GEN Douglas MacArthur

[Bohr Adam]

Every time I read a history book that features him, I dislike him even more. I can't help but think his ego killed thousands of US, Korean, Filipino, and other soldiers. I am no history guru - so I am willing to hear other opinions.

My two big gripes:

1) Sneaking out of the Philippines leaving his army to die / get captured. Did he really think his particular skills were so valuable that they were worth abandoning ship? How would history look at a Naval Admiral if he had done the same thing?

2) Racing to the Yalu river as if there wa some sort of rush - totally underestimating the natural infiltration route the mountains provided for the Chinese. His subsequent bitching about invading China was pure theatrical BULLSHIT. He didn't have a force CAPABLE of doing that, they were getting DESTROYED at the hands of the Chinese. He couldn't handle North Korea - but wanted to go further?

I am sure the Incheon landing will be mentioned. I don't think he was a genius for the Incheon landing - just lucky. There is really no other place to do such a landing, and it takes no tactical genius to wantto do an amphibious flank attack on a peninsula with its capital so close to the ocean.

I also think the English speaking world overplays its significance since the ROK Army handled most of the fighting left over that we "bypassed."

Asbestos suit ON, let the discussion begin.

[Doctor_Doom]

Originally posted by Adam White
I am sure the Incheon landing will be mentioned. I don't think he was a genius for the Incheon landing - just lucky.

Especially since according to Clay Blair an amphibious landing of that type was part of normal doctrine at the time, in light of WWII experience.

Ronald Spector is not very complimentary either. Since my only basis for judgement is from the work of other historians I'm no fan of the man either. Too much of a glory seeker for my tastes, and his abject failures in the beginning of WWII, as well as his tendency to surround himself with syncophants and give peremptory orders from thoudsands of miles away, don't add to my appraisal of the man.

Not to mention his heavy-handed approach in dealing with WWI veterans who were seeking their pensions... only time American troops have killed people on the National Mall, and our own veterans no less!!!

[Frog]

Adam,

I think your view of Gen. Douglas MacArthur is limited by your lack of research. I like your academic spirit though.

Please tell me your thoughts on Gen. George Washington.

[airbornelawyer]

Originally posted by Adam White
I can't help but think his ego killed thousands of US, Korean, Filipino, and other soldiers.MacArthur was famously protective of the lives of his soldiers. "For every Allied serviceman killed, the General killed ten Japanese. Never in history, John Gunther wrote, had there been a commander so economical in the expenditure of his men's blood. In this respect certain comparisons with ETO campaigns are staggering. During the single Battle of Anzio, 72,306 GIs fell. In the Battle of Normandy, Eisenhower lost 28,366. Between MacArthur's arrival in Australia and his return to Philippine waters over two years later, his troops suffered just 27,684 casualties" Manchester, William, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur: 1880-1964, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1978, p. 339. When the press criticized the slow pace of the reconquest of Luzon, and MacArthur's methodical approach to leveling Japanese strongholds with artillery before attacking, he replied "Tell them that if I like I can finish Leyte in two weeks, but I won't! I have too great a responsibility to the mothers and wives in America to do that to their men. I will not take by sacrifice what I can achieve by strategy." Quoted in id., at p. 395.

Originally posted by Adam White
1) Sneaking out of the Philippines leaving his army to die / get captured. Did he really think his particular skills were so valuable that they were worth abandoning ship? How would history look at a Naval Admiral if he had done the same thing? "Sneaking"? Are you questioning his courage or his leadership? If the former, you are on shaky ground. MacArthur's personal bravery is pretty much unquestioned. He was decorated repeatedly for valor. Patton, who stood by his side during a German artillery barrage in Sept. 1918, described him as "the bravest man I ever met." Repeatedly, he accompanied his troops on the front line, taking risks because he felt the need to lead by example. MacArthur: "If I do it, the colonels will do it. If the colonels do it, the captains will do it, and so on." MacArthur's father, BTW, the subject of the other thread, won the Medal of Honor as a lieutenant of the U.S. Volunteers leading his regiment at the Battle of Missionary Ridge.

As for the second part, given his ego, my guess is he did "think his particular skills were so valuable". But he apparently wasn't the only one:    --------------------------------
Marshall to MacArthur
22 February 1942
Radio No. 1078
S E C R E T

From General Marshall to General MacArthur to be seen by decoding clerk only: With reference to the rapidly approaching reorganization of the ABDA area ... The President directs that you make arrangements to leave Fort Mills and proceed to Mindanao. You are directed to make this change as quickly as possible.

... From Mindanao you will proceed to Australia where you will assume command of all United States troops.

It is the intention of the president to arrange with the Australian and British governments for their acceptance of you as commander of the reconstituted ABDA area. Because of the vital importance of your assuming command in Australia at an early date your delay in Mindanao will not repeat not be prolonged beyond one week and you will leave sooner if transportation becomes available earlier.

Instructions will be given from here at your request for the movement of submarine or plane or both to enable you to carry out the foregoing instructions. ...
    --------------------------------The escape from Corregidor was not easy. The exploits of the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3 commander, then-Lieutenant John Bulkeley, would earn him the Medal of Honor. Bulkeley went on to become the most highly decorated American sailor in World War II.

Several people have called into question MacArthur's transporting of some of his family's personal belongings on the B-17s which took them from Mindanao to Australia. Some have said the space should have been used to evacuate Army nurses. They may be right. I don't know the situation on Mindanao, as opposed to Luzon, at the time. My guess is at that point they weren't planning on evacuating the island, so citing the nurses is probably the critics' way of garnering sympathy. But there no doubt were seriously wounded patients at the Army hospital in Del Monte who should have been evacuated.

Regarding Roosevelt's motives, it was in part the perceived need for MacArthur's leadership, but it was also to some extent the fear that allowing MacArthur to be captured would be a demoralizing blow to the American people and a boon to Japanese propaganda.

MacArthur in Korea

I will leave aside most Korean War commentary as I am (a) not sufficiently well-versed and (b) it is late. I will note that, your demonstration of 20/20 hindsight notwithstanding, the Inch'on landing was neither as obvious nor easy as you imply.

It was obvious in a strategic sense - in the sense that MacArthur's preference was always for maneuver and striking at the enemy's head and heart rather than his limbs. It was not a tactically obvious choice, however. Three Plans were proposed: (1) Plan 100-B, landing at Inch'on on the west coast; (2) Plan 100-C, landing at Kunsan on the west coast but much further south; (3) Plan 100-D, landing near Chumunjin-up on the east coast. MacArthur favored the Inch'on landing, and planning went ahead.

The Joint Chiefs had their reservations. Inch'on was opposed by the Navy on grounds of practicality (too many islands on the approach to the estuary where North Korean small boats could launch attacks, bad tidal conditions on the landing areas). RADM James H. Doyle's view at the July 23rd planning meeting was hardly a ringing endorsement: "The operation is not impossible, but I do not recommend it."

The Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who had come to the planning session, favored the Kunsan landing. Kunsan was much closer to Pusan, allowing for a quicker link-up at Taejon and a drive up the peninsula (essentially the North Korean invasion in reverse). Kunsan also had much better beaches.

Another landing site, Posung-myon, south of Inch'on and west of Osan was floated by RADM Doyle. But like Kunsan, this would have placed US/ROK forces below Seoul and wouldn't have delivered the strong blow Inch'on did.

MacArthur prevailed and Inch'on remained the target.

Yet despite your statement of its tactical obviousness, the Joint Chiefs remained unconvinced. In early September, they again asked MacArthur to reconsider and to provide his estimate of the situation. His reply states well what he expected to accomplish: There is no question in my mind as to the feasibility of the operation and I regard its chance of success as excellent. I go further and believe that it represents the only hope of wresting the initiative from the enemy and thereby presenting an opportunity for a decisive blow. To do otherwise is to commit us to a war of indefinite duration, of gradual attrition, and of doubtful results.... There is no slightest possibility . . . of our force being ejected from the Pusan beachhead. The envelopment from the north will instantly relieve the pressure on the south perimeter and, indeed, is the only way that this can be accomplished.... The success of the enveloping movement from the north does not depend upon the rapid juncture of the X Corps and the Eighth Army. The seizure of the heart of the enemy distributing system in the Seoul area will completely dislocate the logistical supply of his forces now operating in South Korea and therefore will ultimately result in their disintegration. This, indeed, is the primary purpose of the movement. Caught between our northern and southern forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy cannot fail to be ultimately shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities.... For the reasons stated, there are no material changes under contemplation in the operation as planned and reported to you. The embarkation of the troops and the preliminary air and naval preparations are proceeding according to schedule.The Inch'on landings and the breakout of the Pusan perimeter went amazingly well and the North Koreans collapsed. Everything was going the UN's way.

When criticizing the US/ROK forces' "race to the Yalu", you offer no alternative. Would you have preferred a slow crawl? Not going into North Korea at all. The latter was more a political than military decision. Having retaken South Korea, nothing seemed to stand in the way of reuniting the entire peninsula. The risk of Chinese intervention was noted, but Washington's instructions to MacArthur were clear: (1) destroy the North Korean forces; (2) reunite the peninsula, if possible; (3) keep an eye out for the Chinese.

Again, 20/20 hindsight says we should have known the Chinese would intervene. But MacArthur didn't have that benefit. My instinct is that were I in his shoes, my goal would be to destroy the North Koreans as rapidly as possible to remove any grounds for Chinese intervention, i.e., present the Chinese with a fait accompli. This would seem to argue in favor of a rapid advance to the Yalu. Again, hindsight may tell us that all the signs were there; the Indian ambassador in Beijing warned that he thought the Chinese would intervene.

But if you were going to go north at all, the rapid advance seems like the best approach. And it wasn't just the views of Truman and MacArthur that made a drive north inevitable. President Rhee had made it clear that he did not intend to stop until all Korea was one (under him of course).Originally posted by Adam White
I also think the English speaking world overplays its significance since the ROK Army handled most of the fighting left over that we "bypassed." You are aware that the first units to cross the 38th Parallel were the ROK 3rd and Capital Divisions? ROK II Corps followed two days later and more ROK divisions after that. All ROK divisions but one crossed the parallel before any American units did.

The rapid advance of the ROKs on the right flank turned the Wonsan amphibious landing by the US X Corps into a simple debarkation, as the ROKs had already captured the port and moved ahead. The Capital Division was 50 miles north of Wonsan when General Walker flew into the city.

The drive continued and everything looked to be going the UN's way. Fresh troops - Americans, Turks, Thais, Canadians, Dutch, etc. - were arriving at Pusan daily. The number of KATUSAs per US company was reduced, allowing for the creation of several more ROK divisions. Mopping up operations were commencing for bypassed North Koreans. The ROKs stood on the Yalu.

As near as I can tell, no one underestimated the tactical ability of the Chinese to infiltrate. The main point of the rapid advance was to get established on the river line before that (weather was also a factor). As it was, there was an intelligence failure in not gauging how many Chinese had already crossed the border.

But the main underestimation was political, not realizing that the Chinese would intervene whether we destroyed the North Koreans or not. I think the judgment was that the Chinese would only intervene to save the North Korean Communists, and if we had already destroyed them, there wouldn't be any grounds for Chinese intervention. Hence, as noted, the need for speed.

Given the military situation - the almost complete collapse of North Korean resistance and the designated mission of destroying what was left - and the political situation - Rhee's determination to reunite the peninsula and the belief that Chinese intervention could be deterred if there was nothing on whose behalf to intervene, MacArthur for the most part did exactly what we would expect.

Even with the benefit of all the hindsight we enjoy, I find it difficult to espouse such a harsh judgment as you do.

Regards,
Dave

[Bohr Adam]

Great stuff, gentlemen.

The WWII stuff is especially great for me - since my knowledge of MacArthur in WWII is slim - and it is my reading about the later Korean War that had primarily caused this impression I have developed about the man.

I was not aware of the message from Marshall to MacArthur ordering him to leave the Philippines. This does shed an entirely new light on his intentions. He was amazingly more agreeable to that order then he was others though.

AirborneLawyer, just a few points of contention for discussion here:

1) I can't help but wonder if the observed personal bravery is more the result of zealous pursuit of glory and recognition than bravery in any purer sense.

2) You seem to contradict yourself with MacArthur's strategic intent with value to operational speed as it related to the lives of troops. You mentioned the operations on Leyte and his comment about taking time to save lives. This seems to contradict his strategy with both Incheon AND the "race" to the Yalu. It would be hard to argue that there wasn't the same "the faster we take care of this, the faster we can end the war and more lives saved overall" mentality in WWII as there was in Korea. One major difference was in Leyte his own forces had to control the island, in Korea he could leave the tough and thankless rear area passfication of "bypassed" units to another nation's Army.

3) Regarding ROK forces in the south: No US forces were assigned the "not quite so easy" duties in the "secure rear" area after we cut off most supply flow to south Korea. ROK forces continuously fought insurgents and nastiness for the duration of the war, and on through long after the war (and one could argue that the fight never really ended). Western histories of the war seem to gloss over this area as insignificant, when in reality it was every bit as important to the viability of the Republic as any other - and the fighing wasn't exactly just a walk in the park once the forces were essentially cut off.

4) Regarding ROK forces in the North. I am more than aware that the ROKs were the ones who crossed over in to N. Korea first. I doubt there was anything the UN could have done to stop them. Everything you mention about their march ("race") to the Yalu is as I understand it. However, by you stating it, doesn't that kind of contradict the need for the rest of the allied forces to do the same - given the same motivations and concerns to have Korea reunited as fast as possible that you yourself mention? AFter all, the North Korean Forces were pretty much non-existent form that part on. That is, UNLESS MacArthur didn't want to not be in on part of the glory. Korea retaking Korea for Koreans was not something he seemed too eager to have history talk about.
Perhaps the issue was to use US and other troops to help seal the border on a perimete established at the Yalu. This is a take on the situation I am going to want to read more on.

Again, I didn't go into any research or reading to dislike the guy. I have never read any particularly anti-MacArthur historians (I didn't realize until the post above that there was such readily available scholarship that was so critical of him). After reading a few books on Korea though, he just came off as brash and arrogant - which, while not necessarily a bad thing in warfighter, really seemed to contribute to the Chinese success on their first few offensives - and, as I 2ID alum (one of many division nearly slaughtered as the Eighth Army tried to fight the Chinese) - this is where my "research" started - and thus doesn't help my bias any.

Thanks again for the information provided - this wil help me pursue avanues for additional reading and research.

[JumpmasterK]

General MacArthur is, to say the least, one of the most fascinating characters of military history. I don't personally have any particular reverence or dislike for the General. But, considering the times in which he fought and led, I do believe that we are better off for him having been there. Brash and arrogant? I would say yes, but you have to realize that such a leader would be one of your prototypical Type A personalities. General MacArthur is revered as a hero in South Korea, and has a statue in his honor at Incheon. As for the Incheon landing - I'd say that it was brilliant strategically, but extremely risky, as well. And there WAS a certain degree of good fortune involved that made the operation a success. I'm sure we'd all view the General differently if the Allies had been slaughtered on the beach rather than taking Seoul as they did. As for the later Wonsan landings, I'd have to say that it was an operation that was unnecessary, and a waste of resources. I do not believe that the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division should have been pulled out of ongoing operations simply to cruise around the peninsula in order to conduct another landing. Many historians have categorized this maneuver as the General, high from his Incheon success, wanted to do another great amphibious landing. Although he couldn't know it at the time (or he underestimated the ROK Army), the speed of the ROK advance obviated the need for an east coast amphibious landing. In fact, when the ROK Army progress was revealed, MacArther wanted to move the landing further north to Hamhung, just so he could have his second amphibious landing. Once again, the ROKs moved so quickly that Hamhung was secured before the fleet had a chance to arrive.

3) Regarding ROK forces in the south: No US forces were assigned the "not quite so easy" duties in the "secure rear" area after we cut off most supply flow to south Korea. ROK forces continuously fought insurgents and nastiness for the duration of the war, and on through long after the war (and one could argue that the fight never really ended). Western histories of the war seem to gloss over this area as insignificant, when in reality it was every bit as important to the viability of the Republic as any other - and the fighing wasn't exactly just a walk in the park once the forces were essentially cut off. That was actually one ot the little known major operations of the Korean War. General Paik Sun Yup, the commander of the ROK 1st Infantry Division that captured Pyongyang, was put in command of two ROK Army Divisions that were moved to the south to eradicate a major communist guerrilla hideout in the Chiri Mountains. This element was known as the "Nambu Gundan" (Southern Corps) and consisted of upwards of 30,000 guerrillas that were creating tremendous havoc in the south. Aside from harassing the local populace, they were very detrimental to allied Lines of Communication. In a major move known as "Operation Rat Killer" (2 - 8 December 1951), General Paik's troops essentially eliminated the Nambu Gundan. Subsequent operations either rounded up or killed off most of the remaining communists.4) Regarding ROK forces in the North. I am more than aware that the ROKs were the ones who crossed over in to N. Korea first. I doubt there was anything the UN could have done to stop them. Everything you mention about their march ("race") to the Yalu is as I understand it. However, by you stating it, doesn't that kind of contradict the need for the rest of the allied forces to do the same - given the same motivations and concerns to have Korea reunited as fast as possible that you yourself mention? After all, the North Korean Forces were pretty much non-existent form that part on. That is, UNLESS MacArthur didn't want to not be in on part of the glory. Korea retaking Korea for Koreans was not something he seemed too eager to have history talk about. On that point, I must agree. The ROK Army essentially could have taken North Korea and eliminated the Communist Regime. Had the capture of North Korea been left to the Koreans, China almost certainly would not have intervened, and Korea would have been reunited. Now I'll admit that this is also mostly historical hindsight, and no one can really say what Korea would be like had that happened, but I do believe that it was a mistake for the allied forces to drive north of the 38th parallel.

[Doctor_Doom]

Do you really believe, JumpmasterK, that the ROK forces could have accomplished the reconquest of North Korea? They were a pretty new army with limited abilities, and the North Korean Army was initially quite well equipped. Please expand on this point.

Thanks.

[Bohr Adam]

Originally posted by Doctor_Doom
Do you really believe, JumpmasterK, that the ROK forces could have accomplished the reconquest of North Korea? They were a pretty new army with limited abilities, and the North Korean Army was initially quite well equipped. Please expand on this point.

Thanks.

The North Korean Army actually left in North Korea didn't put up much of a fight. Most of their forces were in South Korea - even the constabulary forces guarding Pyong Yang weren't much resistance. Nobody would have had any reason to believe that even further north we would come across a better fighting nKPA unit - it was clear they were all behind our lines, slowly being destroyed.

GEN Paik is one of my favorite historical figures - and the day I got to meet him is the day I swore I would never go anywhere again without a camera. We need an (Iraqi) man like him in Iraq BADLY. Also, I am prety sure he had stepped up to Command I coprs byu the time they took Pyongyang - I seem to recall him referencing commanding the Capital division as well - though it could have been something about coordinating with them.

My favorite GEN Paik quote (translated, of course): “We are going to turn around and kick the enemy off our ridge, and I shall be at the front. If I turn back, shoot me.”

Finally, the coin from his old I Corps, 50 years after his command of it -

[JumpmasterK]

The ROK Army was underfunded, undertrained and underequipped BEFORE the war. When the war started, they became well trained under fire. I base my observation that they were capable on the ROK 1st Infantry Division under General Paik Sun Yup. You see, the ROK Army was almost purely foot infantry, with little support (armor, artillery, or even trucks on which to move). For the march on Pyongyang, General Paik was supplied with one US company of tanks and one battalion of artillery. The ROK 1st Division at that time was in a "race" with the US 1st Cavalry Division to see who could capture Pyongyang. General Paik's enthusiasm and desire to capture his hometown were key elements in the drive north. He convinved the attached US elements to "shuttle" his division north. The US trucks and vehicles would take on as many ROK soldiers as they could, drive them north, and then return south to pick up more soldiers. They continued this method of operation all the way to Pyongyang. When the ROK 1st Infantry Division entered Pyongyang, they were led by 20 US M-46 tanks. Each tank was covered by exhausted, but enthusiastic ROK soldiers. Those soldiers that didn't catch a ride on the US vehicles continued to march until they reached Pyongyang.

What I am saying is that the ROK Army could very well have been equipped so as to resemble a US Infantry Division. They could quickly have overrun the north. Even if they hadn't, though, their will and desire would have carried them to the Yalu and to the elimination of the Communists. One quote from General Paik is quite telling, after crossing the 38th parallel. "The problem wasn't the NKPA. The enemy resisted as stubbornly as always, to be sure, but the former excellence wasn't there. A high percentage of the NKPA formations were composed of inexperienced reinforcements who were brought in as fillers after main-force units had suffered terrible casualties in the fighting in the south. Our problem was sheer distance." Had the ROK units been properly equipped, there is no question in my mind that they could have taken the north without the US having to cross the 38th parallel.

[intell106]

While we are on the subject of Gen. Douglas MacArthur..........

Gen. Douglas MacArthur is entombed with his wife at the Douglas MacArthur Memorial in downtown Norfolk, VA, USA.

The memorial shrine includes displays of the different battle histories and lite maps. It has a display of the signing of the Instrument of surrender of Japan on the Missouri (USA Ship). There are also diplays of his honors and medals.
Many of the gifts he and Mrs. MacArthur received from their travels are on display, too.
His staff car can be viewed in another building. This is the gift shop area of the momerial.
Another building is were you can view movies of the MacArthur history and dedication of the MacArthur Momerial Shrine in Norfolk, VA


Reference to resarch material:
My request for materail at the

questia.com
WWII -

Book: "The Defeat of Japan", by David Rees;
Praeger Publishers, 1997

see: Chapter 14, p.163 of 219, The Emperor Seeks Peace, The New Situation.

see: The Epiloque-Meeting With MacArthur, p. 195 of 219
(This is about MacArthur and the signing of the Instrument of the surrender of Japan, on the Missouri in 1945.)

This was just one source of many.

Intell106

[007]

Let's not forget when he accepted the surrender of Japanese forces, he set the tone for a friendly relationship with Japan, and really helped in the rebuilding process of that country.

Plus, he gave what is in my mind the greatest speech of all time :) You know, the one he gave to the USMA Corps of Cadets in 1962....

"Duty, Honor, Country...these three words reverently dictate what you can be, what you ought to be, and what you will be."

[KJ]

I live in the Philippines. The road outside my house is called "MacArthur Highway". It runs the length of Luzon. It is the only road/highway in the Philippines that I know of that was NOT renamed by the filippino's after the Americans left. Even Clark AB here has been renamed Diosdado Macapagal International Airport (DMIA) after Pres. Arroyo's father.

You say you have done an intensive study of MacArthur and yet you did not know he was ordered by the President to leave the Philippines? Study harder.

[Doctor_Doom]

Originally posted by JumpmasterK
Had the ROK units been properly equipped, there is no question in my mind that they could have taken the north without the US having to cross the 38th parallel.

Wow this thread got resucitated...

This is assuming that China doesn't send "volunteers" to bolster the NKPA, right? Also, do you think that ROK could have fielded enogh men to make up for losses and to cover the distance required? ROK strength in pure numbers was low, and the drop off in effectiveness from the 1st ROK is pretty steep...

Thanks.

[SgtUSMC8541]

My main ideas on MacArthur are that he had an ego the size of Asia. He did an amazing job and perhaps we would not have done as well in the Pacific during WWII or Korea without him. But he still lived in a bit of a fantasy world. His surrounding staff would never contradict him. If he said something then it was true. (No Chinese in Korea, no guerilla operations in the Philippines Etc.) As far as he was concerned, even the President of the United States took a second seat to him. Look, without a doubt he was a military genius and as I said before, we might not have gotten done what we needed to in Korea without him.

My main problem is the Marines in the Philippines during WWII. He did not award the 4th Marines because they already had enough awards, or something to that effect. I am sure that someone here will be able to find the quote.

Anyway, just my two farthings.

[SGTROCK]

Originally posted by SgtUSMC8541

My main problem is the Marines in the Philippines during WWII. He did not award the 4th Marines because they already had enough awards, or something to that effect. I am sure that someone here will be able to find the quote.

Anyway, just my two farthings. He didnt like Marines!

ROCK

P.S. I dont like Marines either just the one's on SOCNET!!
Frog you still count as a Marine whether you admit it or not!!:D

[JumpmasterK]

Originally posted by Doctor_Doom
Wow this thread got resucitated...

This is assuming that China doesn't send "volunteers" to bolster the NKPA, right? Also, do you think that ROK could have fielded enogh men to make up for losses and to cover the distance required? ROK strength in pure numbers was low, and the drop off in effectiveness from the 1st ROK is pretty steep...

Thanks. Good questions. I would like to first address this by saying that, so often mis-stated, that hindsight is NOT 20/20. What I say is only speculation based on my research of the events that took place at the time. The Chinese volunteers were sent in because there was a direct foreign (UN) threat to their border. Their concern was about the UN forces, and particularly about General McArthur. He made no secret of the fact that he didn't like the Communists, and Beijing (then Peking) must have understood the direct threat, as they proclaimed when they sent a message through the Indian Embassy that they would forego intervention if UN forces did not cross the 38th Parallel. I believe that their unstated message to the UN (and General McArthur) was that crossing the parallel would result in the intervention of the Chinese People's Volunteers. No crossing, no intervention. The Chinese were forced to intervene because of the crossing of the parallel. They didn't want to commit such a large force because of the situation they were in: The Chinese Civil War was not over, because they were still planning the invasion of Formosa (Taiwan). The UN forced them to abandon the attempt to eliminate the Chinese Nationalists (Chaing Kai Shek on Taiwan). They felt that it was in their best interests to intervene in Korea in order to preserve the victory they had spent years and lives earning. Given the situation at the time, I believe that they would much rather have not had to go into Korea at all.

Then there was the situation in Korea itself; the North Korean People's Army had been shattered. There were probably no cohesive units above the Regiment level, if even that high of echelon. In North Korea proper, probably 60 - 70% of the populace didn't want to be Communist, so that would have made the ROK's job easier. As for the ROK combat formations, imagine that the divisions that they had were fully equipped by the UN (read: US) units that paused at the 38th Parallel. Armor, artillery, transportation and logistical assets. The ROK Army at the time was manned sufficiently, and would have been able to recruit the required manpower to take the north. At that point capturing Pyongyang would have been the death blow to Kim Il Sung's regime, and the remaining pockets of resistance could have been eliminated.

As I stated, this is only my speculation, but a very probable scenario. Also, as I stated, hindsight is NOT 20/20.

[Doctor_Doom]

Interesting speculation JumpmasterK, thank you for taking the time to answer my questions.

[JSOCMarine]

"My main problem is the Marines in the Philippines during WWII. He did not award the 4th Marines because they already had enough awards, or something to that effect. I am sure that someone here will be able to find the quote."


MacArthur will go down in history as a military icon, and in my opinion, rightfully so. His beef with the Marine Corps stemmed from France in WWI. The Marine Corps of that era was simply a tiny, little known branch of the American military when Marine units were sent to France.

The bottom line is that Marine units were involved in a few of the more memorable battles and they performed well. A few American reporters "adopted" the Marines and wrote profusely of their actions, sometimes inferring that other military units in France were not the equal of the Marines. Naturally, members of the others units took umbrage at the glorification of the Marines at the expense of others who had also fought hard, and I cannot say that I can blame them.

The press reports of the battle of Belleau Wood in particular, were extremely complimentary of the Marines courage when they charged across wheat fields covered by scores of mutually supporting German machineguns, reached the other side and killed hundreds of Germans with point blank shooting and bayonets. The French government honored the Marines by renaming the area, "The Woods of the Marine Brigade", which it is still called to this day. This story was big news back in the States, and from that point onward, Americans were aware of the fact that the nation had something called the Marine Corps.

I have actually walked the Belleau Woods wheat fields during a battle study, and we knew the exact position of the German guns, the routes the Marines took across the open fields, etc. Suffice it to say that I was awed as I stood there looking across the fields wondering what went through the minds of these guys as they stood up and began running toward the Germans. I could only conclude that most, if not all of the Marines believed that they'd never make it to the far side of the fields alive and they resigned themselves to keep moving forward in the attack until they were killed. Many of them were killed, but enough made it across to raise a whole lot of hell in the treeline!

The press also made a big deal out of Marine marksmanship ability during this battle. This battle saw Marine infantrymen killing Germans at distances of several hundred yards with '03 Springfields and iron sights. This was relatively unheard of at the time, since most military forces of the world usually considered 200 yards or so as the maximum distance one could reasonably expect marksmen to hit man sized targets with stock rifles equipped with iron sights. Both the press and the Germans took notice of this "new" type of shooting, which again resulted in accolades for the Marines. This was literally the beginning of the Marine Corps' reputation as skilled marksmen.

Now back to MacArthur.

As a result of their actions during this battle, a good number of Marines were decorated with the Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross and French awards for valor. This was the issue that rubbed MacArthur the wrong way. For whatever reason, he believed that the Army did not get their due for its performance in this battle (in the form of press coverage and medals) and he actually stated during World War II that he "did not want to see the Marines 'overdecorated' as they had been during WWI".

(See many of the citations here) (http://combatleadership.com/Heroes.asp)

In time, Mac Arthur seemed to let bygones be bygones and he actually became a big fan of the Corps.

I have read quite a bit about his life, and while he certainly had his faults (as do we all), I rate him as one of the better field Generals that America has produced. I especially like to read or listen to a recording of his final address to the West Point Corps Of Cadets. If you have read or heard this great speech, I'd recommend you take the time to do so.

Address To The Corps Of Cadets (http://www.west-point.org/real/macarthur_address.html)

His words are powerful and his message to the young warriors is timeless. I still get goosebumps when I read this part;

"You are the leaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense. From your ranks come the great captains who hold the nation's destiny in their hands the moment the war tocsin sounds. The Long Gray Line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses thundering those magic words - Duty - Honor - Country."

Semper Fi, General.

[007]

Originally posted by JSOCMarine
[B
Semper Fi, General. [/B]


Good post sir :)

[Bravo Five Romeo]

I have to big friggin gripes about MacArthur. Two things he did that forever soil his image.

1. Leading the attack on the Bonus Army in Washington DC in May 1932.

2. Publicly speaking out against President Truman.

Now let me clarify for the uninformed.
At the end of World War One, returning veterans were given a cash bonus certificate to be paid at a later date. Over a decade later, and with the country in a depression leaving many veterans poor and hungry, over 10,000 veterans marched on Washington and set up camp to stage a peaceful protest to demand payment of their promised bonuses. They were called the bonus Army. The protests were an embarassment to the Hoover administration. General MacArthur was dispatched with the Army (I believe it was a full brigade) to simply support the police. MacArthur disregarded Hoover's orders of simple unarmed support. MacArthur charged the veteran's campgrounds, wounding 300 men and burned the camp to the ground.

Disobeying Presidential orders and attacking veterans... not cool. Apparently disregarding the orders of a President was something that was okay for Mac... he did it again to Truman... only worse.

MacArthur wanted to press the Korean War on into China. Truman said no. MacArthur continued to insist on expanding the war and even publicly spoke out against Truman and pushed his war plan directly to the American people to the press. This is unforgivable. Whether you believe that MacArthur's war plan was right or wrong you must all agree to this one principle (especially anyone reading this that has ever served) THE MILITARY DOES NOT MAKE POLICY. That is why we have a democracy run by a civillian authority, not a military Junta. This is the United States, not Chiile or Argentina. An active duty general can not try to force policy on the President. An active duty general does not push for a war to the press and the public, especially when told specificly not to do so by the goddamn president. That our military answers to a civillian authority is one of the things that makes our military so great. To try to change that is almost treasonous. MacArthur might as well have been tearing up the constitution when he did what he did.

Imagine if today, General Tommy Franks spoke out against the president and insisted on expanding the war in Iraq to Syria and Iran to stop the flow of resistance fighters. Imagine if then the president told him no and ordered him to stop speaking to reporters about invading other countries. Imagine if then Gen. Franks disobeyed the president and appealed directly to the American people at press conferences he put together. Hard to imagine actually happening. American hero MacArthur did it.

Oh yeah... MacArthur also went to the press and the people because he disagreed with Truman and wanted the freedom to use atomic weapons at his choosing.