going to sacrifice other things to keep it healthy."
Schwartz made clear the command¹s frustrations over cost growth and schedule slips in these flagship programs that have left a smaller pie for other deserving programs due to SOCOM’s limited budget. Rapid acquisition of new SOF equipment has been the advantage of SOCOM’s control over its own investment funds, although the command leverages new equipment programs funded by the military services whenever possible.
Schwartz has no doubts that SOF warfighters in the field know what they need. "That's the way we do business around here," he said. "This isn't a case of the folks here in Tampa dictating to the field what they get. It's a family business and, at least for us, it seems to work." He noted, "If you have operators field their own equipment, you end up with very good capability but no way to sustain it. On the other hand, you will have very complete programs if they are left in the hands of the traditional acquirers. So there are plusses and minuses. By staying small, as we are able to do here, perhaps we have the benefit of both.
"We have many more valid [equipment] requirements than our funding can support. The result is that problems in one program create ricochets. There are examples where we have produced superb equipment with all the right kind of sustaining support. What we need to do is take those smaller programs, not as complex as the CV-22 or the ASDS, and scale up that success. That's easier said than done."