Political Islam

[Jimbo]

I have had a number of arguments with people on this board and elsewhere who insist that Islam and the Koran are the root cause of the terrorists who we are fighting today. Thus far, the evidence does not support that position. I am still not smart enough to put together a cogent response, but this book review covers two books that, when combined, make a powerful argument against the position that terrorism is an extention of Islam.

I am NOT posting this to begin yet another thread about how people feel about or what they think of Islam. I AM starting this thread as a discussion of the phenomonon of political Islam and how political Islam has shaped the enemy with whom we are currently engaged.

I have purchased the two books that are the subject of the following review. I will write more when I finish them.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101fareviewessay84113b/mahmood-mamdani/whither-political-islam.html

Whither Political Islam?
Mahmood Mamdani
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

Summary: Thinking of modern jihad as simply a cultural extension of Islam is a common, and unfortunate, mistake. Two new books by Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy offer better historical and sociological explanations, but they are only a start.

Mahmood Mamdani is Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University and the author of Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror.

[Jedburgh]

Jimbo, I feel that anyone with a shred a sense understands that Islam and the Qur'an are not the root causes of the radical, self-proclaimed Islamic terrorists.

...along the lines of your post, I also recommend this monograph, recently published by the Army's Strategic Studies Institute: Islamic Rulings on Warfare (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB588.pdf)

...and from RAND, an older, but very solid study looking at another perspective of Islam: Civil-Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, Strategies (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1716/MR1716.pdf)

...the International Crisis Group has published an excellent series of analytical articles focused on specific countries and groups: Islamism, Conflict and Reform (http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2969&l=1)

[Purple36]

Today I continued to peruse the book, How to Approach and Understand the Quran, by Jamaal alDin M. Zarabozo. I purchased it from Amazon.com after reading how it was recommended to help understand the religion. I came to Chapter 5, The major goals of the Quran: Guiding Muslims in their ongoing struggle against the enemies of Islam...."But this is not the only enemy that Allah cleary describes or talks about in the Quran. Allah also discusses the disbelievers, be they polytheists, Jews or Christians, and how they plot against Muslims. Allah warns Muslims about taking them as close friends and allies..."
This book also liberally quotes from Sayyid Qutb as a source of some respect/authority. Sayyid Qutb, of Muslim Brotherhood fame.
This book was published in Colorado.
I didn't know it until I came across this tonight. Well, if this is mainstream....

One site has this to say of Qutb:
His commentary on the Quran has been extremely influential; some see him as the central theorist of twentieth-century Islamism. There is anecdotal evidence that Sayyid Qutb and Shaykh Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani founder of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, influenced each other. According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, "In a century in which some of the most important writing came out of prisons, Qutb, for better or for worse, is the Islamic world's answer to Solzhenitsyn, Sartre, and Havel, and he easily ranks with all of them in influence. It was Sayyid Qutb who fused together the core elements of modern Islamism.... Qutb concluded that the unity of God and His sovereignty meant that human rule – government legislates its own behavior – is illegitimate. Muslims must answer to God alone." [Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America (New York: Random House, 2002) p. 62] ISBN 0812969847. This point is central to most modern Islamists, in thier assertion that all forms of governance over the muslims is illegitimate except the Islamic state Khilafah.

[Gryfen-FL]

unity of God and His sovereignty meant that human rule “ government legislates its own behavior“ is illegitimate. Muslims must answer to God alone."Frightening idea, but it's certainly not new. Have you by chance read "being a true slave of Allah" it was written in something like the late 13th or early 14th century. The book was recommended in one of the book review threads here so I picked it up...disturbing.

It would seem that the fabric of the religion is engrained with xenophobia. The "'fuck them' before they 'fuck you'" mindset is just a short hop from that.

I'm working on "The Failure of Political Islam" right now, and haven't gotten very far in it.....
It states that the real reason behind the Islamist resurgence in Afghanistan in the 19th century was actually a backlash against colonialism.

What're your thoughts on that?

[Jimbo]

This book also liberally quotes from Sayyid Qutb as a source of some respect/authority. Sayyid Qutb, of Muslim Brotherhood fame... Well, if this is mainstream....

Qutb is NOT mainstream. He is influential amonst a very small percentage of Muslims. He is VERY influential among Jihadists.

"It should be noted that the creators of modern Jihadism - people like Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati or Mawdudi — were very much influenced by Marxism-Leninism. Like the communists, who believe in a global conspiracy of capitalist imperialists aided by native compradors, Jihadists think that the Islamic world's poverty and weakness are the result of a great conspiracy of the West and their local agents. According to this line of thinking, to redeem the Islamic world one needs to strike at "the oppressors" rather than work to raise education levels, productivity or health standards in Muslim societies."

From:http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15951

[Jimbo]

...along the lines of your post, I also recommend...
Thanks, Jedburgh.

[Purple36]

Sorry Jimbo, I didn't mean Qutb was mainstream, but rather this book and it's author. It's touted on Amazon as a book to help understand the meaning and intent of the Quran. So, if say a relatively new convert were to pick it up he/she would immediately be exposed to this line of thought as part of the faith.
I did not question what the book was saying about Islam until I came to that chapter.

[Jimbo]

Sorry Jimbo, I didn't mean Qutb was mainstream, but rather this book and it's author. It's touted on Amazon as a book to help understand the meaning and intent of the Quran. So, if say a relatively new convert were to pick it up he/she would immediately be exposed to this line of thought as part of the faith.
I did not question what the book was saying about Islam until I came to that chapter.
I'm picking up what you are laying down. Who is the publisher? I'll be they get a significant amount of their statup money from Saudi Arabia.

[MilSciFiFan]

Gryfen-FL "It would seem that the fabric of the religion is engrained with xenophobia. The "'fuck them' before they 'fuck you'" mindset is just a short hop from that."

Gryfen, I don't think it's the religion so much as it is the culture. The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs by David Pryce-Jones shed some light on this for me. I think this f-u before you f-me mindset is a combination of things. Does Islam enable the mindset? Maybe. But hasn't this dynamic pre-dated Islam in Arab sociology? Aren't destructive interpretations of Islam a short hop from the mindset you suggest, not vice versa? Maybe certain interpretations of Islam just added fuel to the already existing fire. Combine this with a tribal kinship-based culture with many concentric circles of influence and loyalty, one that that sees all identities, relations and responses through the lens of shame and honor, and a political process based wholly on constant power-challenging (hence, opportunistic interpretations of Islam to aid in the specific power challenge). There is nothing in the resulting sociology (sorry to use the word, Purple36) that gives arabs a framework to understand the notion of consensual government for the common good. It is an alien concept to them. Islam itself might be quite incidental to this dynamic. Terrorism against the west is just another form of power challenge.

Sorry to butt in with my two cents, but this is a topic that interests me. I have to say that I agree with others in this thread that Islam, as it is in itself, is not the root of our current problem.

[Jimbo]

There is nothing in the resulting sociology (sorry to use the word, Purple) that gives arabs a framework to understand the notion of consensual government for the common good. It is an alien concept to them.
It is? I challenge you to read the following article and stand by your comment:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030327.middleeast.davis.democracyiraq.html

Why has the "west" been succussful, relatively speaking, planting democracy in parts of post-colonial Africa? Why has it been such a dismal failure in the Arab world?
You're fucking shitting me, right?

[Jimbo]

So, if say a relatively new convert were to pick it up he/she would immediately be exposed to this line of thought as part of the faith.

Also, I actually know someone who was recruited into the global jihad through the idea that jihad is the individual responsibility of every Muslim (a 6th pillar of the faith). This is the major difference between people who believe what Qutb says and other Muslims.

[MilSciFiFan]

[QUOTE=Jimbo]It is? I challenge you to read the following article and stand by your comment:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030327.middleeast.davis.democracyiraq.html


From the article Jimbo refers to: “…following the Ottoman collapse in World War I, exhibited an ecumenical tradition advocating cultural pluralism, political participation, and social justice. This Iraqi nationalist vision was most evident in the June-October 1920 Revolt against British rule in Iraq. Sunni and Shi’i Arabs joined forces, praying in each others’ mosques and celebrating together their respective holidays while Iraqi Muslims went to the houses of Christians and Jews (who were the largest single ethnic group in Baghdad at the time of the uprising) and insisted that they join protest marches and demonstrations because they were Iraqi citizens like everyone else……….June 1941, the Iraqi nationalist movement developed a broad political coalition encompassing members of all Iraq’s ethnic groups, including Sunni and Shi’i Arabs, Kurds, Jews, Christians, Armenians and other minority groups. Political, parties, such as the National Party, Jami’at al-Ahali (the People’s Organization), the National Democratic Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, student and professional associations, artisans organizations and labor unions, promoted political participation by all Iraqis and emphasized the need to develop an inclusive sense of political community.”

Jimbo, I read the article, and I stand by my comment. I was not intending to give the impression that I think Arabs are incapable of consensual government under any circumstances. This article describes one such brief experiment in Federal government (modeled on the EU), until the next power challenge put a stop to it. What I am trying to discuss is how some strong and enduring aspects of Arab tribal culture have been counterproductive in the understanding and establishment of consensual government, and was giving Pryce-Jones thesis as a starting point, with which I happen to agree. This article you direct me to does not refute that. Are you disagreeing with Pryce-Jone’s characterization of Arab tribal sociology and it's effect upon understanding and receptivity to consensual government? If so, then that’s another matter.

How much of a real basis of support did these temporary institutions in Iraq enjoy in the society as a whole? What organizing principles intrinsic to Arab tribal culture were expressed in the activities mentioned in the article?

[MilSciFiFan]

From a review on Amazon:

Pryce-Jones explores the question why there are no modern Arab liberal democracies.

He finds the answer in Arab social and political culture, specifically:

1. TRIBALISM. Pryce-Jones argues that Arab culture doesn't encourage Arabs to identify themselves as members of a state, but as members of a family or tribe. Arab political life therefore consists of a multitude of warring factions, none of whom seeks the good of the nation as a whole. As Karl Popper might describe it, they ask only the personal question "Who should rule?" (and answer: "I should!") and never ask the more fundamental institutional question "How should power be organized?"

2. THE SHAME / HONOR SYSTEM. Arabs place great weight on perceptions of their honor. This consideration therefore often trumps all others and results in behavior that looks, to western eyes, like insanity.

An example is the Aswan dam. Nasser announces that he will build the dam and that it will be a great thing, thereby committing his honor to its construction and success. Therefore, when his own experts tell him that the dam is a bad idea (it will disrupt agriculture, increase the spread of some diseases, etc.), he suppresses the information and does not back down. When the Eisenhower administration revokes the promised funding for the dam (because it's a bad idea), Nasser's honor has committed him so fully to the dam that he reverses his foreign policy 180 degrees and cuddles up to the Soviet Union to get it done. And when the dam, as predicted, turns out to be a curse rather than a blessing, Nasser goes on shouting its virtues.

3. THE POWER-CHALLENGE DIALECTIC. You're either in power in the Arab world, in which case you're paranoid and watching your subordinates and allies as closely as your enemies, or you're no, in which case you lurk in the shadows, plot and scheme until your hand is ready and you make your move to challenge the power holder. There is no notion of shared power, no notion of purely institutional power.

THEREFORE...

The result is that calls for democracy, like calls for socialism, Palestinian independence and even repentance and return to the true tenets of Islam, are bogus. They mask what would otherwise be naked grabs for power by an individual or a tribal group. The Arabs are constantly and consistently betrayed by their leaders.

Note that this is NOT a book about Islam. Pryce-Jones explicitly argues that this Arab culture pre-dates Islam and that Islam itself is often used as a tool or a pretext in power challenges (as in Wahhabism, for instance).

[Jimbo]

Are you disagreeing with Pryce-Jone’s characterization of Arab tribal sociology and it's effect upon understanding and receptivity to consensual government? If so, then that’s another matter.

I was disagreeing with your statment that the Arabs have no 'framework' to understand the idea of consentual government and that it is an alien concept to them. The article I linked to showed that the Arabs do in fact have a framework (past experience) and that it is NOT an alien concept.

But now that you want to get academic, yeah, I take issue with Pryce-Jones' characterization. Attributing individual or group action to a characteristic that is allegedly observed accross a society is about as useles as you trying to convince me that SciFi is cool. More specifically, shame and honor are not motivations for action. At least in my experience in sociology. Shame and honor are consequences of actions (actions are usually motivated by a combination of desire to achieve power, affiliate with someone or something or desire to achieve something).


But that has little to do with political Islam.

[MilSciFiFan]

Jimbo "I was disagreeing with your statment that the Arabs have no 'framework' to understand the idea of consentual government and that it is an alien concept to them. The article I linked to showed that the Arabs do in fact have a framework (past experience) and that it is NOT an alien concept."

We're not seeing the same things in the article, then. The article describes a brief period of time in recent Iraqi history where westernized elites banded together in a spirit of nationalism first against the disintegrating Ottoman empire, and in opposition to british mandate, because it was opportunistic to do so. This was a common occurence in post-colonial societies, and the nationalist honeymoons didn't as a rule last too long. Alliances were formed only insofar as they had in common the goal of independence. Once the goal was reached, the much more difficult task of building of an enduring political system whose end was consensual government for the common good, wasn't completed.

[Roguish Lawyer]

More specifically, shame and honor are not motivations for action. At least in my experience in sociology. Shame and honor are consequences of actions (actions are usually motivated by a combination of desire to achieve power, affiliate with someone or something or desire to achieve something).

When you say "in your experience in sociology," do you mean your own personal observations, some type of quantitative or other research, or something else? It seems to be that people can be motivated by shame or honor. For example, shame may be the consequence of Action A (e.g., fleeing a battle), but it may then lead to Action B (e.g., suicide). Am I missing something?

I am enjoying this discussion, BTW. Thanks for starting the thread.

[DY]

Also, I actually know someone who was recruited into the global jihad through the idea that jihad is the individual responsibility of every Muslim (a 6th pillar of the faith). This is the major difference between people who believe what Qutb says and other Muslims.Sounds like exploitation. The "greater" jihad being inner struggle with one's self. "Lesser" jihad being outer struggle with the world- not necessarily manifested as war. Perhaps in the case of the mentioned individual, his or her struggle manifested against materialism. Any and every "pious" religion has it's own 'lesser jihad' (struggle with the world). Any "pious" religion has persuasive leaders, providing persuasive answers to deeply rooted questions. Not every Muslim is going to choose violence as the catalyst for the lesser jihad, even if all muslim individuals were in hypothertical agreement as the the ultimate cause of lesser jihad. In pure speculation, I doubt if all Muslims agree what the lesser (or "global") jihad really is and how it should be enacted.

[MilSciFiFan]

I was disagreeing with your statment that the Arabs have no 'framework' to understand the idea of consentual government and that it is an alien concept to them. The article I linked to showed that the Arabs do in fact have a framework (past experience) and that it is NOT an alien concept.

But now that you want to get academic, yeah, I take issue with Pryce-Jones' characterization. Attributing individual or group action to a characteristic that is allegedly observed accross a society is about as useles as you trying to convince me that SciFi is cool. More specifically, shame and honor are not motivations for action. At least in my experience in sociology. Shame and honor are consequences of actions (actions are usually motivated by a combination of desire to achieve power, affiliate with someone or something or desire to achieve something).


But that has little to do with political Islam.

I disagree. What are honor killings? Is not shame and/or honor a motivation for an action in this circumstance?

[Jimbo]

That is a dangerously simplistic view of an honor killing. What happens if you do not carry out the killing? You are cast out from the social unit you belong to. "Honor" is a pretty abstract idea, even in sociology. However, taking actions to remain accepted by your peers not only makes more sense, it has twin roots in psychology.

[Jimbo]

Sounds like exploitation. The "greater" jihad being inner struggle with one's self. "Lesser" jihad being outer struggle with the world- not necessarily manifested as war. Perhaps in the case of the mentioned individual, his or her struggle manifested against materialism. Any and every "pious" religion has it's own 'lesser jihad' (struggle with the world). Any "pious" religion has persuasive leaders, providing persuasive answers to deeply rooted questions. Not every Muslim is going to choose violence as the catalyst for the lesser jihad, even if all muslim individuals were in hypothertical agreement as the the ultimate cause of lesser jihad. In pure speculation, I doubt if all Muslims agree what the lesser (or "global") jihad really is and how it should be enacted.

The individual in queston had a number of issues. He was looking to define himself. defining himself through violence was the way he chose. it could have been any cause. They just got to him first.

[Jimbo]

We're not seeing the same things in the article, then. The article describes a brief period of time in recent Iraqi history where westernized elites banded together in a spirit of nationalism first against the disintegrating Ottoman empire, and in opposition to british mandate, because it was opportunistic to do so. This was a common occurence in post-colonial societies, and the nationalist honeymoons didn't as a rule last too long. Alliances were formed only insofar as they had in common the goal of independence. Once the goal was reached, the much more difficult task of building of an enduring political system whose end was consensual government for the common good, wasn't completed.
In that paragraph, you do not dispute the fact that they did have some form of experience with consentual government. You don't refute the elections that the article discusses. What you're disputing is the quality of their experience.

[Purple36]

I'm picking up what you are laying down. Who is the publisher? I'll be they get a significant amount of their statup money from Saudi Arabia.

Al Basheer Company for Publications and Translations
Boulder Colorado

[Gryfen-FL]

Honor killings: :rolleyes: ‘excuse me folks, my femi-nazi bone is itching a little…
scritch
…
scratch
…
ahh, that’s got it, OK, now:

I agree that a strong, deeply rooted tribal society can be an impedance to the establishment of a centralized “of / by / for the people” type government. But I think there are enough examples of the leagues formed and tribal counsels elsewhere in the world to provide evidence that tribal society itself is not the impediment. Just looking at the nuts and bolts of how government was handled, I would think a tribal society much more likely to go democratic than were the old ‘divine right’ monarchies of Europe. …well, so much for that theory…go figure.

I'm inclined to believe that a large part of the initial intent of Islam was to harness the tribes and get them to function as a coherent unit. Anyone with a 7th grade reading level who watches the news can tell you that Islamic fundamentalism is not completely in step with what’s in the Qur’an. Islam’s plan of influencing and harnessing the tribes seems to have backfired. Although the tribes were united for a time, the first generations of Islam did not significantly change the pre-existing culture. Through successive generations, and new additions of Surra those tribal societies impressed their culture upon Islamic dogma. This influence, combined with Islam's ascertain of perfection seems to be a recipe for disaster. Apparently Jones isn't the only one to highlight the 'Closed culture' concept, It's addressed in "The Failure of Political Islam" as well.

Is this counter-influence the big thing that has left the 'Arab' society hamstrung in political development?

[Purple36]

I think it would be nice to have an actual Islamic scholar chime in here. Who amongst us actually knows the Quran? I sure don't.

"Anyone with a 7th grade reading level who watches the news can tell you that Islamic fundamentalism is not completely in step with what’s in the Qur’an."

[Jimbo]

I think it would be nice to have an actual Islamic scholar chime in here. Who amongst us actually knows the Quran? I sure don't.
You see, that's what I was trying to avoid with this thread. I don't want to have a discussion about what the Koran says or doesn't say, because, like the Bible or Torah, its open to interpretation.

Political Islam, while kind of rooted in the Koran, has more to do with Marxism than it does the holy book.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Political Islam, while kind of rooted in the Koran, has more to do with Marxism than it does the holy book.

This is a bold and fascinating hypothesis. If I could read only one book (or maybe 2-3 if I really need to) addressing the topic, which one would you recommend?

[Jimbo]

This is a bold and fascinating hypothesis. If I could read only one book (or maybe 2-3 if I really need to) addressing the topic, which one would you recommend?
The book that got stolen from my car. Globalized Islam by Oliver Roy
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231134983/qid=1108699218/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/102-7080114-1198518?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

See page 41:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0231134983/ref=sib_rdr_toc/102-7080114-1198518?%5Fencoding=UTF8&p=S00B#reader-page

[Ace]

I think it would be nice to have an actual Islamic scholar chime in here. Who amongst us actually knows the Quran?
I would hardly consider myself a scholar on the Qur'an but I have read it extensively and feel I have a pretty good grasp of its contents and meaning.

I don't want to have a discussion about what the Koran says or doesn't say, because, like the Bible or Torah, its open to interpretation.

I agree to an extent. I think that what is more open to "interpretation" is the Hadith. (the collection of Islamic traditions from which the details of early Islamic history are derived). In the Arab world it is also considered the most important external aid used in interpreting the meanings of the Qur'an.

[T-Rock]

Me brain hurts trying to follow this discussion. The knowledge you guys have posting here on this subject matter is way over my head; nevertheless, I am trying to learn.
Ace, are you suggesting the Hadiths are more influential in the Islamic practice more so than the Qur'an? If so, how can someone tell which Hadiths are authoritative given the multiple interpretations? Are the following linked hadiths accurate or interpreted correctly? :
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/052.sbt.html
If they are accurate, I can see where someone seeking power could utilize them in achieving a political goal.

[Anouar]

The Quran is the Holy Book and the Word of God descended upon His Prophet(pbuh). It is mostly a guidance and retelling stories of people and events as well as defining rules for rewards and transgressions.
The Sirah (words and deeds of the Prophet pbuh) is also influential in guiding the actions and way of life of muslims. It is mostly a clarification and at times a continuation of what the Quran prescribed. Therefore, a muslim must believe the Quran as well as follow the Sirah. Think of the hadiths and deeds of the Prophet as the continuation and clarification of what was written in the Quran. It is not as intransigent as the Quran or holds more weight. Far from that, it just provides concrete examples of the orders, advice and way of life prescribed in the Book (ex: way to perform prayers, ablutions, zakat.....) There were trusted scholars who strove to gather the hadiths of the Prophet (Boukhari, Muslim, Thirmidhi...)
Therefore, interpretation of the Quran is only permitted within the confines of the Sirah and other methods (Ijtihad, Qias....) Interpretation has always had as a goal to better understand and apply God's injunctions and orders. Unfortunately, there have always been others to seek "loopholes" or misinterpret both the Quran and Sirah to fit their own agenda.
What we see emerging in the ME is people trying to mitigate their actions by finding a holy origin in the scriptures. They use that more as a recruiting tool than a way to better understand the Quran and get closer to God by performing their deeds better.
T-Rock, the hadiths provided in your link are true if they have been authenticated by the main early scholars. Their interpretation and application is the one that is left to individuals. That page mentions Jihad and the fighting in the cause of Allah. Well, I personally would understand Jihad differently than one in the Aqsa brigade or Hizbollah. They seek to destroy Israel and the infidels and bla bla bla. That was considered the lesser Jihad in the time of the Prophet. There have been many articles about its definition, from finghting against one's desires and weakness to going on a rampage killing all those who do not want to convert to Islam.

[T-Rock]

Thanks SnafuRacer for the reply. I,m assuming Islams doctrine is a little like mormonism with respect to having multiple doctrinal sources to pull from, dependant upon who is in political power, in order to manipulate those who are truly zealous? (no offense mormons).
If i'm correct in this assumtion, whereas mormonism has the Pearl of Great Price, The Book of Mormon, Journal of Discourses, the Living Prophet, etc. Isalm has the Qu'ran, Hadith, Ijma and Qiyas?
Jimbo, unless i've got it all wrong, I think I see where you are coming from when you say Islam and the Qu'ran are not the root cause of the terrorist threat we are fighting today. It's the corrupt figureheads who manipulate the religion (scripture,etc.) to attain an objective? Since Jihad is primarily considered a spiritual struggle and not a "Holy War" (unless Islam is threatened/jihad-bis-saif), will we (the west) ever be able to change the perception among Islamists that we are not an oppressive/aggressive threat against Islam?

[Anouar]

The two sentences after "Jimbo... " are basically correct, not the first paragraph.
I don't know anything about mormons, so I won't attempt to debate or compare that. Basically, Islam has one real doctrinal origin: the Quran. The Sirah is basically a complimentary addition to the Quran. It is not to be studied or adopted in lieu of the Quran. But you are correct in saying that many rulers (political or religious) have used the Quran and the Hadith to suit and justify their actions.

[Jedburgh]

Snafu, you keep stating Sira, I believe you mean Sunna - as it refers to the normative behavior of the Prophet that supplements the Qur'an as a textual source of Islamic Law. Sura is a Chapter of the Qur'an - as Ayat is Verse.

There are actually 3 types of Sunna - Sunna al-Qawliyya, what the Prophet said, Sunna al-Filiya, what the Prophet did, and Sunna al-Taqririya what the Prophet permitted. These are contained in the Hadith (pl Ahadith), as has already been stated.

The Ahadith were collected and studied for authenticity by Islamic scholars in the 9th and 10th centuries. Six collections came to form the basis of the major schools of Islamic law - with those of Bukhari and Muslim in particular having a very high status.

As most of you already understand, or have guessed by now, Islamic law - the Shari'a - does not have a single standard in either application or interpretation. There are four major schools of Islamic law among the Sunni, and two among the Shi'a - with both groups having a number of minor interpretations, as in the Deobandi school of which the Taliban were adherents.

And, T-Rock - Ijma, or community consensus, was looked at as a source of Islamic law, and at the time of its true development in the 9th and 10th centuries played a key role in the development of interpretation of the Shari'a, or Fiqh. Today Ijma is completely stagnant. As is Qiyas, or analogical reasoning - the fourth source of Islamic law, but, again, only at the time of its early development. As I already stated, Ijma and Qiyas are completely stagnant, and have been for centuries. Most of today's Muslims only understand the Qur'an and the Sunna to be true sources of the Shar'ia, not realizing the important role the other two elements played in the development of the various schools of Islamic law.

BTW, to bring us back to the original term - coming from the same root as Jihad, Ijtihad is the general term for legal reasoning in Islamic law - meaning to strive intellectually.

[Ace]

SnafuRacer,
Thanks for picking that up for me, I haven't been back to this thread for a day or so.


Jedburgh, no he was not wrong, he actually meant Siras.

Siras are the traditional Muslim biographies of Muhammad (pbuh), from which most historical information about his life and the early period of Islam is derived.

Sunna (or Sunnah) means “way” or “custom”, and therefore, the sunna of the prophet means “the way of the prophet”, or what is commonly known as Prophet’s traditions. Terminologically, the word ‘Sunna’ means the deeds, sayings and approvals of Muhammad during the 23 years of his ministry, and this means that whatever he said, did, or approved during his ministry as a prophet and messenger of Allah is considered a sunna.

Now, all you Muslim heathens stop hijacking this thread, go on....get out of here......Jedburgh, you don't know me so understand this is meant in a joking manner, SnafuRacer would know this already.


BACK TO THE TOPIC PLEASE.

[Roguish Lawyer]

The book that got stolen from my car. Globalized Islam by Oliver Roy
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231134983/qid=1108699218/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/102-7080114-1198518?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

See page 41:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0231134983/ref=sib_rdr_toc/102-7080114-1198518?%5Fencoding=UTF8&p=S00B#reader-page

Thanks. Just ordered it.

[Jedburgh]

BACK TO THE TOPIC PLEASE
I AM starting this thread as a discussion of the phenomonon of political Islam and how political Islam has shaped the enemy with whom we are currently engaged.
Alright then. Along those lines, did anyone else pay attention to the Counter-Terrorism International Conference (http://www.saudiembassy.net/Issues/WOTConference/Con1.asp) held in Riyadh, KSA the 5th - 8th of this month? It was unique in that, at least in the statements that came out of it, it seems to portend a significant shift in strategy on not just the part of the Saudis, but also the Arab/Islamic world as a whole in conjunction with the international community in the context of the GWOT. If words do turn into actions, then indigenous actions against Islamic extremism and terrorism will be the norm rather than the exception.

Regarding Saudi specifically, CSIS published a decent paper back in January: Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia: Asymetric Threats and Islamic Extremists (http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/050106_Al-QaedainSaudi.pdf)

Also, following the recent Iraqi elections, the Iraqi police in Mosul have been broadcasting videos on a local TV station showing once masked kidnappers, who have been captured and are now quivering, broken men. The government officials are using to the videos in an attempt to divest the terrorists and criminals of their religious platform by challenging them with questions about Islam. The official stance is that by declaring this behavior to be un-Islamic, it is the beginning of the Umma’s turn toward inward reflection a step on the road to rejecting the jihad and declaring the terrorists apostates.

...and in Malaysia, a series of ads are denouncing terrorism, “Violence dishonors faith” is one slogan being used. Another ad begins with a baby boy and takes him through school and university, he then turns to militancy and dies in conflict, the goes on to say this is not the dream for Malaysians. So, Malaysia is also striving to promote anti-terrorism and break the terrorist link with Islam.

Thoughts?

[Anouar]

This is a transcript of a program sponsored by the Council On Foreign Relations about Political Islam in Southeast Asia.

Link (http://cfr.org/pub7789/calvin_sims_marie_huhtala_zachary_abuza/islam_around_the_world_session_4_islam_in_southeas t_asia.php)

[Jedburgh]

Understanding Islamism (http://www.icg.org//library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/egypt_north_africa/37_understanding_islamism.pdf)
...analyses which see the Muslim world as deeply polarised between pro-Western and pro-jihadi sympathies, and the conflict between these viewpoints as amounting to a civil war within Islam, are greatly exaggerated if not entirely mistaken. The various tendencies within Islamic activism generally, and Sunni Islamism in particular, let alone the wider ideological and political spectrum in Sunni Muslim countries, have not been reduced to a pro-Western (let alone pro-American) camp and a pro-bin Laden camp. U.S. rhetoric to the effect that "you are either with us or against us" has made little if any impression. Suspicion of, if not opposition to, the behaviour of al-Qaeda and its imitators is widespread within Islamist circles and all but unanimous among political Islamists, but this does not translate at all into a pro-American outlook; at the same time, hostility to Western and especially U.S. policy is very widespread but does not translate into support for, let alone participation in, al-Qaeda's global jihad except for a tiny minority, many if not most of whom are drawn from the Muslim diaspora.

[Spinner]

I won't start chiming in on Political Islam so much as any church based opinions regarding politics. Catholicism for many years has espoused a doctrine of Just War that attempts to reconcile the theocratic (or perhaps I should say theologic) underpinnings of its religion with the reality of the world around it. The criteria the Catholic church uses to define a Just War are at odds with the very idea of applying combat power to a situation. Right off the bat it says the war must be "defensive and never aggressive". As we all know, that flies in the face of military doctrine that calls for overwhelming force and aggressive application of that force.

History has shown leaders that will use whatever means at their disposal to influence and guide their followers, whether it be the use of religious doctrine or the skillful manipulation of the populace through propoganda. Radical, political Islam fits the bill for many of its followers. It removes all doubt, and reduces everything to a fatwa. The madrasas that teach this version of Islam are like bad computer programmers. Garbage in, Garbage out.

[Jimbo]

To help define terms for this discussion:
http://www.family.org/cforum/fosi/islam/faqs/a0027025.cfm

And a contrary perspective:
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer205/hirschk.htm


And a summary of a book I badly want to read:

Islamic theocracy is now firmly established in fundamentalist Iran, and waves of fundamentalism are sweeping the entire Islamic world, and its diaspora.
This book examines the claim of those Islamists who contend that, as a belief system and a way of life, Islam carries with it a theory of politics and the state which should be applied unquestioningly. Ayubi traces both the intellectual sources and the socio-economic bases of Political Islam, arguing that it is a modern phenomenon, dating back only to the inter-war period. He describes its major proponents as urban, educated and relatively young people, whose energies were mobilised, but whose expectations were not fulfilled by the post-independence `populist' regimes in the Arab World.
Islamic movements in six countries are studied in detail. Ayubi's distinctively broad definition of politics encompasses innovative material on sex and the family, and on the emerging alternative economic and social networks of Islamic banks, schools, and hospitals in the countries discussed.
Ayubi stresses the traditional concern in Islam for the collective enforcement of morals, but argues that there is no case for the commonly held misconception that politics begins from theological principles in the Arab world: the historical connection between Islam and politics can be explained as an attempt by the rulers to legitimise their actions. He suggests that radical Islamists are reversing this position by subjecting politics to their specific religious views, so their movement is in some senses an anti-state one. He concludes by discussing possible intellectual responses to fundamentalism, drawing on the thinking of contemporary Muslim liberals.
http://www.ebookmall.com/ebook/82287-ebook.htm

[Jedburgh]

Interesting article from CEIP: Debating Islam in Post-Baathist Iraq (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO13.Brown.FINAL2.pdf)

[Spinner]

Discussing political Islam is difficult because it is so hard to pin down a definition of what it is. Are the political aims and agendas of Islamists in Algeria the same as those in Iraq, or Iran? Probably not, and not just because of their geographical and cultural differences. The great migration of Puritans to our shores in the 17th century had less to do with their escaping religious persecution than with their attempts to foist their extremist religious views on others. Here's an interesting quote from the BELIEVE website:

http://mb-soft.com/believe/txc/puritani.htm

These Puritans insisted that they, as God's elect, had the duty to direct national affairs according to God's will as revealed in the Bible. This union of church and state to form a holy commonwealth gave Puritanism direct and exclusive control over most colonial activity until commercial and political changes forced them to relinquish it at the end of the 17th century.

I think we're hamstrung a little in the sense that we have come so far from our roots. Separation of church and state was, in itself, a radical political idea back when this country was in its colonial infancy. To expect Muslims who have spent centuries adhering to sharia to suddenly change course and embrace democracy and secularism overnight is bound to fail.

Still, those last two posts have some very good information on the very basics of what political Islam is. That piece on debating Islam in post-Baathist Iraq is great, because ultimately the Iraqis themselves are going to have to figure this whole process out for themselves.

[Jimbo]

Discussing political Islam is difficult because it is so hard to pin down a definition of what it is. Are the political aims and agendas of Islamists in Algeria the same as those in Iraq, or Iran? Probably not, and not just because of their geographical and cultural differences.

Actually, I'm toying with the notion of writing my Masters thesis on the development/evolution of whatever the AQ ideology is over the course of various insurgencies in which Muslims were involved. The political aims of the Islamists in Algeria are very similar to the aims of other Islamists because usually they have been influenced by the same Muslim philosophers.

[mara]

Actually, I'm toying with the notion of writing my Masters thesis on the development/evolution of whatever the AQ ideology is over the course of various insurgencies in which Muslims were involved. The political aims of the Islamists in Algeria are very similar to the aims of other Islamists because usually they have been influenced by the same Muslim philosophers.

I'd be interested to read it when you have it put together.

[Jimbo]

I'd be interested to read it when you have it put together.
So will I. :)

Its a ways off since I'm doing mid terms at the moment, but I'd like to get most of it done before the end of summer so that I might submit it for publication.

[DY]

To expect Muslims who have spent centuries adhering to sharia to suddenly change course and embrace democracy and secularism overnight is bound to fail. That makes sense to me. But please tell me where you see that we are trying to impose democracy and secularism. It seems to me that with Shiites and Kurds in the representing majority in Iq, secularism isn't even a consideration on their or our part. Give them a theocracy, thats my take. We we're rather close to that ourselves in the early days.
*ducking for SOTBs swipe*

[Jedburgh]

...on the development/evolution of whatever the AQ ideology is over the course of various insurgencies in which Muslims were involved.

Have you seen this article in the latest issue of Parameters: The Origins of Al-Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for US Strategy (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/henzel.pdf)

[HoosGhost]

So will I. :)

Its a ways off since I'm doing mid terms at the moment, but I'd like to get most of it done before the end of summer so that I might submit it for publication.
I'd like to see all the versions. I'm going to need reading material.

But between being "the boyfriend" and warm weather, methinks you won't reach your goal. I hope to see it by Columbus Day.

[Spinner]

That makes sense to me. But please tell me where you see that we are trying to impose democracy and secularism. It seems to me that with Shiites and Kurds in the representing majority in Iq, secularism isn't even a consideration on their or our part. Give them a theocracy, thats my take. We we're rather close to that ourselves in the early days.
*ducking for SOTBs swipe*

I don't actually see us trying to impose secularism, I just said we can't expect them to embrace it. The Baath party more or less saw to that, as one of their political objectives was secularism. Of course, in a one party state, religious and other influences are going to take a back seat. Now that Iraq has held elections, it stands to reason that those once dormant institutions that were held in check by Hussein are going to compete for their piece of the political pie. Since Shiites are in the majority, I would expect them to take the biggest slice for themselves.

Being from Chicago, I have my biases. Our election day rallying cry is Vote early, vote often. :D

[DY]

I don't actually see us trying to impose secularism, I just said we can't expect them to embrace it. The Baath party more or less saw to that, as one of their political objectives was secularism. Of course, in a one party state, religious and other influences are going to take a back seat. Now that Iraq has held elections, it stands to reason that those once dormant institutions that were held in check by Hussein are going to compete for their piece of the political pie. Since Shiites are in the majority, I would expect them to take the biggest slice for themselves.

Being from Chicago, I have my biases. Our election day rallying cry is Vote early, vote often. :DFollowing article takes what you said even further. I was unnaware that Ba'athism drove Shi'ite intellectualism and debate to Iran. But the article suggests that such intstitutions will return to the original geography of the birth of Shi'ism; Karbala and Najaf (Iq). And it verifies what you said about theological influence will be moderated by democratic means. This also implies a strong possibility of a less hardline Islamist stand in Iran, which has actually been failing since the death of Kohmeini. Sort of a temperred meduim.

http://www.globalengagement.org/issues/2005/03/shi%27a.htm

[Spinner]

This also implies a strong possibility of a less hardline Islamist stand in Iran, which has actually been failing since the death of Kohmeini. Sort of a temperred meduim.


Lot of truth in that statement, especially when you consider the population in Iran born after the revolution that has never known anything but an Islamist state. They don't embrace its dogmatic tenets so much as sidestep them. Azadeh Moaveni, a Time reporter who worked in Iran during the reform movement, has just written a book, Lipstick Jihad. Saw her on the tail end of Nightline the other night, she might have some interesting perspectives on the issue, both as a woman and Iranian-American who grew up in the states during the rise of the Islamic hardliners in Iran.

Maybe we should just start a contest, and call it "Will the REAL face of political Islam please stand up." As the article by Kirby states, shiite leadership traditionally distanced themselves from political institutions. With any luck, Iraq will strike a nice balance right from the beginning when they draw up their constitution. As for Iran, the best that we can hope for is a subtle transformation toward moderate secularism instead of another radical revolutionary shift toward...who knows what.

[DY]

Maybe we should just start a contest, and call it "Will the REAL face of political Islam please stand up." As the article by Kirby states, shiite leadership traditionally distanced themselves from political institutions. With any luck, Iraq will strike a nice balance right from the beginning when they draw up their constitution. As for Iran, the best that we can hope for is a subtle transformation toward moderate secularism instead of another radical revolutionary shift toward...who knows what. My question is why do we really need to to posess a hard definition of political Islam except for Jimbo's thesis? The ambiguity is not new as far as I know. After the death of Mohammad all hell broke loose and it's been that way ever since. The only text I ever read concerning Islam's politics had a shitload of very small words to which I comprehended about 50%. It was organised chronlogically and was really an account of every complication that was thrown in the way of Allahs followers, to include their own folly. Politics does not bind the people of Islam like it does in the west. Islam binds Islam. There never was an organizational hierarchy. That is a modern concept, a dream of the present day faithful. Islam weaved it's way through tribal dynamics that are not vanquishsed today. But perhaps when the West came in and drew nice little lines across the desert, our percetions would be simplified. Why does the most powerful Shi'ite in Iraq live in a small home with dirt floors? How come the Northern Kurdish clan leaders home only has one floor? If I had to put my hands on a hard definition, I would search out mysterious values and try to imagine a world that was utterly inconceivable. Look for the Islam that remains untouched by the West, then work backwards. But I'm too busy for that shit so let me know how it turns out.

[Jimbo]

OK. Discuss how Marxism influenced the politics of the Middle East.

[DY]

OK. Discuss how Marxism influenced the politics of the Middle East.I'll send you the book.

[Jimbo]

Excellent.

[Jimbo]

Look for the Islam that remains untouched by the West, then work backwards.

I thought about this statement often while reading Angry Wind: Through Muslim Black Africa by Truck, Bus, Boat and Camel by Jeffrey Tayler. I like his travel writing and since he speaks French and Arabic fluently, he offers a solid perspective on things.

Not much of Islam remains untouched by "the West". The religion itself take a fair amount from Judiasm and Christinaity. Traditionally Islamic lands have been ruled for varying amounts of time by "the West". And, as I was trying to point out with this thread, there is significant cross over from Western political philosophies. In today's geopolitical climate, many politicians are defining themselves in terms of the West.

Getting back to the book, the autor has a number of encounters where he is left perplexed and disappointed by his encounters with various Sultans and Rulers etc. I think one explanation that he brings up might explain some of the examples you bring up. Often, ethnic or religious groups self organize and in the absence of strong central powers will act as the local power. This gives ethnic and religious leaders a great deal of influence, but it does not mean that they have a lot of resources. In these cases, there is often a almost notional secular government that is technically responsible for the infrastructure of the country. Graft and corruption result in much of teh resources not going where they should and you wind up with poor areas with little state control being effectively run by people with no significant resources, other than social status.


I found this interesting: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//courses01/rrtw/Newell.htm

[DY]

Graft and corruption result in much of teh resources not going where they should and you wind up with poor areas with little state control being effectively run by people with no significant resources, other than social status.


I found this interesting: So psychology plays a part in all this. Without any 'tangible' power, social status is defined by traditional terms. Whoever is the boss, is the boss. At some point, force must be exerted, though.

I heard an interesting term the other day as a surrogate to the popular "Radical Islam." The guy from the Institute for National Security Policy called it, "Facist Islam."

[Jimbo]

I heard an interesting term the other day as a surrogate to the popular "Radical Islam." The guy from the Institute for National Security Policy called it, "Facist Islam."

Fascism and Leninist revolutionary philosophy are very similar in my mind. I would agree with that characterization.

Edited to add that I should say I think elements of Fascism and Leninist revolutionary philosophy can be applied to the modern jihadist philosophy.

[lal]

New to this field, I have worked through a lot of these texts recently. Great thread.

Jimbo--did you finish your thesis? Would love to see it--especially for the bibliography.

[Infanteer]

Interesting.

Just finished reading Marc Sageman's Understanding Terrorist Networks; I'd highly recommend it - he focuses in on one aspect of militant Islam, the Global Salafist Jihad, and analyses it in detail. This is the movement spearheaded by Al Qaeda that is composed of AQ, with networks into the Middle East, the Mahgrib, and Southeast Asia. They are rooted in the works of Qutb and found incubation in the links formed in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets.

[lal]

Interesting.

Just finished reading Marc Sageman's Understanding Terrorist Networks; I'd highly recommend it - he focuses in on one aspect of militant Islam, the Global Salafist Jihad, and analyses it in detail. This is the movement spearheaded by Al Qaeda that is composed of AQ, with networks into the Middle East, the Mahgrib, and Southeast Asia. They are rooted in the works of Qutb and found incubation in the links formed in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets.

Just finished this, too, as rec'ed by Jimbo. Really enjoyed it--but I think he does a little too much extrapolation in de-bunking the traditional terrorist theses. Am new in this field, so very well could be wrong.

[Polynikes0321]

i recommend the book "islam and the jews."

if you are a christian, you'll like it even more...

it's by dr. mark gabriel, a former mosque leader who converted at 34 to christianity. he had the entire quran memorized by age twelve...

[T-Rock]

Have you finished your thesis yet? I'd like to read it if it's available for public viewing.

[Jimbo]

I'm actually doing midterms this weekend. I probably won't be satisfied with my thesis until next Nov/Dec.

[T-Rock]

Cool! Good luck with the midterms. BTW, how big an influence was/is Ibn Taimiya regarding Political Islam?

[ilots]

Cool! Good luck with the midterms. BTW, how big an influence was/is Ibn Taimiya regarding Political Islam?

A good read on this is Benjamin and Simon, “Ibn Taymiyya and His Children"

Certainly Ibn Taymiyya was influential in the expansion of "jihad" as the 6th pillar and in the justifications of killing non-combatatants, fellow muslims, and infidels.

[ilots]

Sorry, all. I tried to edit my post & add this, but my comfuser is far smarter than I.

Sageman on C-SPAN, for those with further interest.
"Motivation of Terrorists"

http://www.c-spanstore.org/shop/index.php?main_page=product_video_info&products_id=190022-1
I'm not sure if/when it will air again.

[Citizen]

Depending on who you ask, Ibn Tamiyya is considered either a wayward soul or the devil incarnate (within Islam).

As most of you know, the study and focus on his 13th century work is at the center of the Wahabi Movement in Saudi Arabia, as al-Wahab studied him and the Hanabali school of Islamic law in Mecca. The puritanical Wahabis were the root of tribal contests for the next hundred and fifty years on the Arabian penninsula, and gained some noteriety during the 20th century for things you can read about in "See No Evil".

However, to say that Ibn Tamiyya or Wahabism is a danger or major role player in terrorism today might be giving them undue credit. Most contemporary Muslims recognize that trying to incorporate a puritanical 13th century doctrine today is about as absurd as Christianity reverting to the Middle Ages. Others consider him to be the theological root, or the convenient excuse, for terrorism today. But the real threat, as in all forms of fundamentalism, is posed by Islamic theologists who cherry-pick what they want to hear from the doctrine.

Whatever the interpretation, the threat posed by people who actually subscribe to Ibn Tamiyya or Wahabiism today is limited, as their opposition to modernization just champions their own cultural consequence.

[ilots]

Whatever the interpretation, the threat posed by people who actually subscribe to Ibn Tamiyya or Wahabiism today is limited, as their opposition to modernization just champions their own cultural consequence.
I'm sorry, but I'm not sure I am understanding.
Are you saying that Wahhabism played/plays no part in the current threats? Are you saying that Ibn Taymiyya's influence played/plays no part in the current threats?

I have trouble matching the above quote with this quote:
"But the real threat, as in all forms of fundamentalism, is posed by Islamic theologists who cherry-pick what they want to hear from the doctrine."

[Citizen]

I'm sorry, but I'm not sure I am understanding.
Are you saying that Wahhabism played/plays no part in the current threats? Are you saying that Ibn Taymiyya's influence played/plays no part in the current threats?

I have trouble matching the above quote with this quote:
"But the real threat, as in all forms of fundamentalism, is posed by Islamic theologists who cherry-pick what they want to hear from the doctrine."

Wahabism and Ibn Tamiyya are not threats in the context within which they are created. (The "spirit" of the scholar and movement, if you will). They are recurrent (throuhgout history) tools used by people who are, though.

The doctrine of Ibn Tamiyya vis a vi Wahabism is only a threat insofar as the extreme fundamentalism is often broken apart (e.g. when "Islamic theologists cherry-pick what they want to hear from the doctrine") to serve as the convenient excuse for terrorist tactics. For example, a common misinterpretation of I. Tamiyya is that he condones political assasination. This is true if you read his texts, but only within the confines of the period he wrote about, which summarized, amounted to his believing that the politicalization of Islam had led it astray, people were no longer walking the path as the Prophet had ascribed it, and political assasination was the first necessity to reinstitute "order" in the Islamic world.

Because the Saudi Royal family underwrites the Wahabis, there is often an assumption that the W. foster terror. To be sure, they have served as the inspiration for the Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Sunni movements. But the true Wahabis (fundamentalist religious zealots who live a lifestyle cleaved from reality, think Islamic Amish) have neither the means nor reason to support global terror networks. Their concern is not with the infidels, who they can't help, but with the wayward trend (per their perception) of progress within the Muslim world.

[Citizen]

For those interested in learning more about Wahhabism, check out this book (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195169913/sr=8-1/qid=1144231527/ref=pd_bbs_1/103-5346701-3787825?%5Fencoding=UTF8) "Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad."

(pp. 117): "Not only did Ibn Abd al-Wahhab not support a literal interpretation of the Quaran and hadith, but he also denounced those who did for their ignorance... He particularly singled out as an example of such ignorance the Kharijites- an early group of Muslims known for their purist and literal interpretation of the Quran," (they descended from the mountains to kill people because they thought Allah told them to execute them- think Muslim Boondock Saints), "and literalists who believe that they please God by their strictness and harshness. al-Wahhab considered such literalism to be tantamount to exaggeration and charged that people who literally interpret the Quaran clearly do not comprehend it's meaning."

[BCoRanger]

That was a good book. Another good one is "Understanding Arabs" by Margaret Nydell.

[ilots]

For those interested in learning more about Wahhabism, check out this book (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195169913/sr=8-1/qid=1144231527/ref=pd_bbs_1/103-5346701-3787825?%5Fencoding=UTF8) "Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad."


Thanks for the link!! I WILL check it out. -

But I am not sure where the interjection of Wahhabism came into the discussion of the question, “how big an influence was/is Ibn Taimiya regarding Political Islam.” I’m afraid, as can easily happen in a forum, it may have turned apples and oranges.

“To be sure, they have served as the inspiration.” How does one ‘inspire’ but not influence?

I stand by the contention that he holds/held influence. Certainly Qutb, Rida, Faraj, Azzam, bin-Laden, (the obvious names) and other actors of the past & present – especially those opposed to Muslim “apostate” regimes - make NO mask of the influence of Ibn Tamiyya's lessons, and have even quoted him particularly pertaining to the un-interpretable nature of jihad, the rights and duties of rulers to rule justly and IAW Islamic law. I think failing to recognize this influence is to view him in a very narrow context, regardless of whether or not he preached the same manner of modern radical fundamentalism and violence we see today.

There are many flavors of Ibn Taimiya that linger today; some were diluted, some were concentrated; but obvious flavors remain.

“For example, a common misinterpretation of I. Tamiyya is that he condones political assasination. This is true if you read his texts, but only within the confines of the period he wrote about, …….political assasination was the first necessity to reinstitute "order" in the Islamic world.” Though I openly admit, I’m not the sharpest mind here, but I certainly don’t recall reading an expiration date on Ibn Taimaya’s works. To use a more western context, there is much in Clausewitz written for the period of warfare of the time, and yet to ignore his influence on schools of modern strategy and military theory would be considered derelict.

Ibn Taimiya’s teachings include justification, and in fact duty, for Muslim-on-Muslim jihad in order to preserve and protect the Ummah. You ref/him as a rejectionist of modernization; but like most rejectionists, he did not simply reject the modern, he look to models of the past. Often in the historical case of Islam, this appears as B. Lewis describes "a rejection of modernity in favor of a return to the sacred past." Ibn Taimiya advanced the notions of the early Caliphate in which rulers ruled with direct consult to the clergy, vis-à-vis social codes and laws. He furthered the idea that obeying a leader who did not follow the precepts of Islam was rejecting the word of God; as such, Muslims were obligated to rebel against such leaders. In his Fatwahs he attacked the Mongol and rebel leaders for not ruling IAW/Islamic law, instead under the Yasa; a crime was punishable w/death. These, and others, lesson have had relevant influence on modern schools of though in Political Islam.

In an isolated, false microcosm where context, perception, and relevance carry no weight, perhaps the scholars that ascribe directly to Ibn Taimiya have no bearing and are not concerned “with the infidels, who they can't help, but with the wayward trend (per their perception) of progress within the Muslim world.” But haven’t actors, themselves, in both Political Islam, and associated w/current threats, made clear their influence by Ibn Taimiya, and or his teachings?

I simply think it is important to note that Ibn Taimiya influence goes beyond the “Islamic theorist,” - Abd al-Wahhab -, who also “cherry-picked what (he) wanted to hear from the doctrine.”

None-the-less, whether "apples and oranges," we simply disagree, or I'm just plain dumb - thanks for the time!

[auc1004]

What do people on here think about Marc Lynch's theory of the Arab public sphere? He argues that there is a transnational Arab public sphere forming because ideas and debates are carried out in a fairly free form on the various Arabic satellite channels and through the Internet. The U.S., he says, should take advantage of this and start a dialogue (I know "dialogue" sounds wishy-washy) with the Arab world. This dialogue, over time, would change attitudes toward the U.S. among opinion leaders and filter down to the masses, and intra-Arab debate reflected the change in attitudes. He sets up a pretty convincing plan for how to do it.

The problem with his theory, as I see it, is that the transnational Arab public sphere is just that: transnational. It doesn't deal with particular local and national issues, and instead focuses on Arab vs. non-Arab situations (Palestine and Iraq take up the vast majority of newstime). Also, satellite and Internet reach relatively few Arabs, thus making the dialogue between the U.S. and elite Arabs. Meanwhile, Arabs are still being informed about local and national issues by government propoganda and through the local mosques. I think this sets up a possible major conflict between the elite Arabs and the regular Arab. Let's say a democracy is set up in an Arab country...I can't see an outcome that would favor a non-Islamist government, because the transnational public sphere hasn't dealt with the local issues, the government info is useless, and the only real source of change and good info (in their view) is the religious establishment. Plus, I sometimes wonder if the satellite channels divert attention from local concerns. Democratic practices have been used in various Arab countries in order to save the regime.

Anyways, I don't see how a dialogue with a transnational public can really solve problems in the Middle East until we can also get a free public debate about national issues to occur. Does anyone have thoughts about this? Sorry for the long post.