Civil affairs out of Special Ops?

[Drake]

I'm new to this board even though I've been reading these postings for almost 2 years. I'm currently interested in either a reserve civil affairs or psyop position after active duty. I've been going back and forth on which one to pursue for the last year and a half.

Anyhow, I read an article posted in the early bird Sunday that Secretary Rumsfeld wants to move civil affairs out of Special Operations Command. Any thoughts on this move?

The article...

Army Contests Rumsfeld Bid On Occupation

Special Operations Would Lose Cadre of Nation-Building Civil Affairs Troops

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Army is engaged in a bureaucratic brawl with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld over how to organize troops for "nation-building," a growing problem for the military as it settles in for lengthy occupations in Iraq, Afghanistan and possibly other countries.

Rumsfeld wants to shift thousands of civil affairs troops from the Special Operations Command to the regular Army on the theory that the service needs to do better at security and stabilization. This comes as he is pushing other components of the elite Special Operations Command -- such as Navy SEALs and the Army Delta Force -- to focus on aggressive actions against terrorists and other missions.

Officers specializing in civil affairs -- which helps establish local governments in occupied areas, oversees humanitarian assistance and coordinates military activities with aid organizations -- say they oppose the move. They say many officers believe, based in part on their experience in Iraq, that regular combat commanders do not understand their work and do not know how to use them well.

"This is a huge change," said retired Army Col. Michael Hess, who remains active in civil affairs issues and who said he has concerns about it.

The proposed reorganization is the latest issue over which the strong-minded defense secretary has tangled with the Army, which is the largest of the services, the one most enmeshed in Iraq, and the one that most consistently feels misunderstood. Over the last two years, the Army saw its chief of staff publicly rebuked by civilian leaders over the number of troops that would be required to occupy Iraq, and then, after the spring 2003 invasion, saw the firing of the Army secretary.

The reorganization also touches on the sensitive issue of the changing role of Special Operations forces since Sept. 11, 2001. Some Special Operations officers feel that under Rumsfeld, short-term "direct action" missions to kill or capture enemies are being overemphasized to the neglect of less dramatic long-term missions, such as training foreign militaries or winning hearts and minds with aid projects. They maintain that those less dramatic missions are sometimes more important. One example, they say, is Iraq, where the U.S. exit strategy turns on training local security forces, an endeavor that has hit frequent bumps.

In recent years, said Robert Andrews, a former official in the Pentagon office overseeing Special Operations, "Our Army Special Forces have been focusing on direct action -- killing or capturing HVTs" -- that is, the "high-value targets" who are key figures in terrorist organizations and Saddam Hussein's deposed regime.

Rumsfeld "wants the SOCOM [Special Operations Command] guys to focus more on kinetic stuff," agreed one civil affairs commander who recently returned from Iraq. Like every other active-duty civil affairs officer interviewed for this article, he declined to be identified because he fears being punished. "The CA [civil affairs] community is really concerned" about the proposed change, he added. "One hundred percent, we want to stay in the Special Operations community."

Historically, civil affairs has been something of a backwater for the military. But since the end of the Cold War, it has served an increasingly prominent role, most notably in peacekeeping and relief operations in northern Iraq in 1991, in Bosnia and Kosovo later in the 1990s and across Iraq and Afghanistan over the past three years. Most recently, civil affairs soldiers have been deployed to Southeast Asia for tsunami relief.

Some civil affairs officers interviewed for this article said they fear Rumsfeld's desire to move them out of Special Operations will only accelerate the trend toward emphasizing Special Operations attack missions. "From my perspective, he's never liked nation-building," said Hess, who helped run such missions in northern Iraq and in Bosnia. He worries that the proposed transfer would "dilute" the effect of civil affairs work.

Rumsfeld has been pushing the Army on the Special Operations reorganization issue for a full year, having first issued a "Snowflake" -- the Pentagon term for the short memos he issues by the score to prod the defense bureaucracy -- to Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Jan. 12, 2004, asking him to consider making the move. He queried top generals again in March, when Rumsfeld argued that the transfer of civil affairs units would help focus the Army more on handling missions such as the occupation of Iraq.

"My impression is that we ought to give careful thought to moving it over to the regular Army, so that the regular Army interests itself in that subject and so the transitions from combat to post-combat stabilization can be relatively seamless," the defense secretary wrote, according to a slide titled "SECDEF Rumsfeld Snowflakes" that was contained in an internal Army briefing given in December.

Last April, Rumsfeld wondered about the delay in acting. "Is it getting on my schedule?" he asked in a Snowflake, the briefing notes.

Finally, on Oct. 29, Rumsfeld wrote to Myers with apparent dissatisfaction at the pace of change. "What is taking so long in deciding where Civil Affairs ought to be located?" he asked. "If they don't agree I want it kicked up to me and I will figure it out. Let's get it moving."

The answer to Rumsfeld's question comes just two slides later in the Army briefing: The Army opposes the move.

That is because an Army panel that studied the issue concluded that "CA and PSYOP [psychological operations] forces can best support Army operations by remaining under USASOC," the Army's Special Operations Command, which also includes the Green Berets, the quasi-secret Delta Force, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Notes attached to the PowerPoint briefing summarize the Army's opposition to Rumsfeld on the issue: "Any reassignment of forces will undermine the systems and relationships carefully developed between the Army and the United States Special Operations Command since the mid-1980s. This would not be wise, given our involvement in current operations and the Global War on Terrorism."

The Civil Affairs Association, an affiliation of about 3,000 current and former civil affairs officers, sent the Army a private statement arguing against the move on largely the same grounds.

As one civil affairs lieutenant colonel summarized the situation, the Army is having a hard time resolving the issue with Rumsfeld "because we're not giving him the answer he wants."

The major fear among his peers, another civil affairs officer said, is that the contemplated move would leave those units under the control of combat, or "maneuver," leaders who have not been trained in how to employ them. "You'd put the CA assets in the hands of maneuver commanders who don't want to do the touchy-feely stuff and don't understand it," he said.

At the same time, another officer said, having civil affairs in Special Operations has never been a great fit, either. "We do not, after all, fit the mold of steely-eyed killers," he said. "We are supposed to be language and cultural experts."

Rumsfeld's office referred questions to a relatively low-ranking spokesman, Maj. Paul Swiergosz. He declined to comment, saying, "It would be inappropriate to discuss this concept while it is pre-decisional." A spokesman for the Army Special Operations Command also declined to comment.

[SN]

Bad move if it happens.

SECDEF will win in the end, but it will be interesting to see conventional commanders have to deal with CA issues, a real shifting of gears. I also want to see how many folks the conventional army sends to language school, another importent skill.

[Boxcar]

I think this is a really interesting topic, hope there are a lot of comments on it.

[TPD1280]

One question that is unanswered in this is the status of PSYOP in all of this.

There has been, and continues to be, rumblings of splitting USACAPOC. That is, separating CA and PSYOP.

This issue is very important to those in PSYOP, as we are continually lumped in with CA because we wear the same patch and fall under the same subordinate command within ASOC.

I agree that moving CA out of ASOC would be detrimental to the overall mission of CA. USACAPOC elements are already at a disadvantage being slice elements to maneuver elements. As slices we have to fight very hard to get any thing from our "supported units".

SF teams provide a CA function, albeit on a smaller scale, when they establish a base camp and form CIDG teams and Mike Forces. They address the humaintarian needs of the indigent population in an effort to recruit the manpower they need. CA just does it on a much larger scale. So the precendent for CA under SOF is well established.

Conventional maneuver unit Commanders have their eyes focused firmly on whatever combat mission is at hand, and rightly so. But they focus exclusively on this, with blinders to anything else. It takes quite a bit to get them to understand the effectiveness of multipliers such as CA and PSYOP.

PSYOP has it a little easier because we conduct our missions in concert with the combat maneuver, and then shift gears afterwards for SASO activity. Explaining to the Combatant Commander that we are going to conduct direct surrender appeals, with the goal of reducing the number of enemy soldiers shooting at your boys, or civilian non-interference broadcasts to keep non-combatants out of your way is an easy sell.

CA, typically, comes in afterwards to "secure the peace". They do not directly add to the immediate and tangible combat effectiveness of a maneuver unit. But this is short sighted. CA efforts do ensure that the maneuver commander doesn't have to come back and fight for the same ground again.

Because of this short-sightedness, moving CA out of SOF and into the realm of the conventional would effectively geld their efforts.

PSYOP has had the advantage recently in that one of the evaluations focuses at JRTC and NTC has been the effective use of PSYOP. This has also been pushed at advanced Officer schooling. The same should be done to promote CA and their capabilities as a combat multiplier in support of the conventional Army.

there's my rambling $0.02

[ilots]

Originally posted by TPD1280
[B]One question that is unanswered in this is the status of PSYOP in all of this.

There has been, and continues to be, rumblings of splitting USACAPOC. That is, separating CA and PSYOP.

This issue is very important to those in PSYOP, as we are continually lumped in with CA because we wear the same patch and fall under the same subordinate command within ASOC.

not rumblings - happenings. PSYOP is headed the opposite direction of CA and will finally step out from it's umbrella. Good by CAPOC, hello 2 star.

[Doogie320]

CA seems to be doing well here in the Stan, not just in the mission but in integrating with conventional forces. Is that an aberration? Am I seeing the end results at the FOBs and not the in-fighting at the JOC level? Maybe, I don't know.

A comparison between CA units in Iraq vs. the Stan and their interaction with conventional units would be interesting. I wonder if there's tension in Iq driving this move?

[PSYOP ROB]

Originally posted by ilots
not rumblings - happenings. PSYOP is headed the opposite direction of CA and will finally step out from it's umbrella. Good by CAPOC, hello 2 star. Where are you getting this from? Sounds great if it happens, if you have a link or a report that discusses this I would be very interested in seeing it.

[TPD1280]

ditto.

I have heard the rumblings for a couple of years, but never seen any thing that could be construed as a substantial step.

I also heard today that PSYOP is supposedly included in move out of ASOC. Still seeking more info.

[PsyGuy]

TPD1280, PM inbound.

[Bailaviborita]

I would have to agree that moving CA out of ASOC would be bad. However, I would also opine that having CA under ASOC in the past was bad, too. Having them under regular guys would possibly hurt them resource-wise, but would get regulars more integrated with them and know how to handle them when they work with them/ command them overseas.

Having them under SOC I would think (correct me if I'm wrong)leave them estranged from conventional to the point that no-one knows what to do with them or how to use them. SOC operations guys do a bad job (IMHO) of integrating them- don't know if conventional would do worse. I personally think that the entire Army (actually, DoD and Executive Branch too) needs to become more unconventionally oriented- so getting CA into the regular side might actually do more in that direction.

As for Psyop- I think they need to stay, be expanded, and forced onto conventional commanders as a requirement instead of an afterthought.

[TPD1280]

As for Psyop- I think they need to stay, be expanded, and forced onto conventional commanders as a requirement instead of an afterthought.

They are, see the tail end of my above post. Conventional Commanders are actually dinged at JRTC if they do not integrate PSYOP into their war-planning and maneuver. Same thing at the Advanced Course and CAS3.

CA however is ignored in most of this because their actions are an after-thought to combat maneuver, which is usually where the focus of the training ends. Maneuver elements train for war, not for its aftermath. It's a wheel we have had to reinvent every single time.

Where current schooling and warfighter exercises fall short on the PSYOP side is that Commanders focus solely on the loudspeaker side of PSYOP and forget that the definition of Psychological Operations is a coordinated campaign of actions, inactions, and messages designed to bring about a desired response from a target audience. The PSYACT is ignored unless it is a deception op (feint) planned by a higher maneuver commander to divert attention from the main attack. This is not to imply that PSYOP is the be-all, end-all, but PSYOP has not been used to its fullest capabilities.

It will be harder to decentralize PSYOP (which is what will happen by moving from ASOC to FORSCOM) since the themes, symbols, and scripts are approved at a Theater level. Local Commanders, even at Division level cannot simply create their own messages, themes, or symbols as this may contradict wider campaigns.

[Bailaviborita]

Originally posted by TPD1280
The PSYACT is ignored unless it is a deception op (feint) planned by a higher maneuver commander to divert attention from the main attack. This is not to imply that PSYOP is the be-all, end-all, but PSYOP has not been used to its fullest capabilities.

It will be harder to decentralize PSYOP (which is what will happen by moving from ASOC to FORSCOM) since the themes, symbols, and scripts are approved at a Theater level. Local Commanders, even at Division level cannot simply create their own messages, themes, or symbols as this may contradict wider campaigns.

That is interesting. I would say that we fall woefully short in the psyop arena. Madison Avenue can get fat people to continue to eat at McD's- but we can't get Moslems to stop blowing each other up. Al Jazeera does a much better job. We should empower Psyop to do more, take chances, and think unconventionally. All that centralization is bad IMHO. Generals rarely have good ideas sitting at Bragg in my experience. The best ideas come from the guys on the ground. Psyop could be so much more- but generals in ASOC would have to take risks and the Pentagon would have to put same effort as the "Army of One" drive into psyop.

[TPD1280]

The best ideas come from the guys on the ground. Psyop could be so much more

I could not agree more. The biggest stumbling block to this comes from within unfortunately. Many O's are so afraid for their OER's that they are unwilling to take any risk whatsoever. Lingering zero-defect mentality. So they continue to recreate the same wheel, knowing that they won't have to go out on any limbs if they are rehashing a previously approved product.

We saw some of our biggest successes when we got out of the business of being heavily armed paperboys.

While I was in Bosnia, there was a town called Derventa that was staunchly Serb. They didn't want to be Republika Srpska, they wanted to be part of greater Serbia.

Try as we may, we could not get to these people. Until we started teaching Landmine awareness classes in the school. After several weeks of negotiations, and overcoming a lot of suspicion, once the people of Derventa saw that we were not preaching any SFOR/Dayton/political stuff, that the class was simply how not to get blown up 101 for their children we began to win them over.

It was an underhanded approach, going through their children, but we eventually did win over a Serb stronghold. (not completely underhanded, we really did want to do something to keep the kids safe, and Mine awareness was an approved theme). After that the people were much more open to discussions of the messages that SFOR wanted to get out to the RS.

It took some creative thinking, and a little going out on a limb by a LT.

The SME's in any psyop situation should be (and in most cases are) the TPT's. They are the boots on the ground, the guys who are in daily contact with the target audience, refining the TAA, learning things that the Country Study missed, and figuring out what will work in what situation with what target audience. Effective methods in Iraq can change just by moving a few blocks. What works in Sadr city doesn't necessarily work in Sava Nissan.

[Bailaviborita]

Originally posted by TPD1280

We saw some of our biggest successes when we got out of the business of being heavily armed paperboys.

Until we started teaching Landmine awareness classes in the school. After several weeks of negotiations, and overcoming a lot of suspicion, once the people of Derventa saw that we were not preaching any SFOR/Dayton/political stuff,

It took some creative thinking, and a little going out on a limb by a LT.

The SME's in any psyop situation should be (and in most cases are) the TPT's. They are the boots on the ground, the guys who are in daily contact with the target audience, refining the TAA, learning things that the Country Study missed, and figuring out what will work in what situation with what target audience. Effective methods in Iraq can change just by moving a few blocks. What works in Sadr city doesn't necessarily work in Sava Nissan.

Great points, all. I've often thought that Reserves was best for Psyop to overcome the political/ OER/ and zero mistakes mentality you mention- but have heard and seen of idiot officers in their ranks too. Too many layers between national policy and guys on ground IMHO (read- too many generals and OER's). But- press and partisan politicians help that along by blowing any and all mistakes up into a national emergency.

I sat in on a meeting once where a general at Bragg asked why we just didn't find out where "their" families were and kill them! The solutions being tossed around before that comment were how best to train and equip our guys so they can do the missions they were already doing. A good example of a general in the rear with the gear trying to put his hand somewhere it didn't belong...

[psyopranger]

Late to the party but I'll add my two cents:

I have heard the same rumors. We also heard that the reserve side who go back to the big army and 4th POG and 96 CA would stay under USASOC.

PSYOP really needs a 2 Star billet to compete with the heirarchy mess. In Iraq we had a LTC reporting directly to CENTCOM but, the MNF-I commander was a 4 star??

Plus, the whole IO mess is out of control. IO was running wild in Iraq putting out products without an approval process, etc.

I think we are taking the steps to prove ourselves as a vital asset in the SOF community. As it has been stated earlier, many O's don't understand our capabilities or use them incorrectly.

Recently, we are starting to work on more cutting edge, new technology products. This is the future and Gen. Brown is listening. I am engaged in a product that will start this evolution.

For the first time, the restrictions are being lifted and we are able to develop a product that uses the most effective influence factors available.

No more: Don't talk about relegion, don't use that theme.

As I was told by the DC of 4th POG, we are bringing PSYOP into the year 2005. Leaflets and loudspeakers are WWII relects.

The Internet, Satellite Radio, Email, Video Games, Directed Text Messaging - These are the future.

I like the idea of 4th POG and 96 CA staying in USASOC and the RC leaving. It would finally free up some cash so we can outfit our units properly and get the product development capabilites into the 21st Century.

Just some thoughts.

[TPD1280]

Psyopranger, glad to hear from you again. I was beginning to think you didn't love us anymore (or that the Grinch got you hurt):D

Glad to hear that there is some new thinking going on about choice of media.

I have said for a long time that we could get better speakers for much cheaper by going to Car Toys.

As for moving RC PSYOP to FORSCOM, I would agree with using the RC exclusively to support conventional units, but still being under the Command umbrella of ASOC.

If you think things are screwed up right now, wait till you see what happens once things get decentralized to the point that every Brigade Commander has his own organic TPD, completely under his control. A prime example of what will happen is exactly what happened with IO doing their own thing.

Using 4POG and 96CA for ASOC support and the RC for FORSCOM support makes good sense, but splitting PSYOP up, and moving it out of ASOC will be counterproductive, and in the long run could be the undoing of PSYOP.

Last thing I want to see is PSYOP return to being an additional duty in MI.

[Jawbreaker1]

I recently read the article about CA being removed from ARSOF. I am currently a CAT-A leader operating in Baghdad. Here is my take on this issue.

I was drawn to CA after being one of the tens of thousands of Reservists and Guardsmen who were mobed for the beginning of OIF I, and then demobed months later without ever stepping foot out of the U.S. I was an Army engineer in a former life, and when I was mobed in early 2003, I was the engineer officer for an MP EPW brigade.

There was a CA unit at Fort Dix, my MOB site, and as I was demobing, one of my fellow captains convinced me to go and meet with them. As soon as I heard the CA story, I wished I had joined them 5 years earlier.

What got my attention was the small team concept, the good budget for training, and the wide array of missions that the unit participated in. When I joined my unit, they were already deployed for OIF I, so I wound up training with the rear det and all of the other newcomers. Once we finished our schools, etc., we were cross leveled to units mobing for OIF III.

After reading the article about CA being split from ARSOF, and after spending 5 months in Iraq, I started to ask myself questions. Why is it important for us to be part of SOF? Would it be better if we were part of the Big Army? What is CA really doing here...what is our value added to this operation?

I think it is important for CA to remain part of SOF. I have trained my guys to act as a team and to be able to fend for ourselves. We do our missions as a team and my guys give me crap if I ever go off and do my own thing, even when I hitch a ride with one of the maneuver guys so my boys can spend a day at the FOB. We even make special trips to BIAP to drop off and pick up eachother from leave. It's our SOP. Rely on one another and no one else. To me, that is part of what makes Special Operations "special". Also, being SOF gives my guys a pride and espirit de corps that goes a long way to keep them motivated.

I was part of the Reserve system for over 15 years, and I know that while the soldiers are great, if you are not high on the priority list, you get screwed when it comes to training, equipment, etc. It was nice coming to CA and seeing that they have a good budget and they get their people trained. If we get sucked into the Big Army Reserve system, I fear that much of that will fall by the wayside, and we will be just another line item on some massive spreadsheet, eeking our way through the mire.

As far as what CA is doing over here, well that's a big question for me that I am far from answering. Being new, I tried to speak to as many CA guys as I could about what our missions are, what we do and what to expect from Iraq. It has all blurred into some awful myriad.

Much depends on where you get deployed. Before I mobed I got to speak with some folks who were just getting back from OIF I. They were up north with the Kurds, and they told me how great it was. I guess the CA BN was a land owning unit, and they worked in conjunction with a BN of local Peshmerga militiamen. Each team had two Pesh assigned as part of the team, and they had tons of money to do what they needed to for their AOR. One LT told me that "autonomy" was the operative term, and you could get as much of it as you could grab.

Another variable is when you get here. This is now a "mature theater", so we now have to deal with the cantonement mentality that the regular Army loves. God forbid one of us walks around with our sleeves cuffed or a micro-lite clipped to our DCU tops!

Being a mature theater also means that the money is controlled way up the food chain, and that there are plenty of staff weenies who run around like "good idea fairies" sprinkling down their pearls of wisdom on us. We spend a lot of time and money on doing silly projects at the whim of someone who has probably never stepped out into the cesspool (literally) that is Iraq. Why focus on soccer fileds and playgrounds when we could really hit their water and sewage nets?

The bottom line is that the money strings are held tightly, way up the food chain. We have some input into what projects get done, but it would be nice if we had our own budget to spend within the CA channels.

Lastly, who you get assigned to is another factor. My team was fortunate enough to be assigned to a National Guard infantry unit. At least they understood the concept of the "part time soldier" and they have been less apt to jump on every stupid mandate that comes down the pipe.

What it has also meant is that we work with people who have civilian jobs on the outside. As the BC told me during my initial meeting with him, all of his soldiers could do CMO at some level. That made me have to ask, "what the hell are we gonna do here?"

What we wind up doing is working a lot of projects, from school renovations to water networks. I work closely with a maneuver 1LT who is the Pay Agent/Project Manager. Its a good relationship, but it detracts from where I see us doing more good. It seems to me that engineering projects should be handled by engineers. CA can work with the local leaders to develop and refine ideas, and then let the engineers run them, but instead, we wind up becoming the project managers. Meanwhile, my buddies from my engineer days are doing FOB maintenance. What a waste!

I would love to able to spend most of my time working with the local neighborhood councils and getting to know them and their communities inside and out. By getting deep into their affairs, we could offer valuable insight to the maneuver commanders as to what the pulse of the community is. This is vital in a theater that is basically fighting an insurgency. If the local populace can be wooed or bought off to come to our side, the bad guys would find themselves without a support system. But we need time and money to do this.

I know peers of mine who wind up doing nothing but projects. Everything from surveying roads to providing the plans to the contractor and supervising the work. To me this is an assinine waste of CA assets. But he is stuck because the manuever commander wants him to do it. At least my team gets to meet with local councils and work on other issues beyond construction projects.

I guess what I attribute this all to is a lack of unconventional thinking on the part of the CA hierarchy. We come over here as a group, and then get kicked to the maneuver guys with little or no support or guidance from above, unless it is from my commander who is forced to wait at BDE and follow up on all the "good idea fairy" droppings.

Instead, CA leadership at all levels should be working with their superiors and subordinates to build a concise, cohesive CMO picture for this theater, and then work on ways to improve that picture and provide this insight to the maneuver commanders. They can go do their raids and security patrols, which are very important, but we need to be the ones to develop the ideas and spend money on CMO. Instead of being owned by the maneuver unit, we should be on loan to them. The problem is that our leadership don't think outside the box like we CA operators are supposed to. We have sold out to the regular Army and now they want to own us.

When you boil it down, what does a person who has spent years on an Army post know about much of anything outside the gate? Not to slight anyone, but not a whole lot. That's why the Reserve component of CA is supposed to be so "special". we all have other jobs and a vast array of experiences. Given the autonomy, lattitude and money we can execute some awesome effects.

That is why CA is vital to this new era of warfare, and why we need to an integral part of SOF. Nation building in the midst of an insurgency is about as far from the conventional Army's capabilities as possible. And they want to drag CA into that arena.

I saw an email from an SF COL who was writing to some of his former students. He was addressing a number of issues that came up in the SF community early in OIF. His first bullet was about CMO, and his comment was that there is no plan for it. He stated that this will be a 10 year war fought one year at a time.

He is right.

Jawbreaker1 out.

[psyopranger]

Psyopranger, glad to hear from you again. I was beginning to think you didn't love us anymore (or that the Grinch got you hurt)

No. I'm still alive and kicking. Back a Bragg for a few months then back over to work with the Spooky Boys. Grench is finishing his tour next month haven't heard from him in a few months.

I think he got lost in "Staff Working Group" land.

Stay Safe,

PR

[Bailaviborita]

Originally posted by Jawbreaker1

Instead, CA leadership at all levels should be working with their superiors and subordinates to build a concise, cohesive CMO picture for this theater, and then work on ways to improve that picture and provide this insight to the maneuver commanders. They can go do their raids and security patrols, which are very important, but we need to be the ones to develop the ideas and spend money on CMO. Instead of being owned by the maneuver unit, we should be on loan to them. The problem is that our leadership don't think outside the box like we CA operators are supposed to. We have sold out to the regular Army and now they want to own us.

When you boil it down, what does a person who has spent years on an Army post know about much of anything outside the gate? Not to slight anyone, but not a whole lot. That's why the Reserve component of CA is supposed to be so "special". we all have other jobs and a vast array of experiences. Given the autonomy, lattitude and money we can execute some awesome effects.

That is why CA is vital to this new era of warfare, and why we need to an integral part of SOF. Nation building in the midst of an insurgency is about as far from the conventional Army's capabilities as possible. And they want to drag CA into that arena.



I see from the guys on the ground that the right way wouldn't be to take them out of ARSOF. I'd have to agree with you, too- that the cantonment idea is killing us- why a firebase mentality is ever forced on SOF is beyond me.

What about this idea: making conventional guys attached to SOF? Counterinsurgency shouldn't be run by guys who have trained mainly for knocking out a tank battalion IMHO. SOF runs the show- CA if that's what your area needs, and when you need the cavalry- you call the boys up, give them your intent, and they whup the bad guys. Then they can go home back to the firebase while you dress like the locals, eat their food, live with them, and really try to solve their long-range problems. When the POTUS declares military ops are over, then there should be a shift in who's calling the shots.

[TPD1280]

You're talking about decisions made at ecehlons-above-God. There is no way the Conventional Army would allow themselves to be subject to Special Operations. It has only been recently that SO has received any real respect from the "Big Army". SOF has historically been treated like rogue step-children by the 'ring-knocking" conventional combat arms brotherhood. Don't forget who the "King and Queen of Battle" are.

One would think that with as many Flag Officers as we currently have who have spent time in SOF that some unconventional thought would enter the planning process. But alas, we are reminded again of the Shinseki Proofs substantiating the postulate that "Ranger" and "Ranger-Qualified" are different animals.

Theoretically, tactically, strategically, what you are suggesting makes sense, but you have been warned about asking for common sense from the military.

JMHO

[B 2/75]

This thread has taken an interesting turn, one which now prompts me to throw in my paltry .02 kopeks. Conventional forces HAVE been attached to SOF successfully in OIF… witness the good folks from the INF Div who provided security for Task Force Legion in Baghdad and all the team houses. When they were in Baghdad it sucked for them, as they were doing wall duty with occasional patrols. But when they rotated out to the Team Houses most of the ODAs integrated them into their operations to the extent of their capabilities. I’m a bit outta my lane here, but remember that its part of the SF mission to take a bunch of soldiers of lesser skills and coordinate their efforts to bring about the destruction of the enemy. Who says the folks being led can’t be USGI? Let me tell you one thing about the conventionals who were assigned to the SF’ers: their combat zone motivation had to be the best in Country. I truly don’t think you could have had a better group of Grunts. They were learning every day, they got cool STUFF, they actually got to go out and DO things, and they reenlisted, extended, put in for selection, and were generally better soldiers because of their relationship with the SF soldiers.

I dare say that most of us tend to fall victim to being at least marginally a part of the “ME GENERATION…” in that we want instant gratification. We want to see results, now, on the ground. This is why we wind up with the same stuff, time and again, in country: schools, soccer fields, water treatment/filtration plants, garbage cleanup. These are dinky little things that a CA unit can leap on, wrestle to ground, and pop back up from, brandishing those oh so necessary quantifiable results. HOWEVER – REAL CHANGE is GENERATIONAL. That means it takes TIME, as in about 10 years. So, if its going to take so long, why does CA continually get myopic and fail to see the big picture? Because it is unfortunately clogged with morons and idiots in the upper ranks who bailed into the branch from others because they couldn’t get their stupid fat ass promoted as an MI officer, but I digress. The weakness (as I perceive it) of the STRATEGIC level planning within the CA branch, and read strategic in this case to be the big stuff which takes a really long time, isn’t so much in getting those huge restoration projects identified, started, and maintained. The weakness is in getting the senior ground commanders to understand that the big picture of long-term change has got to be supported by smaller-scale movement. For example: bringing potable drinking water to all of the small villages in southwestern Baghdad. Big project. Lots of pipe to be laid, pumps to be bought, etc. A project like this might take years to accomplish. The first thing a ground commander can accomplish in moving toward his desired endstate is to BE FAMILIAR WITH THE PLAN. Sounds easy, but it is sadly overlooked by too many commanders at too many levels. Annex Q CA Opns comes mighty deep in a often-times mind-numbingly written document. Secondly, he could be proactive, work CA issues and meet FREQUENTLY with the people, treating them as friends, not targets. Tell them what is going on; that work is ongoing to bring drinking water to the area, but it is a big project that will take time. Ask for their help and advice. You’ll get an earful, and you certainly don’t have to act on any of it, but you’ve included them in the process, further cementing your ties. Remember, these are by in large good people. Get to know them personally, and your mission will be much easier, and you’ll have a better experience, too. Believe it or not, Hadji actually does know when you want to kill him, and he isn’t going be a wild supporter of your initiatives when you behave badly. Be Rambo when the shooting starts, not when you’re sipping chai in a local’s back yard.

Another aspect is our consistent failure to integrate our heavy Engineer assets into the big CA plan. Perhaps I should say that we just don’t support it because of a pecking order problem. The Division engineer sets the priority of work, tasking his graders, backhoes, and dozers with daily tasks from which they may not deviate. Just try to get one and you’ll see for yourself. This guy works of course for the Division CDR who wants to fill barriers, clear fields of fire, all manner of jobs generally prioritized toward serving and protecting our soldiers first, then allies, then outside folk. That means the equipment never gets to the outside folk. So… to support long-term big-picture CA missions, more is clearly better when it comes to all manner of earth moving gear.

[Olive Drab]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Bailaviborita
[B]I see from the guys on the ground that the right way wouldn't be to take them out of ARSOF. I'd have to agree with you, too- that the cantonment idea is killing us- why a firebase mentality is ever forced on SOF is beyond me.[/url]


Why is this mentality forced upon them? It was in the blood of the deployment leadership before we left. When the majority of the former Special Forces officers/senior NCOs in the units are AGR and can not deploy, fillers take their place. These fillers for the most part have no time in SOF units and in some cases, due to the deployment tempo, are not MOS-Q in Civil Affairs.
Example, the DCO of our deploying task force was a former 7th,11th and 12th grouper who was all for the SOF mentality, using gear that works for the person and not necessarily what the unit provides, not sticking to doctrine on how to handle things and not conforming to regular Army ways but to our own ways. This is what it is all about. Unfortunately he only spent a month here for the transfer of authority and was sent home with the rest of the AGR people who deployed as part of the transition team. This may have not been the best example since his replacement is good to go he just isn’t as gung ho about it as the AGR Col was.
The upper level leadership of the current CA foot print here in theater for the most part comes from a broad range of backgrounds. Due to the shortages of people in CA a good number of the soldiers here just transferred into the unit before deployment. This includes many people at the top including the CSM (an old MP). They did a few drills and went to a 3 week reclass which doesn’t teach you a thing about CA or SOF. All they know is the garrison mentality they dealt with before so they start enforcing it on the soldiers below them. They are what is causing this merging of CA/1 Cav way of doing things. Mainly this is enforced on the E-6 and below crowd because I routinely see those in the rank of e-7 to 0-6 doing whatever they feel like but never the less this way is being enforced at some level.
The higher ups at Brigade are more concerned with not offending some random CSM or Col for whatever reason. They are all for conforming to every single policy letter then remembering what their job is about. There is a limit as to how far away from the policy they can flex but they dont need to follow every reg to the T just to make some people happy. Part of this is because they are bored and have nothing better to do than nitpick people. The more they continue to conform to Big Army and move further away from SOF the argument to remove them from SOF grows in Big Army’s favor.
Luckily the leadership at the team level still has common sense. We have some sharp 0-2s and 0-3s in charge of teams who are smart enough to look past the bullshit and do what is best for the mission and the men (which does not include them conforming to 1st Cav rules on everything). Maybe its just me but it appears that the officers who come to CA as a senior CPT got passed over for promotion and see their careers on the way out. CA gives new life to their career and short of a major incident pretty much guarantees a promotion to 0-5 without being a commander somewhere along the line. They begin to worry about their OERs instead of the mission so they can stay in. They fail to stand up for whats right but instead for what their rater wants to hear. And so the cycle continues driving us further and further away from what CA was.
Unlike Jawbreaker I work for those at the very top out of the embassy. I dont get to go out with the teams as much as I would like to but I do get to see what CA is doing on the strategic level and who is doing it. With what I have seen and who I see doing it, the reason we are on the path towards becoming part of the conventional force makes sense. Hopefully someone will smarten up before we start acting like an MP unit.
What I have wrote here is regarding CA in Iraq and not AFG. From what I hear AFG is a lot more friendly toward the SOF way of doing things. It probably is because of the smaller footprint there.

[TPD1280]

B 2/75

That last post of yours was lucid, articulate, well reasoned...and spot on!

[Bailaviborita]

Originally posted by Olive Drab
[QUOTE][i]The upper level leadership of the current CA foot print here in theater for the most part comes from a broad range of backgrounds. Due to the shortages of people in CA a good number of the soldiers here just transferred into the unit before deployment. This includes many people at the top including the CSM (an old MP). They did a few drills and went to a 3 week reclass which doesn’t teach you a thing about CA or SOF. All they know is the garrison mentality they dealt with before so they start enforcing it on the soldiers below them.

You are right on. I have a buddy who went from IN to IRR and was called up for Bosnia, placed in a CA unit and has been deploying off and on since. Just got back from somewhere southwest of IQ. His take on things is like yours- upper level leadership and many others come from conventional side, get a weeks long course, maybe a couple of drills, and then deploy. Most are scared to approve anything out of the box. Lower level guys make things happen because they don't care about promotion, want to get job done, and just use common sense.

IQ has all the attention now, so higher ups can't afford another Abu G. To keep that from happening, they force as many as they can into firebase, little-boy rules- to keep the 10% from screwing up the strategic picture for the country. Same anywhere- wherever the press is you have to clamp down and get your panties in a knot. Afgh doesn't have as many five star hotels or bombings- therefore less press- therefore less firebase mentality.

[Olive Drab]

We had a good discussion which died down quite a bit. Are there any other ways to make CA more marketable to the SOF community? Any suggestions which may turn it into a better organization?

Heres my two cents. Do away with the whole 38A MOS. Replace all MOS with something similar to the 96th CA bn. Allow all E-4 and below to enlist into one of the following MOS: 21B combat engineer, 31C communications, 91W Combat Medic. Put these MOS on the team so they bring a skill to the table. 99% of people E-4 and below here are pulling security and not doing any Civil Affairs work. The 1% that are have some amazing skill and are working at the theater level advising some ministry, the state dept or something else because of their civilian job.
Getting back to the MOS, why did I choose those 3 MOS? They all bring a skill to the table which each team needs. A communications specialist who will get some additional training for SOF specific commo equip (MBITR, PSC 5/D, PRC 150, V-mail, etc). The engineer to aid in CA projects requiring their input. Instead of searching through every soldier's resume to see who is a General Contractor, Civil Engineer, Mechanical Engineer, Electrical engineer etc, you have someone who is MOS Q with a basic understanding of the job. Hopefully enough to get by.
Medic on the team is for obvious reasons. They are the team medic along with being able to do hospital assessments, treat foreign nationals and do other medical and vetrinary tasks. They would all go to SOCMED for additional training.
When these soldiers hit E-5 they would be offered a chance to go to a Civil Affairs course to get an identifier to be able to do CA work as a team SGT or higher. It would be mandatory for e-6 and above. In this 2-3 week course the CA SGTs would be taught about dealing with the foreign customs, negotiating, not making promises, passive intel gathering etc.
Language training for CA wouldnt be mandatory but would be highly encouraged. More slots to the units to send troops to DLI and language training at the SOAF.
IMHO CA as an MOS is kind of weak. There are quite a few people in theater who arent CA qualed doing CA work. It doesnt take a genious to do it, mostly common sense and being personable. I feel that if they did away with the MOS and went this way it would benefit CA as a whole. It also helps with manning issues for deployments. Right now they are hurting big time for 38A soldiers. If they broadened the MTOE to allow for those other MOS it would allow CAPOC to draw soldiers from other units in time of need and also allow soldiers who dont necessarily want to be locked into a MOS like 38A but want someting like a 12B that can do the same work.
The 96th has a similar setup and it seems to work for them, so why not try it on the reserve side of the house?

Any questions, comments, critique? Lets keep this going since its a good thread.

[B 2/75]

Make both the team daddy and O smart in contracting. That will lessen their learning curve and pain level considerably.

[Jawbreaker1]

I have a big problem with CA being involved in contracting and project management. I am a CAT-A Team Leader, BTW.

It's late here in Baghdad, so I will make this quick. CA is not here to manage projects and work with and pay contractors. There are plenty of other folks over here who can do that.

Rather, we should be deeply involved in the inner working of the civilian populace in our AORs, i.e. the local government, the mosques, tribal groups, etc. In our relationships with these folks, we can work to nominate projects and inform the rest of the Army what the indigeneous population thinks needs to be done. Once these projects get started, other branches, like the Corps of Engineers, can come in and get the project done, from proposal to contracting to completion, while doing QA/QC along the way.

What we have now is a gross misutilization of the CA community, which is due in part to Big Army's lack of understanding of our purpose and capabilities, and partly due to the CA leadership way up high not making sure that the manuever guys use us properly.

I know a fellow TL over here who does nothing but projects and contracting, and nothing else. No slight to him, or any other CA folks, but how are we supposed to be qualified to manage a project from beginning to end? I never saw any of this at the CAQC.

Oh well. This issue is near and dear to my heart and I am doing my small part to unfuck things at my level. I'm probably fighting a losing battle, but you never know!

Jawbreaker1 out.

[psyopranger]

What we have now is a gross misutilization of the CA community, which is due in part to Big Army's lack of understanding of our purpose and capabilities, and partly due to the CA leadership way up high not making sure that the manuever guys use us properly.

It is the same on the PSYOP side of the house. Their is a big difference between PSYOP, PA, and IO. IO is trying to do PSYOP and PSYOP is being used by Big Army Combatant Commanders for PA.

The SOF and JSOC Community are about the only ones who have been utilizing PSYOP for it's true purpose.

[TPD1280]

One of the sources of the addiction to contracting by CA, is the fact that numbers are demonstrable fodder for an OER. A bullet comment that says, "MAJ Soandso was responsible for managing a contract worth over $12 million..." looks very good. Same thing on the PSYOP side of the house. Printing contracts, acquiring equipment that we will never use, under any circumstances, simply because it adds to the dollar value of the equipment for which they are responsible, all looks nice on an OER. I'm not just pulling this out of my ass, I watched it. When our relief got in country, there were several pages of hand receipts for shit that was not on our property book when we went to war. Shit that was covered in dust from having not ever left the hooch. It was useful as furniture I guess. But it took forever (or some serious horse trading) to get tires so my guys could continue missions, or a turret ring so my gunners could actually use the turret in the manner intended.

[Bro]

One of the sources of the addiction to contracting by CA, is the fact that numbers are demonstrable fodder for an OER.

Speaking of OERs, who's going to be in charge of 1st SWTG and all them 38/37 AIT-ers out in Bragg? It's bad enough officers have little to no exposure to what the other side of USASOC has to offer, but to decrease the existing training structure? Com'n.

There's got to be a better way.

-Bro

[B 2/75]

Git real. If yer boss was working for an OER than shame on him, and have him read the "where have all the Colonels gone?" thread. The bottom line reality on the ground is that CA and PSYOP actually DO engage in projects which require contracting abilities. If you're clueless about how they work, then you're in the dark.

TPD, on your tires and .50 turret problems... Had this O been there those issues would have been a priority and would have never gotten to be a problem. (How can you roll without a ringmount?)

If you do your job, and do it well, then all the rest will fall into place, including any paperwork.

Sorry if you had to work for a dingbat, but please, for your own sake, don't fall into the rut of blaming marginal officers for everything you guys perceive as being wrong with the branch. It only makes you appear bitter.

[TPD1280]

B 2/75

This particular O was a constant source of frustration, and yes he really was working for the OER. Unfortunately he was assigned to my Det 5 days prior to heading to Bragg for Mobilization. We never had time to work through the kinks prior to heading out. That is a whole long story best told over cold beer and not publicly.

As for contracting, I am well aware of its role and function and legitimate use by both CA and PSYOP. When the PDD found out that the risograph was incompatible with Iraqi dust they began contracting out all of our printing for non classified products. My guys coordinated for numerous local contracts for projects in the sometimes blurry area of SASO PSYOP/CA. Things like shit suckers to clean out the open sewers running through the streets of Sadr City. Wins hearts and minds, puts the locals back to work and infuses capital into the local economy. A true win/win.

What my rather emotional, and less than articulate rant was more aimed at were those who truly do abuse the system in order to chase bullet comments, and unnecessary procurement that borders on fraud, waste and abuse.

As for turret rings and tires, once again the E-7 Mafia prevailed and the needed parts were acquired through cannibalization. A suitable loaner HMMWV was provided by 2ACR while ours was being fixed. (sidebar: the turret ring was damaged by the O when he drove under a balcony and caught the mounted loudspeaker on the edge)

You are correct, I do have some bitterness that I do try to keep in check as it clouds objectivity. But I daresay that anyone who has been in the Army for more than a couple of tours will have something about which they feel some bile.

Elevated, pushed, azimuth reacquired, driving on.

[B 2/75]

TPD, we all get frustrated to no end by what we perceive to be idiots who happen to be in our chain of command uplink. Sometimes they really are dangerous idiots, and then the troops have got to be protected from them at all costs. Other times it is our own perceptions which have gotten clouded by our own attitutes and interactivity with the person. I knew a CA Major in Baghdad, who was tasked to head up a special mission from McDill. His team members were all Navy and Army SOF professionals, while this guy's background was as an MP. He was a nice guy, and he pushed the pencils (sort of, I suppose) but he definately didn't have the trust of his team. He was completely out of his element, and he knew it. The good thing on him was that he didn't try to force himself on the guys, but the bottom line was that they wouldn't go out the gate with him. And they didn't. The administrivia which he should have attended to exclusively, was in the end conducted and concluded by team members. They took up his slack, acting as if he had been the object of a casualty feeder report.

[CATAtonic426]

Sorry to raise the dead, but what is currently happening with this dilemma?

[Olive Drab]

Sorry to raise the dead, but what is currently happening with this dilemma?
Reserve CA and PSYOP are transitioning to FORSCOM within the next few months. Active CA and PSYOP are supposed to stay under USASOC/SOCOM. AIT is still at JFK SWCS to my knowledge.

[Baildog]

Reserve CA and PSYOP are transitioning to FORSCOM within the next few months. Active CA and PSYOP are supposed to stay under USASOC/SOCOM. AIT is still at JFK SWCS to my knowledge.

Yep, that's exactly the word we got.

[CATAtonic426]

Reserve CA and PSYOP are transitioning to FORSCOM within the next few months. Active CA and PSYOP are supposed to stay under USASOC/SOCOM. AIT is still at JFK SWCS to my knowledge.
What does this mean for us kids on the ground?

[B 2/75]

What does this mean for us kids on the ground?

LOL in a nutshell, go turn in yer M-4, and draw an M-16.





Not serious there... obviously, I hope.

The real implications remain to be seen. How the Big Army commanders will exercise their new assets remain to be seen. Hope CA doesn't wind up pulling blocking position or gate guard duty...

[ODA 564]

Late to the party but I'll add my two cents:
No more: Don't talk about relegion, don't use that theme. WARNING WILL ROBINSON WARNING! Are you (WE) prepared for that? Especially since UBL, Zarqawi and AQ have the Koran on their side?

As I was told by the DC of 4th POG, we are bringing PSYOP into the year 2005. Leaflets and loudspeakers are WWII relects. We thought that once before. Joe Iraqi couldn't be reached by anything other than leaflets and loudspeakers in DS/DS - thank God a few of us kept the old books.

The Internet, Satellite Radio, Email, Video Games, Directed Text Messaging - These are the future. Do a media analysis of a A-stan village... NEVER throw a tool away. NEVER forget how to do it with out the high-tech.

Just some thoughts..

And some more.

[SN]

LOL in a nutshell, go turn in yer M-4, and draw an M-16.
Not serious there... obviously, I hope....

Bet this is a truer statement then you know, they'll carry what Big Green carries.

.The real implications remain to be seen. How the Big Army commanders will exercise their new assets remain to be seen. Hope CA doesn't wind up pulling blocking position or gate guard duty...

They will, brain dead CSM will look at them as another body pool. I am not convinced conventional units will know how to properly use these new assets.

Curious if the CA task forces get dropped off org charts now?

[Krall]

That's part of the problem - analysis. There is none.... it's all "I have a great idea"...... wheeeee, let's go down tunnel number 2... I thought there was light here.... someone said there was light here... shit, wrong tunnel. it was the second one from the left, not the right.

[Baildog]

Not sure exactly how it is supposed to work, but I believe that all of the reservists, to include CAPOC HQ, will be under administrative control of FORSCOM, but that USASOC will retain operational control.


BLUF: less money and training, more beauracracy for the reservists.

[Krall]

something like that - same as I heard

But that means that USASOC has to ask FORSCOM to let them use the soldiers from the RC units

[CATAtonic426]

This doesn't sound like fun. What about the FID/UW Bns? Will they also be reassigned to FORSCOM? And does the expansion of the AC CA mean that the 96th will now be exclusively working with SF and that the Reserve Bns will now exclusively work with conventional units?

And the comment about turning in the M4 & drawing an M16... are you refering to the high-speed nature of the RC units being diminished?

What effects will this have on Psyops?

[Krall]

426 as in 426 CAB ?

Rumor has it - I have to start everything out like this cause I have not seen official paper work on anything.......

For now this is a C2 issue only -- funding and TOEs are not affected (yet) - Mobilization of RC etc... will go to FORSCOM/USARC/OCAR as well as the command....

Hopefully more concrete and in writing guidance will be out soon...

[Olive Drab]

the 96th has been working with SF since the beginning. On my rotation no one was opconned to the JSOTF besides them. During the invasion there were RC CA soldiers attached to SF.

Fid/UW have been redesignated Special Operations bns which really doesnt mean much in the switch to FORSCOM. I am not sure if the war traces go out the window or now. I am assuming you are in the 426th which works with 1st Group. Ask around your unit for the word on whether or not it still exists. Be warned that the whole war trace concept has gone out the window and you will get attached to whoever is there when its your time to go.
I cant comment on the specifics of PSYOP but their RC units will go to FORSCOM along with CA.

I am also wondering if the units recently placed on jump status will have that taken away. Any ideas?

[CATAtonic426]

So the formerly FID/UW BN will now be called "Special Operations" BNs? But they will also switch to FORSCOM? I am just trying to understand what this change in commands will mean for the operator... or will it be simply 'soldier' now?

the 96th has been working with SF since the beginning. On my rotation no one was opconned to the JSOTF besides them. During the invasion there were RC CA soldiers attached to SF.

Fid/UW have been redesignated Special Operations bns which really doesnt mean much in the switch to FORSCOM. I am not sure if the war traces go out the window or now. I am assuming you are in the 426th which works with 1st Group. Ask around your unit for the word on whether or not it still exists. Be warned that the whole war trace concept has gone out the window and you will get attached to whoever is there when its your time to go.
I cant comment on the specifics of PSYOP but their RC units will go to FORSCOM along with CA.

I am also wondering if the units recently placed on jump status will have that taken away. Any ideas?

[B 2/75]

As I understand it, with recent reinforcement from pretty damn good sources, is that if yer not in the 96th, you'll be under FORSCOM, which means conventional army leadership / supervision. SOBs won't be special.

[Olive Drab]

So the formerly FID/UW BN will now be called "Special Operations" BNs? But they will also switch to FORSCOM? I am just trying to understand what this change in commands will mean for the operator... or will it be simply 'soldier' now?
The renaming of the BNs from FID/UW to SO happened a while.

[Olive Drab]

As I understand it, with recent reinforcement from pretty damn good sources, is that if yer not in the 96th, you'll be under FORSCOM, which means conventional army leadership / supervision. SOBs won't be special.
Im hearing the exact same thing at my level.

[Krall]

Well the rumor mill is way outa control with a bunch of unofficial talk going on --

Trust me....

Don't get me wrong - it sucks - it sucks bad

But no ones really going to know wtf until all the ts are crossed and Is dotted.... etc...

I saw the snowflake and other docs back in Nov -- it could be just bad or it could be really bad - time will tell for sure