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The Take-Down of Kabul: An Effective Coup de Main
by Lester W. Grau
Long article (http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:oRI68OxUo-kJ:www.leavenworth.army.mil/csi/research/old%2520MOUT/MOUTGrau.asp+The+Take-Down+of+Kabul:+An+Effective+Coup+de+Main&hl=en)
Excerpts:
On 27 April 1978, Afghan officers that had trained in the Soviet Union conducted a military coup bringing Communist power to Afghanistan. Nur M. Taraki, the new Soviet-backed president, announced sweeping programs of land distribution, emancipation of women, and the destruction of the old Afghanistan social structure. The new government was immediately challenged by armed resistance. The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) disintegrated as bloody purges swept the officer ranks. In March 1979, the city of Herat rose in revolt. Most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. Forces loyal to President Taraki advanced and occupied the city, while the Afghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Over 5,000 people, including Soviet citizens, died in the fighting.
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This invasion model was used successfully in Afghanistan. Beginning in 1978, Soviet military and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed Forces and Security Forces down to battalion level. In March 1979, eight Mi-8 helicopters, a transport squadron of AN-12s, a signal center, and a paratroop battalion transferred to Bagram airbase in Afghanistan. The aircraft and all the crews were Soviet, yet the aircraft had Afghan markings and the personnel wore Afghan uniforms. The paratroopers, who provided security, wore Afghan flight suits.[4] The squadron conducted extensive reconnaissance of the country. In April 1979, General of the Army Aleksiy A. Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegation of several generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation. Gen. Yepishev had made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 invasion. In August 1979, General of the Army Ivan G. Pavlovski, Commander in Chief (CINC) of Soviet Ground Forces, led a group of some 60 officers on an extended reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan that lasted for weeks. In 1968, he also had been involved in the Czech crisis as commander of the invasion force. In November 1979, a Spetsnaz battalion, clad in Afghan uniforms, deployed to Afghanistan and was incorporated into the presidential security forces, guarding the outer perimeter of Amin’s residence. This so-called “Muslim” battalion was made up of Soviet Central Asian soldiers who spoke Pashtu, Dari (a dialect of Farsi), Tadjik or Uzbek. In December, two thirty-man Spetsnaz groups, code-named “Grom” (Thunder) and “Zenit” (Zenith) deployed to Kabul and began reconnaissance of the thirteen objectives that they would have to take out in the coming assault.[5] More members of Zenith deployed later in the month.
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By noon, the Soviet forces had received their orders signed by the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitri Fedorovich Ustinov. These orders directed that the 40th Army and Soviet Air Force planes would begin crossing the borders of the DRA at 1500 (Moscow time) on 25 December. The Soviet forces began their incursion precisely at the established time. The scouts and air-assault battalion of Captain L. V. Khabarov were the first to cross. They were tasked with seizing the Salang pass, a crucial choke point on the road to Kabul (twelve Soviet scouts would die in ambush at the pass). The remainder of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division followed the troops across the pontoon bridges.
Simultaneously, Soviet Military Transport Aviation aircraft crossed the border carrying elements of the 103rd Airborne Division (commanded by General Major I. F. Ryabchenko) and the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment to airfields in the capital and nearby Bagram. It took a total of 343 flights and 47 hours to transport the paratroopers and their vehicles and gear. The first aircraft touched down at 1615 on 25 December and the last touched down at 1430 on the 27th. General Colonel I. D. Gaydaenko directed the military air transport operation. The effort did not occur without casualties. At 1933 on the 25th, an IL-76 piloted by Captain V.V. Golovchin crashed into a mountain and burned during its approach landing. All thirty-seven paratroopers and seven crew members were killed.
On the 25th, the chief Soviet advisers to the Afghan military met in Kabul. They were ordered to prevent any Afghan units, which were opposed to the Soviet presence, from approaching Kabul. Those military advisers and technicians who worked with the DRA air defense forces were directed to prevent actions against the air movement of the paratroopers by taking control of all the air defense systems and their ammunition storage bunkers. The advisers temporarily disabled some air defense systems by removing the sights or physically locking them. Consequently, the Soviet air armada flew into Afghanistan unopposed.[11]
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The commanders of Thunder and Zenith, KGB Majors M. Romanov and Ya. Semenov, conducted a reconnaissance of the external area and examined the firing positions and the nearby locale. Not far from the palace, on the hill where the tanks were in over-watch, was a restaurant/casino where the high-ranking officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext of finding a place for their officers to gather for New Year’s celebration, the Spetsnaz commanders visited the establishment. From there, the Tadzh-Bek was clearly visible, as were the approaches to the palace and the outposts sited to protect it. The commanders conducted a thorough reconnaissance and then started to drive back to brief their findings. At the second outpost, they were stopped, disarmed, and held for four hours by a suspicious Afghan officer. Finally, after much tea drinking and conversation, the commanders were released. It was a day before the assault, and the reconnaissance was accomplished. The KGB Spetsnaz knew the approach routes; the guard schedule; the total number of Amin’s guards and bodyguards; the location of machine gun nests, armored vehicles and tanks; the internal arrangement of rooms and corridors in the palace and the location of radios and telephone equipment.
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Shortly before 1900, KGB Col. Kozlov called General Magomedov, the Chief Soviet Military Adviser, and told him that due to unforeseen circumstances, the time of the assault had changed and it was necessary to start as soon as possible. After some fifteen minutes, the 12-man assault group lead by Capt. Sakhatov boarded its truck and started to drive to the hill where the tanks were dug in. Their mission was to seize the tanks and prevent their being used against the assault groups. Further, they were to deceive the defending palace guard, pretending that the members of the Afghan Security Brigade had revolted and were attacking the palace. The Soviets had to create the impression that the first volleys fired came from the security brigade headquarters caserne. The 2nd Company of the Muslim battalion lay in wait at its designated position ready to support the movement of Group Sakhatov by fire.[27]
As planned, Sakhatov’s group moved out fifteen minutes prior to the beginning of the assault. As they drove through the Afghan 3rd Battalion area, they saw that the battalion was on alert. The battalion commander and deputies were standing in the center of the parade ground while weapons and ammunition were being issued to the battalion personnel. Quickly estimating the situation, Sakhatov decided to capture the command group of the 3rd Infantry Battalion. Moving at top speed, the truck full of Spetsnaz suddenly braked by the Afghan officers and within a few seconds, the officers were lying on the floor of the truck. The GAZ-66 jumped forward leaving a cloud of dust behind. During the first few minutes, the soldiers of the battalion did not understand what had happened, but then they opened fire on the fleeing vehicle. It was too late. The dust cloud hid the vehicle and the firing was ineffective. Sakhatov drove two hundred meters and then, reaching advantageous terrain, stopped the vehicle and unloaded his personnel. The Spetsnaz immediately lay down and opened fire on the pursuing 3rd Battalion soldiers. The leaderless Afghans bunched up presenting a fine target. The two machine guns and eight assault rifles of Sakhatov’s group killed over two hundred personnel. In the meantime, the snipers removed the guards by the tanks. When the vehicle holding Group Sakhatov left the Afghan 3rd Battalion’s position, Col. Kozlov heard the firing and quickly gave the commands “Fire” and “Advance” to the officers and soldiers of the Muslim battalion, paratroop company and KGB Spetsnaz groups. Red rockets flew into the air. Wrist watches showed 1915. Over the radio crackled the code word to begin the assault, “Storm-333.”
The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: CPSU CC Politburo Decision and Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan, 24 May 1979
To KABUL
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the instruction, inform him that the Afghan leadership's request about the provision of supplementary military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been attentively reviewed.
Say that in Moscow they share the concern of the Afghan leadership in relation to the activation of counter-revolutionary activity by the reactionary forces in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership, guided by a strong desire to provide further internationalist assistance in order to stabilize the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has taken a decision to deliver to Afghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free-of-charge, special property in the sum of 53 million rubles, including 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which 50 will represent an expedited delivery), 48 thousand machine guns, around 1000 grenade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, and also to send in the form of an expedited delivery in June-July 1979 medicines and medical equipment in the sum of 50 thousand rubles. In terms of immediate assistance in May of this year, 100 incendiary tanks and 160 single-use bomb cassettes. The delivery of gas bombs with a non-toxic poison gas is not considered possible.
...more (http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=526)
More documents here (http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.Collection&class=New%20Evidence%20on%20the%20Soviet%20Interve ntion%20in%20Afghanistan)
This .pdf document (http://www.donaldsensing.com/docs/CHAPTER_1_%20Lighting%20the%20fuse.pdf) claimed that Colonel Boyarinov had been killed by his own men.
Ironically, the Soviet dead included spetsnaz commander Col. Grigoriy Boyarinov, who
had ordered his troops to gun down anyone who exited the palace before the all-clear signal was
given. Forgetting his own order, Boyarinov rushed outside in the thick of the fighting to order
more ammunition be brought up. He made only a few steps before his own soldiers machine
gunned him into eternity.
Recently I spoke with some Soviet veterans about that but of course, they rejected to make any comments on that ...
Air Assault Comes to Afghanistan 1984
In 1984, the Soviets began to modify their air and ground strategy in an effort to more effectively employ their assets against the insurgents.
Stephen Blank described this shift in strategy and tactics as “moving in the direction of greater reliance upon mobility, long-range ordnance from air
power, vertical rather than tank-led encirclement, [and the] use of specially assigned forces.” The Soviet lessons drawn from the first three years
of the war involving the necessity for rapid mobility and massive, responsive fire support in essence constituted a restatement of traditional Soviet
doctrinal precepts. The focus on “vertical envelopment,” however, established a new emphasis for Soviet operations involving the massed use of
heliborne operations by specially trained airborne and air assault forces.
Soviet airborne operations involving actual parachute drops were relatively rare in Afghanistan. Still, airborne forces (VDV) had proved vital in
conducting operations to secure key installations throughout the country during the initial invasion. As the war progressed, VDV forces pioneered
many of the Soviet irregular warfare tactics, and, in turn, these forces became a primary element for conducting counterinsurgency operations either as dismounted infantry or by helicopter insertion. The following eyewitness account by a former mujahid aptly described the special capabilities of VDV forces in unconventional warfare:
We had taken positions close to the top of a mountain overlooking a valley and were shooting at the Soviets with BM-12s [rockets] and mortars. . . .
Then all of a sudden a VDV company of about 90 men appeared and attacked us from behind. They had climbed straight up the mountain during the
night. . . . We fought for two days there, and many people were killed. Before that I had thought that the Soviet soldiers are not worth anything
These were really tough guys.
This story not only illustrates the capabilities of the VDV, but it also points to a shift in Soviet strategy toward night operations during this period. As
late as November 1982, one senior Soviet military leader, Guards Major General F. Kuz’min, had criticized the performance of Soviet forces in night
operations. Soviet planners responded to the need for a more effective night fighting capability, and by 1984 VDV (airborne), DShB (air assault),
and specially trained reconnaissance troops constituted the primary forces for conducting night attacks and ambushes. Still, the lack of an
effective night-capable aircraft restricted support to these ambushes and limited other aerial operations during the hours of darkness.
By 1984, helicopters, and the mobility they provided, began to play a much-expanded role in the war against the insurgents. Both VDV and DShB
forces counted on helicopters to provide them with increased mobility and firepower support in contrast to the vulnerable and slow-moving
mechanized convoys. One veteran of the desant forces, Vladislav Tamarov, stated “It was a lot easier on us when the helicopters took us into the
mountains: you went to the airfield, boarded the copter, and in an hour you were there.” Desant forces conducted four major types of military
actions in Afghanistan, including: large-scale operations using artillery and aviation support to destroy concentrated pockets of mujahideen;
small-scale operations by regiments with artillery and aviation support aimed at destroying a specific group of mujahideen; the “combing” of villages
to identify weapons stores and field hospitals; and company-sized ambushes near roads, major trails or villages. Tamarov remarked that the Soviet
counterinsurgency forces relied heavily on dismounted operations in contrast to their motorized rifle counterparts. His description of Soviet
operations also illustrated the desant forces’ reliance on air support as well as the routine use of these forces in counterinsurgency roles. In fact,
DShB forces began to conduct surprise heliborne attacks against both villages and suspected mujahideen way stations (chaikhana, literally “tea
house”). In one example, two helicopters landed approximately two dozen troops at a chaikhana. They surprised and, in about ten minutes, killed 30
insurgents before departing by helicopter.
An operation in October 1984 in the area of the Pizgoran ravine demonstrated the increasing Soviet reliance on large-scale air landings involving
motorized rifle and counterinsurgency forces. On 25 October, 24 Mi-8 Hip helicopters airlifted 1,280 men into the area. During the operation, Mi-24
Hinds, MiG-23 Floggers, and Su-25s provided fire support for the landing force. Sarin and Dvoretsky stated that this type of operation allowed Soviet
forces to inflict losses on insurgents holding defensive positions while projecting “concentrated fire at distant operational locations beyond the front line.” Main force units subsequently accomplished a link-up with the airhead forces in this operation prior to a further advance against the
insurgent positions. In this instance, the air assault landing had essentially acted as the force with which first to outflank, and then to crack the
mujahideen defensive line.
The relative success of this new combined arms strategy employing air assault techniques led to a growing optimism among the Soviet leadership
concerning their ability to eventually defeat the insurgency. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa stated in 1986 that the war would be
over in five years. Kapitsa’s assertion proved prophetic, but not in the intended sense of a Soviet victory. Prior to 1984, Soviet control of the skies
was largely uncontested. The mujahideen lacked the armaments with which to construct an effective air defense system, and achieved their
greatest successes against Soviet air units in mortar and rocket attacks against their airfields. However, this situation began to change as the
insurgents acquired a greater number of heavy machine guns and manportable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Prior to 1986, the mujahideen’s most effective anti-aircraft weapon proved to be the “Dashka” 12.7 mm and the “Zigriat” 14.5 mm heavy
machine-guns. A Soviet defector, Alexander Zuyev, noted that the mujahideen air defense tactics were “relatively primitive” in 1984, “[but] their
12.7 mm and 14.5 mm antiaircraft guns could be dangerous below an altitude of about 4,500 feet.” These heavy machine-guns began arriving in
greater numbers as a result of increasing Chinese deliveries. For example, there were only 13 mujahideen heavy machine-guns in the Panjshir Valley
in 1982, but, by the end of 1984, there were almost 250. The mujahideen became quite proficient in the use of these weapons to conduct “lateral
ambushes.” They situated gun sites at positions along opposing ridgelines in order to provide enfilade fire of Soviet aircraft operating in the area
below the ridge or along the valley floor. A chagrined Soviet veteran described his unit’s capture of several “Dashka” heavy machine-guns which
had found their way from the Soviet Union to China, and on to Afghanistan, where they were now being used to kill Russian soldiers.
Mujahideen air defense initiatives were not only confined to the battlefield. In fact, the insurgents achieved some dramatic results by infiltrating
areas in the vicinity of Soviet airfields in order to attack Russian aircraft. Military Transport Aviation (VTA) continued to play a key role in resupplying
Russian forces in Afghanistan. According to one analyst, from the early stages of the war the Soviets relied “heavily on the VTA for the routine
introduction of military materiel ordinarily transported by road. . . . [and] helicopters were being used extensively to move supplies within the
country.” However, the VTA was not able to escape the effects associated with the mujahideen’s increased number of SA-7s. On 28 October
1984, the insurgents shot down a Soviet An-22 Cock heavy transport using a SA-7 as it took off from the Kabul airport. In another example, an
Afghan Airline DC-10 with 300 passengers aboard was hit by a SA-7, but managed to land safely. Surrounded by a series of low hills, the airport at
Kabul remained particularly vulnerable to the SAM threat throughout the remainder of the war. Kabul was not the only airfield put at risk by the
mujahideen’s manportable SAMs. In September 1984, the insurgents shot down a Bakhtar Airlines aircraft with a SA-7 just after it took off from the
Kandahar airfield. The Soviets countered the growing SAM threat with on-board decoy flare systems as well as helicopter flare ships orbiting the
airport prior to take-offs and landings. The increasing SAM threat throughout the theater resulted in the redeployment of Soviet electronic
intelligence (ELINT) aircraft and long-range bombers based at Shindand back to the Soviet Union. Bases inside the Soviet Union, such as Termez,
provided greater security for these assets, and still allowed for their effective employment within Afghanistan.
The acquisition of SA-7s allowed the mujahideen to achieve limited success in blunting the Soviet aerial advantage. The impact of the weapon should
not be measured in the numbers of aircraft shot down alone. The missiles forced Soviet and DRA aircraft and helicopters to adjust their mission
profiles and tactical procedures. The introduction of the SA-7 not only increased the threat experienced by the aircrews, but it also demonstrated
the disproportionate impact that can occur when insurgencies obtain modest technological upgrades to their weapons arsenals. In the
unconventional warfare environment, insurgents do not need to control the air, but only to dictate the way in which airpower can be employed by a
technologically advanced adversary.
By the end of 1984, Soviet airpower, in all its various forms, carried the lion’s share of the burden in prosecuting the war against the mujahideen.
Operations ranged from the use of 36 Tu-16 Badger bombers in a mini “ARC LIGHT” campaign against the Panjshir Valley in April 1984 to the
employment of VTA An-12 Cubs and An-26 Curls as master bombers. Transport aircraft acting as flare ships for battlefield illumination also played
an important role in discouraging or combating mujahideen night attacks. In addition, the use of helicopters in support of air assault, CAS and
interdiction operations formed a crucial element in the Soviet air strategy to defeat the insurgents. Stephen Blank correctly argued that “Between
1980 and 1986 Soviet strategy in Afghanistan gradually came to rely almost exclusively on airpower, staking everything on airpower’s capabilities to
deliver ordnance, interdict supplies and reserves, isolate the battlefield from the rear, destroy the agricultural basis . . . and rapidly move troops from
point to point.”
By 1985, barring a massive influx of Soviet forces, it was clear that Soviet airpower would have to play an even greater role in order to win the
battle against the mujahideen. The relatively small size of the Soviet contingent, estimated at 115,000 troops by early 1985, precluded a ground
solution to the campaign. By the end of the year, Soviet strategy mirrored the proverb “live by the sword, die by the sword.” A survey in 1985 by
Swedish relief workers illustrated the continued willingness of the Russians to employ the sword of airpower as a punitive weapon. The survey
indicated that the fields of over half the farmers who remained in Afghanistan were bombed, and over a quarter of these same farmers had their
irrigation systems destroyed and livestock shot by Soviet and DRA forces. The Soviets were in fact living to a great degree by the airpower sword,
but the mujahideen were becoming increasingly adept at blunting the blows of the Soviet aerial cutlass.
By the beginning of 1986, the mujahideen had clearly demonstrated an increased ability to combat Soviet airpower, and had forced Russian jets to
operate at higher altitudes thereby decreasing their accuracy. The greater number of heavy machine-guns among the insurgents also led to an
increasing capability to threaten the mainstay of Soviet aviation in Afghanistan, their helicopters. The Mi-24 Hind, almost impervious to small arms fire, was vulnerable to concentrated fire from both heavy machine-guns and the SA-7. In the end, the numbers tell the story. One Afghan defector
estimated DRA aircraft losses between December 1979 and early 1984 at 164 aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter). Joseph J. Collins, a former
US army officer, estimated that by the end of 1984 Soviet losses totaled 600 aircraft. The balance of power began to shift in favor of the
insurgents as the mujahideen achieved their first successes in contesting Soviet dominance of the skies over Afghanistan in 1984 and 1985.
Mujahideen Ascendant
The offensives of 1984 and 1985 had proved costly to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Western intelligence reports estimated that 2,343 Soviet
personnel were killed in action (KIA) in 1984 and another 1,868 KIA in 1985. The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1985 coincided with what would become the third costliest year of the
war for the Soviets. Soviet frustration with the war was becoming increasingly apparent. From the platform of the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, Gorbachev described Afghanistan as a “bloody stump.” In addition to the cost in lives, the Soviet Union was spending an estimated 5 billion dollars a year in prosecuting the war. In fact, 1986 was destined to be the year of decision for Soviet policy makers concerning their continued
involvement in the Afghan quagmire.
British defense correspondent Mark Urban stated that “From early 1986 the Soviet Army switched to a more defensive strategy. Rural operations
were reduced and defences around towns increased . . .” Urban estimated that there were six offensives involving more than 5,000 Soviet troops
each in 1984-85 while there was only one such operation during the last three years of the war. Urban’s argument is correct with respect to the
involvement of Soviet ground forces, as the burden of large-scale ground fighting began to shift to DRA forces. In fact, Soviet casualties in 1986
dropped to their lowest levels since 1981. The Soviets did not, however, completely abandon offensive operations. In February 1986, Soviet forces
conducted a large-scale operation into the Charikar valley, approximately 40 miles north of Kabul, which demonstrated the increasing proficiency of
Soviet forces in the conduct of desant-type combined arms operations. For example, on the first day alone, helicopters conducted a tactical
insertion of three airborne battalions and three motor rifle companies. Later, an additional 17 battalions were landed in support of the operation.
The Charikar valley operation illustrated the increased proficiency achieved by Soviet forces in massed air assault operations by 1986.
In early April, Soviet and DRA forces launched a joint operation aimed at capturing the major mujahideen stronghold at Zhawar, a mere three
kilometers from the Pakistani border. The attacking force consisted of 12,000 troops of which only 2,200 were Soviet. Soviet airpower played a
critical role in assembling forces for the attack by airlifting 4,200 DRA and Russian troops into the airport at Khost just prior to the start of the
operation. During the initial stages of the operation, DRA mechanized and ground forces pushing south from Khost encountered heavy resistance that
slowed their advance to between two and three kilometers per day. In attempting to break the mujahideen resistance, the offensive on the road to
Zhawar relied heavily on large-scale heliborne operations in order to provide the anvil for the hammer of the advancing mechanized forces. Brigadier
Abdol Gafur, the DRA commander for the operation, employed elite Soviet and DRA battalions in air assault landings behind the mujahideen lines.
Soviet aircraft also supported the DRA forces by conducting strikes on mujahideen positions. For example, Soviet Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack
aircraft with laser-guided bombs successfully struck the insurgents’ cave/storage complex at Zhawar. After almost three weeks of fighting, Zhawar
fell to the DRA and Soviet forces. Although modest in terms of Soviet ground participation, the campaign clearly indicated the continuing importance
of Soviet airpower in all its forms. The Zhawar campaign provided an example of Soviet airpower’s effectiveness when the mujahideen chose to stand
and fight a fixed battle.
During this period, the Soviets also adapted their tactics to better suit the nature of unconventional warfare by employing small groups of specially
trained commando forces (spetsnaz) to conduct hit-and-run raids against the mujahideen. Edward Girardet, a journalist with extensive experience
traveling with the mujahideen, stated “The special troops are swift, silent and deadly. Swooping down in a single December [1985] raid, they
slaughtered 82 guerrillas and wounded 60 more.” A mujahideen commander, Amin Wardak described the ambush: “They attacked at night in a
narrow gorge. At first, we didn’t know we were being shot at because of the silencers. Then our people began falling.” These ambushes were
effective, but relied on small numbers of specially trained forces. In addition, these forces relied largely on the mobility provided by helicopters for
insertion and exfiltration. Still, these isolated successes could not break the mujahideen’s hold on the countryside.
If Soviet ground operations were reduced in 1986, the nature of Soviet air operations remained essentially the same. One estimate of Soviet aircraft
in Afghanistan in 1986 included 80 MiG-21 Fishbeds, 40 MiG-23 Floggers, 80 Su-17 Fitters, 30 Su-25s, and 27 reconnaissance aircraft. However,
the number of helicopters in the country dramatically declined between 1985 and 1988. Compared to a high of approximately 600 aircraft in 1982, the
number of helicopters fell from 350 in 1985 to 325 in 1986, and, finally to 275 by February 1988.91 The greatly reduced number of helicopters was in
part tied to the restricted size and nature of Soviet ground operations. More importantly, the growing vulnerability of rotary-wing assets to the
increasing missile threat undoubtedly played a role in the decision to reduce these forces.
Online books:
The Bear Trap - The Defeat of A Superpower (http://www.sovietsdefeatinafghanistan.com/beartrap/english/index.htm)
Two Steps From Heaven (http://artofwar.ru/e/ewstafxew_mihail_aleksandrowich/theafghanwindblowsagain.shtml)
Soviet - Afghan Group Of S. Amosov
Kunar battalion (# of military unit 93992) of the 66th separate infantry brigade of Dzhelalabad division moved to Novobad bridge across Kunar river on 15th May of 1983. The task: companies # 8 and 9 were supposed to occupy commanding heights and blockade Nova ravine, the 7th company blockades Gandzhgal and Borugey ravines, where a special group of mine-layers would be installing sensors LRealiyaі. A battalion of Ltsarandoyі (Afghan forces) was given to Soviet units under indispensable condition that Afghan groups would be moving in advance of Soviet soldiers. Immediately after passage across the river Afghan soldiers refused to move forward and politic officer of Soviet battalion made a decision to move ahead of them. Soldiers of both Soviet and Afghan battalions mixed and some Soviet-Afghan groups were organised. In particular, seven Ltsarandoyі soldiers Lmergedі with the 2nd platoon of the 7th company (the head of platoon lieutenant Demtchenko), which was leaded, in fact, by the political officer lieutenant S. Amosov, who was taking care of recently arrived lieutenant Demtchenko. The 7th company was supposed to break up on platoons and to be located on three knolls - 1st platoon on the right side, the 3rd, leaded by the commander of the company - captain A., in the heart of the ravine, the 2nd platoon on the left wing, the closest position to the Pakistan border, which was just three kilometres away.
Link (http://artofwar.ru/g/grigorxew_w_a/text_0090.shtml)
Shutul tragedy. 16 - 17 October 1985, Pandjshir
The first act of that tragedy happened on the mountain ?shelfі on the way to Rukha. That time everybody regretted they had ignored the GRU information. The ambush was very real, besides well prepared. Seizing the carelessness of the sentry posts the small group of ?dukhs-і grenade launcher shooters and snipers infiltrated to the road and took position not above, as usually, but beneath the road, behind duvals (solid clay fence) of ruined kishlak, extending along the road. Some mortar detachments allocated behind the line of our posts. They even could manage to put special marks on rocks, kind of guiding points. They made the only one mistake - thinking that mobile commander centre would be in the column, moving to Rukha. Blowing up, from the grenade launcher, moving in the head of column the sapper-s truck and BMP, moving at the rear of column, ?beardedі calmly began to fire upon the rest of trucks between those two. Both ensigns, who were riding on armoured carriers, were wounded, the lieutenant burned in one of trucks. Expecting dazing ?shuraviі (Russian in Afghan language) come out of trucks, ?dukhsі covered the column with mortar fire. Whereas soldiers in the column understood they had to shoot down the road not up, whereas people at the sentry posts required and corrected the artillery fire upon the mortar detachments positions ten minutes past by. During that time ?dukhsі disappeared. Totally three people were killed in that short combat, ten were wounded, five BMP and six trucks were burned to ground. One can just imagine how many people could be killed and wounded if the command centre and soldiers of supporting units were in the column.
Link (http://artofwar.ru/a/aleksandrow_s_k/text_0060.shtml)
The Smack Brigades
How Opium Lost the Afghan War
by Misha Pozhininsky
June 8, 2005
Every few days the merchants come to our base with their big cart of junk. There had been feelings before that we shouldn't deal with them because over in Herat, one of our boys had been killed by an ambush when he was examining something in the cart and noticed a system of wire from the engine, painted the same color (or just covered in dust) as the rest of the vehicle. He backed away but it was too late, they saw him, and the whole thing was packed with dynamite and other explosives and they blew it up.
It went up in flames, but the bullets in the cart kept the guys jumping around. That was a favorite tactic, cunning, of the dushmani, the Afghan mujahedin.
There were also ideological problems with this "free market" buying from merchants. We in the "Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces" as someone got it in his head to call us, were there to bring the people to power and then kill the ones in the way of Afghanistan's Socialism. But no one reported this behavior, because the officers were big players in the "free market," with the merchants at the bases and some others.
Most of the soldiers also had to do something with the free market if we wanted to survive. When I arrived in Afghanistan, I took care of my equipment as I was trained to do at the academy. It was after my first week that I noticed these pieces of string that were hanging from my boots. I repaired them as I was able to with strong thread from a torn uniform collar. The other soldiers from 40th Army Air who had been at Bagram longer laughed and pointed at their feet.
Link (http://www.diacritica.com/sobaka/2005/smack.html)
God in Hell
Memories of Afghanistan
by Misha Pozhininsky
Winter 1999
Afghanistan means pain. Afghanistan means tears. Afghanistan can mean anything you like, but not shame. It was politicians who made the decisions: some wise, others less so. For the unwise decisions, soldiers paid with their blood. The politicians who started and ran the war knew that neither they, nor their children, nor their grandchildren, nor their friends, nor anyone they knew personally would do the fighting. The "workers' and peasants' Red Army" fought there.
Maj. General Aleksandr Lebed Afghanistan, '79 - '83
Afghanistan in a way was like an incubator for this new era. Every time we killed a civilian, intentionally or not, we made his children orphans, his wife a widow, and every male in his family from grandfathers to boys new recruits for the mujahedin. Every time we blew up a village, nest of resistance or not, we got a few dushmani and a lot of civilians, and everyone who got away joined the uprising. We created guerrillas with everything we did, but it was the Americans who trained them and turned them into terrorists. Afghanistan was the coming-of-age for the Mujahedin, al-Faran, the Algerian GIA, some of whom fought, but many more of whom swindled the CIA out of their money and guns and hid in the lawless hills outside of our air bases waiting for the Red Satan to die and plotting against the Great Satan. It was our fault first, your fault last, to quote a Russian saying.
I didn't think I was unlucky. I joined Airborne because I wanted adventure and, like most, I was a frustrated aviator. Now of course I have to add that I was a little cracked in the head. I didn't meet the minimum requirements for math skills or physical stature, so my dream of flying MiGs and taking out rogue F-16s over Soviet airspace was ruined. The next most glamorized wing of the Red Army was Airborne. We were kind of like your Navy SEALS, we were elite and anonymous. We trained jumping out of planes into high drifts of snow but when I jumped off to load the coffins from the tarmac in Bagram, that was the only time I jumped out of a plane in Afghanistan. I didn't even get to use my parachute.
I served a two year tour in Afghanistan, which was later followed by another two years. My reconnaissance company had been commanded by Aleksei Ivanovich Lebed, the brother of Aleksandr Lebed and now also a governor somewhere in Siberia. But that was two years before I got there - ancient history in "war time". I served under a lot of people perestroika made famous. Aslan Maskhadov, President of Chechnya, I knew in Hungary; former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ran the training academy in Ryazan. Today, if someone asks you, "Did you serve in Afghanistan?", it's kind of shorthand for saying "Cut the shit, you and I have been in the real shit before, so let's be level." Afghan War veterans make up a lot of the new politicians and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation barely has anyone who served. Why they make the same mistakes is the subject of another article entirely...
Link (http://www.diacritica.com/sobaka/archive/afghan.html)
I know that militaryphotos.net has a bad reputation over here at SOCNET but it would be silly to leave out this excellent thread (link bellow). Besides many kids there are also experienced servicemen and member 16 OBr SpN is one of those few. I wish he paid a visit to SOCNET as well ... if he is not here already :)
Link (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=7201)
Afghanistan: eight years of Soviet occupation - includes related articles
US Department of State Bulletin
March, 1988
by Craig Karp
Introduction and Summary After 8 years of brutal war on the Afghan people, the Soviet attempt to control Afghanistan has failed. The conflict between the Soviet occupation force and the Afghan resistance grinds on, but it has changed. Death, destruction, and the suffering of an innocent people continue, but military, diplomatic, and political events have moved against the Soviets. These pressures may lead Moscow to end its horrible and ultimately futile endeavor in Afghanistan.
In the 8th year of Soviet occupation, the military initiative in many ways passed to the mujahidin. They dictated a higher level of combat, which was higher throughout the year and less subject to seasonal fluctuations. The regime announced a cease-fire in January and extended it in July and again in November, but its forces did not keep the cease-fire commitment.
Soviet forces also were more active but ultimately adopted a more reactive, defensive posture. In the latter part of the year, they pulled back from several isolated bases. The Soviets and their Afghan clients have seen their unquestioned dominance of the skies slip. They have suffered increased losses in the air and on the ground. Kabul's forces deserted repeatedly, sometimes by the hundreds, and force levels are maintained mostly by press-gang conscription.
Despite a year-long effort, the Soviet proxies in Kabul failed to entice either their Afghan opponents or prominent neutrals to support or join a government dominated by Najibullah (Najib) and his People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In January, Najib announced a campaign for "national reconciliation." Offers of some form of participation have been made to Afghanistan's former monarch, Zahir Shah, to a variety of prominent non-party Afghans, and to leaders of the resistance, who rejected these offers and refused to become "reconciled" to Soviet domination (even if disguised in Afghan clothes). The regime made more concessions over the year that also were unacceptable to the Afghan people.
The PDPA, Moscow's chosen instrument of rule, has become weaker. Party factionalism was further complicated by the purge of former party leader Babrak Karmal and his followers. Although Najib has little personal support, even within the party, he had himself named head of state in September. In December, when a new constitution was imposed by an illegitimate, party-packed assembly, Najib had himself elected president. At that session the regime changed its name from the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" (DRA) to the "Republic of Afghanistan" (RA).
The Afghan resistance continues to challenge Soviet and regime control from every corner of the country. In the last year, however, it became a greater threat. Mujahidin military capabilities grew in many ways--better cooperation and air defense meant that many areas of the country were effectively free of Soviet/regime control. Mujahidin morale is at an all-time high. Political cooperation within the seven-party resistance alliance in Peshawar improved. In October, the Alliance members selected Maulavi Mohammed Yunis Khalis of the Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis) party to an 18-month term as its Rais, or leader.
The UN-sponsored indirect talks on the Afghan issue continued in 1987. The proximity talks--between Pakistan and the Kabul regime--narrowed differences on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the only outstanding issue. In two rounds, in March, and September, the gap narrowed to 16 months offered by Kabul and 8 months by Pakistan. By the end of the year, Najib suggested Kabul might accept 12 months or less.
Diplomatically, the Soviets tried to improve the government's international legitimacy by sending Kabul emissaries on a 6-month-long worldwide diplomatic and public relations campaign. Kabul scored some gains in diplomatic recognition, but the overall effort failed. Other countries continued to condemn the occupation and reject the Soviet assertion that there is any solution to the Afghan issue short of Soviet withdrawal. In November, at the General Assembly, 123 nations, the largest total to date, voted for a resolution calling for the immediate and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The resolution has passed with increasing margins every year since the Soviet invasion on December 27, 1979.
Outlook. The prospect of peace has great appeal for a people who have suffered 9 years of tyrannical rule backed by 8 years of foreign occupation. But the Afghans have made it clear that they will not accept peace at the price of continued foreign rule.
Moscow has stated repeatedly that "a political decision to withdraw has already been made." Soviet public statements on the eve of the December Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Washington, D.C., raised expectations that the U.S.S.R. might bring an acceptable withdrawal proposal. In fact, the Soviets refused to commit themselves to an early "date certain" for a troop withdrawal.
The world will remain skeptical of Soviet intenet until the Soviet Union agrees to and implements a settlement which provides for the rapid and complete withdrawal of its troops without preconditions.
Military Activity In many ways 1987 can be described as the year of the mujahidin, a year in which the resistance began to seize the initiative from the Soviets. Unlike past years, when the Soviets exercised more choice in their operations, the mujahidin generally dictated the pace and location of combat.
The level of fighting was consistently higher than in the past and less subject to seasonal variation. Combat escalated dramatically in the winter. Summer combat also was at historic levels, particularly in the Qandahar area, Kabul environs, and in Paktia Province. By late December, heavy fighting still raged in much of the eastern part of the country; the expected winter decline in fighting had not occurred.
The War of the Cities The Soviets and the regime increased their emphasis on urban security in 1987. As a result, mujahidin penetration and operations in major urban centers became more difficult and less frequent. The Soviets improved defensive belts around the cities, and resistance rocket attacks had to be made from greater distances. In the cases of Kabul and Qandahar, the defensive posture required costly and almost constant operations around the cities' edges to keep the mujahidin off balance. The sights, sounds, and casualties from nearby combat served to curb any increased sense of urban security.
Kabul. Kabul remains key to international perceptions of the security situation in Afghanistan, but calm in the city often coincides with heavy fighting in the surrounding areas.
Soviet upgrading of the defensive infrastructure--now three rings extending up to 20 miles from downtown--prevented major military losses like the spectacular destruction of the Kharga arms storage facility in 1986. About 22,000 Soviet troops are in the Kabul vicinity. They are supported by about 10,000 Afghan army troops and considerable numbers of militia, state security (KHAD), and Sarandoy forces.
Whenever there is a major security alert--because of threat, regime event, or high-level visit--the Soviets take charge of security in the capital. Soviet tanks guard key intersections every night during curfew. Security concerns were particularly apparent during the January visit of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] adviser Dobrynin; Kabul skies were well lit by the flares dropped by Soviet escort aircraft during their arrival.
Nevertheless, security remains a major problem, even in the city itself. The frequency of small arms fire from Soviet or Afghan security posts reflects the level of tension in the city. Protracted firing or exchanges usually indicate that the mujahidin have been spotted or have attacked security elements.
Intraparty or intraregime factional disputes also erupt frequently, with exchanges of fire clearly audible from regime installations. Urban dislocation, refugee influx, and degenerating regime cohesion also contributed to an increase of crime and attacks by regime and Soviet personnel on civilians, particularly in the spring.
The mujahidin focus their attacks on regime military and official and Soviet targets. Enjoying strong popular support, they avoid attacks which would harm the general population. The resistance may have reduced rocketing in recent years in order to avoid civilian casualties, although they also were deterred by Soviet security measures. Rocketings focused on specific targets, such as on the Soviet cultural center in January, and four rockets that disrupted Najib's November Loya Jirga. In September, the Soviet Embassy complex was hit by mortars. Bombings increased in 1987.
Kabul Vicinity. If the capital itself was somewhat quieter this year, its surroundings saw record combat. Bagram Airbase to the north of Kabul, perhaps the most important Soviet base in the country, often was hit by rocket attacks.
The area along the Salang highway to the Soviet Union was the scene of fierce fighting most of the year. In the spring resistance attacks triggered severe Soviet retaliation in the Shomali that caused numerous refugees to stream into Kabul. In August, this 40-mile basin was hit by its most destructive Soviet attack since the invasion. Thousands of residents fled indiscriminate rocket, artillery, and air bombardment. Both mujahidin and Soviets suffered heavy casualties, but regime losses were limited to heavy desertion. The highway itself was closed several times by resistance attacks and once, in April, by a snowslide that completely destroyed a 70-man Soviet post at Khenjan, north of the Salang tunnel.
To the east of Kabul, in early July, a coordinated attack on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway caused the loss of several Soviet outposts and a number of vehicles. In the west, the level of fighting fluctuated in Paghman throughout the year, beginning with an unusual winter offensive by the mujahidin. Artillery flashes and bomb blasts here are visible in Kabul. Soviet operations in August destroyed orchards to eliminate mujahidin cover.
Herat and the West. There are continued reports of heavy fighting in and around Herat. The mujahidin were particularly effective in the spring. Damage in the city remains severe, although the regime has launched some repair programs. The Soviets have bulldozed a large swath across the western part of the city and turned the western outskirts into a free-fire zone. By late in the year, these security measures have apparently succeeded in limiting mujahidin operations in the city.
Resistance forces continue to operate outside the city, where they are targets of intense, but not precise, high-altitude bombing. Regional commander Ismail Khan continues to broaden his areas of influence (see Central Afghanistan). One of the largest regime militia formations in the Herat area defected to the resistance in early fall.
Qandahar. Qandahar remains a war-torn city. Soviet/regime forces took the lead during the winter, when Qandahar is traditionally the major theater of conflict. Spetsnaz (Special Forces) and other operations focused on resistance resupply efforts and caravan interdiction. But their efforts failed to make a major impact, as the resistance in Qandahar remained well stocked and key to the logistics train deeper inside the country.
In Qandahar, the resistance is well organized with a local council, including all parties, presided over by a nonpartisan elder. Most actions involve mujahidin from several parties; they choose a leader from among the participating commanders at a war council. Early in the year, the resistance almost succeeded in gaining full control of the old city from the regime.
By the onset of summer, the capital of southern Afghanistan and its surrounding areas had become the scene of what has been probably the heaviest concentration of combat of the war. In late June, Afghan forces led a drive up the Arghandab Valley. They were turned back by well-entrenched mujahidin, although prominent local commander Lala Malang was killed. Regime military suffered severe losses, and hundreds of troops deserted.
Soviet and regime forces launched several other operations over the summer. The regime was only able to provide troops for these operations by drawing forces from all over Afghanistan, particularly the north. The long series of Soviet/regime drives into the Panjvai and Mahalajat Valleys were costly and did not overwhelm resistance formations, but they did keep local mujahidin off balance. The Soviets used the opportunity to extend the security belt around Qandahar. In addition, they bulldozed a grid network of roads through the old city, indiscriminately destroying homes and shops.
While resistance activity has been complicated, the mujahidin still operate in the city. Combat continued on a steady basis throughout the latter part of the year, with the mujahidin in full control of outlying areas.
In the latter part of the year, Soviet military correspondents in the Qandahar area painted a particularly grim picture. On September 18, an Izvestiya correspondent reported:
If you judge by newspaper reports, especially television reportage, on what is happening in Afghanistan, especially in the south, you get the impression that columns of people returning home fill all the roads leading into Afghanistan, that the national reconciliation policy has already led to a situation where yesterday's enemies kiss each other in the city squares. But you go to Qandahar and you'll see how it really is.
The city is one big ruin. There is shooting all the time. Nobody would give a brass farthing for your life if you took it into your head, say, to walk down the street unarmed.
A Soviet drive established as many as 70 security posts to guard the road from Qandahar to the Pakistan border. These posts were manned with tribesmen loyal to militia leader Gen. Ismatullah Achekzai, who 2 years ago became the regime's prize defector from the mujahidin. In September, 35 groups belonging to six parties launched a coordinated attack along a 40-mile stretch and took many of the posts.
Ismatullah is a warlord without particular loyalty, who often fought party officials, especially Interior Minister Gulabzoi. In November, on his way into the Kabul Loya Jirga where he was a delegate, Ismatullah was wounded in a shootout with security guards. A number of his followers were killed in subsequent gunbattles. Whatever his ultimate fate, regime control in the south is shaken.
The North Over the past year, resistance activities markedly increased north of the Hindu Kush Mountains--once considered relatively secure for the Soviets--and even spilled over the Soviet border. Mujahidin actions included the storming of regime garrisons, a rocket attack on the city of Mazar-e-Sharif during the anniversary of the April coup, and a variety of attacks in the northwest (near the gasfields).
Comparatively little Soviet/regime offensive action occurred in the Panjsher Valley as mujahidin commander Masood concentrated his efforts north of the Hindu Kush. Following news of successes in the north, rumors spread that he was about to, as he did in 1985, storm the most exposed regime garison in the valley, Peshghowr. In October, the base's defenders suddenly pulled further back into the valley, leaving Peshghowr to the mujahidin.
The Council of the North strengthened its organization and ties with parties other than the founding Jamiat-i-Islami. However, perhaps the heaviest fighting of the year anywhere in Afghanistan among mujahidin groups took place in this region.
Mujahidin in Masood's sphere are organized in four levels: self-defense units defend villages from attack; second-level units defend whole valleys; mobile groups with training and heavy weapons attack and operate on a provincial level; and central units are the potential core of a professional resistance army and operate throughout the north. Extensively trained and experienced, they have been a crucial element in the garrison assaults. Fighters from a number of groups in the north and elsewhere have trained with Masood's units.
Northern council forces were responsible for some of the major resistance successes of the year. In July, they attacked and stormed Kalafgan, less then 50 miles from the Soviet border. More than 100 regime prisoners were taken, and large amounts of weapons, including light artillery, were seized. The operation was led by local mujahidin, including Harakat-i Inqilab-i-Islami (Nabi) forces, and planned by Masood. The garrison sits astride a major supply route for Soviet forces just inside Afghanistan. A late summer Soviet supply operation along this road was heavily contested by the mujahidin.
In October, local forces, mujahidin from the Ittihad of Sayyaf, and council forces overran the regime garrison at Koran va Monjan, in Badakshan, astride a critical supply path into the Panjsher.
Because of careful planning, Masood's assaults have been successful with relatively few casualties. The Soviets and the regime have not been able to reoccupy the garrisons overrun by Masood during the last 2 years.
Kabul broadly publicized the late summer defection of Abdul Rasul Phelwan, from Faryab Province in the northwest, who delivered French journalist Alain Guillo to the regime. The size of Phelwan's group testifies to long-standing resistance presence in this sensitive region (near the gasfields and the Soviet border) which continued after his defection. In December 1986, Kabul media had reported that Phelwan had been killed by the regime security forces.
Across the Soviet Border The resistance has long operated across the Soviet/Afghan border, sometimes along traditional smuggling routes. Usually this movement has simply involved the distribution of Korans and party cards into the largely Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia, but there have been occasional armed attacks.
In 1987, for the first time, Soviet media acknowledged two assaults, in both cases after mujahidin claims were replayed in Western media. On March 8, resistance forces rocketed a match factory in Pyandzh, a city on the Amu Darya River border. Soviet media acknowledged the raid in April. On April 19, TASS reported that on April 9 mujahidin slipped across the border and attacked a contingent of Soviet border guards, killing two. It stated in harsh terms that the U.S.S.R. would do everything necessary to protect its border. Soon after, KGB chief Chebrikov visited the area and addressed the border guards about the threat to Soviet security. By May, Soviet media denied the existence of mujahidin incursions, which had tapered off. By the end of the year, however, there was at least one additional mujahidin action inside the U.S.S.R.
After both raids Soviet forces from the U.S.S.R. immediately launched both counterinsurgent and reprisal attacks on Konduz and Takhar Provinces in an apparent effort to construct a cordon sanitaire south of the border. Civilian casualties were enormous, and numerous villages were destroyed. Refugees from these attacks constituted the most visible--and appeared the most miserable--group that entered Pakistan all year. Few refugees had previously fled the north.
Eastern Afghanistan Mujahidin activity increased in the eastern provinces. Several large Soviet regime operations occurred, but the day-to-day Soviet/regime presence declined.
Nangarhar and the Konar Valley. Much of Nangarhar has become liberated territory. Foreign journalists noted farmers planting in areas under mujahidin control that previously had been abandoned. The provincial capital, Jalalabad, was under constant resistance pressure. The road to Pakistan remained open, but the mujahidin exerted nearly as much control over what travels on it as the regime.
In late October and November, a long awaited mujahidin assault hit a number of Soviet and regime posts and garrisons in the Konar Valley. The operation--one of the most broadly coordinated operations of the war--involved several parties and attacks on almost every bivouac, from Barikowt almost to the Kabul River. Barikowt did not fall but remained under siege as it has been since the war began. A concentrated attack on the Soviet garrison at Asmar was an example of increased mujahidin readiness to target Soviets, as opposed to Kabul regime installations. Soviet and regime forces took substantial losses, but all garrisons in the valley held.
Paktia. Paktia Province, on the border of Pakistan, is the site of heavy resistance concentration and a hub of transport routes. It has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting of the war.
In late May, a multiregimental force of about 5,000 Soviet troops moved to attack mujahidin near Ali Khel, in one of the key battles of the conflict. They were backed by tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, including 152mm self-propelled guns along with Kabul forces.
The Soviet assault was accompanied by intense air attacks, but the attackers dropped bombs from high altitudes, apparently trying to stay out of the reach of mujahidin defense. Several Soviet/regime aircraft--perhaps a dozen--were shot down. Forced to rely less on air power, the Soviets attacked with the most intense artillery fire of the war.
The most dramatic engagement occurred when Soviet/regime forces tried to attack mujahidin positions near Bayan Khel. When initial air strikes and artillery barrages failed, Soviet troops, led by elite Spetsnaz commandos, charged. They were repulsed by the mujahidin in fierce hand-to-hand fighting with heavy casualties on both sides.
Some regime units at Bayan Khel attempted to surrender but were stopped when they were bombed by the Soviets and incurred heavy casualties. Despite such antidefection measures, hundreds of regime soldiers defected to the mujahidin. Observers in Kabul reported almost daily funerals. At one mass funeral, mourners clashed with the police. Kabul media claimed the regime captured a number of Arab nationals who were fighting with the mujahidin in Paktia.
The battle was notable for the ability of the mujahidin to stand and fight, for their good logistics, and for the excellent cooperation between resistance parties. Several of the Peshawar resistance leaders personally participated in the battle, which boosted mujahidin morale. Despite substantial casualties, the mujahidin claimed a victory in Paktia, and their morale reached its highest level since the Soviet invasion.
In November-December, a major battle occurred around the regime garrison at Khowst, scene of a large resistance attack in 1985. The mujahidin tightened their siege of Khowst and on a number of regime positions on this vulnerable plain. In the city food was in short supply, and casualties were high.
A major Soviet-Afghan counteroffensive was launched from the provincial capital Gardeyz with an unprecedented amount of artillery fire-power--in an apparent effort to open the road to Khowst, closed since 1979. By late December, the Soviets and their allies had not broken through. Mujahidin poured into the area to resist the advance, coordinated as in previous years by joint provincial commander Jallaluddin Haqqani (Hezb-e-Islami Khalis).
Central Afghanistan Afghanistan's Soviet forces evacuated their garrisons in Bamian--after a resistance attack--and in Chagcharan, capital of Ghor Province, in the summer. However, the regime retained control in these cities, since Afghan forces remained.
In general, the situation in the Hazarajat was relatively quiet and free of regime presence. Most of the area remained under the influence of pro-Iranian groups, but the traditionalist Shi'a Shura party continued to hold fringe areas and operate against the Soviets.
A remote part of southern Ghor Province was the scene of one of the most broadly based meetings of commanders ever held inside Afghanistan. Chaired by Ismail Khan of Herat (Jamiat), the meeting included hundreds of mujahidin and commanders from several parties and many of the provinces of western Afghanistan. For several weeks in July, this large group--unharassed by Soviet/regime forces--discussed military and political issues.
Their communique, distributed inside and outside the country, called for practical measures to improve military coordination, including improved communication. It demanded military and political unity and chastised the political leaders for not being able to work together. It called for the establishment of a national commanders' council and a role in determining the future of Afghanistan.
An Increasingly Powerful Resistance The Afghan resistance is a broad national movement encompassing almost the whole population inside the country, Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and Afghans in exile throughout the world. The military side of the resistance, the mujahidin fighters, are grouped in hundreds of fronts in every part of the country. Most are affiliated with one of seven parties headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, which have joined to form the Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan Mujahidin (IUAM), generally referred to as the Alliance. (See p. 8 for the seven parties and their leaders.)
The growing resistance threat is partly due to the improvement in quantity and quality of resistance supplies in recent years. Despite recent efforts to interdict resistance supply lines, the Soviets have not been able to staunch the mujahidin logistics flow. As a Soviet army correspondent described the supply train: "Caravans sometimes number up to 300 or 400 pack animals. They travel not only on camels but they use trucks and tractors. Their guards are mobile--on horseback or motorcycles."
Small arms are plentiful, and the mujahidin still get significant supplies from sympathizers or through capture from the regime military and from the Soviets. They have used 107mm and 122mm rockets, like the Soviet model BM-21 multiple rocket launcher, to exert increased direct and standoff firepower.
Advanced surface-to-air missiles have improved resistance air defense and made heavy machine guns, still the mainstay of resistance air defense, more effective. Soviet/regime aircraft losses are up, and more important, attacking pilots are more cautious--cutting the impact of their air power.
Improving resistance strength also comes from more training and combat experience (which leads to better tactics), expanded cooperation (intergroup fighting has steadily declined), and the rapid development of a communications and supply network in a country that in peacetime had only the most basic road system. The Soviets have not been able to counter these developments, and while Soviet forces rotate, the mujahidin remain and know the terrain intimately. Over time, the mujahidin's gains have increased.
The resistance's cumulative military and political successes have greatly boosted their morale, which, in 1987, rose to its highest level since the invasion.
Political Developments. Whereas the pace on the battlefield was dictated by the mujahidin, many political efforts responded to regime initiatives. Reacting to Najib's January campaign, the Alliance held an unprecedented demonstration in January in Peshawar that was attended by hundreds of thousands of refugees and mujahidin. The seven leaders appeared publicly together and denounced the Kabul regime. They called for:
. A total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces;
. An interim mujahidin government, which would hold free and fair elections; and,
. Resistance unity and arbitration of interparty disputes.
In April, the resistance parties announced a scheme for election, to be held among the refugees and the population inside Afghanistan, particularly among the commanders. The elections were postponed, however, due to the difficult security conditions inside the country. Also in the spring, having successfully completed the rotation of the role of spokesmen among all seven Alliance leaders, the parties decided to give Mohammed Yunis Khalis a second term as spokesman.
In July, again rejecting regime proposals, the party leaders in Peshawar reiterated their positions that, should the Soviets leave, they would not indiscriminately retaliate against Kabul regime personnel, would pursue non-alignment, and would maintain correct relations with Afghanistan's neighbors.
In October, as Khalis' term as Alliance spokesman expired, the Alliance met again to further refine its organizational arrangements. A Shura, or council, was chosen, with equal representation from each party. The Shura chose Khalis for the new post of rais, or chairman, of the Alliance (see above). Although the Alliance displayed significant political development, its members continue to disagree on Afghanistan's future and sometimes on tactical issues.
International Relations. In 1987, Alliance leaders were increasingly visible on the world scene. Individual leaders were welcomed in many countries. In January, they attended the Islamic Conference in Kuwait. In November, Rais Khalis led an alliance delegation to the United Nations for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Afghanistan debate. Following the successful UN vote, Khalis took a delegation to Washington to meet with President Reagan.
The Soviets in Afghanistan
The Military: A Changing Soviet Strategy The Soviets have shifted their strategy over the years. At first, their efforts focused on the major cities and on the areas around the road between Kabul and the Soviet Union. They concentrated on large attacks. The Soviets used up to 20,000 troops in their numerous drives into the Panjsher Valley and high-level carpet bombing.
Several years ago, the Soviets began to notice an improvement in the mujahidin supplies and placed more emphasis on cutting off the flow. They focused on the border areas near Pakistan and increased helicopter use and adopted small unit tactics. Many believed these tactics would help build the Afghan army and destroy the mujahidin, and these tactics were successful for a time. But the mujahidin have learned how to counter these tactics, so their success was temporary.
In the past year, the Soviets again have been forced to shift their strategy. This time they were more on the defensive. They no longer have complete control of the air. The Soviets reduced their efforts to stop the movement of supplies, although they occasionally attacked caravans, and tended to operate less in the border areas. Major operations appeared to keep the mujahidin off balance and unable to attack while the Soviets improved their defenses in the major cities--Qandahar, Herat, and Kabul. Over the summer, Soviet forces pulled out of several isolated bases, leaving much of the country without a Soviet presence.
Infrastructural Constraints. Under Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets have only marginally increased their forces in Afghanistan. This may not be a solely political decision; it also may reflect the potential difficulties of supplying additional forces using the rudimentary transportation infrastructure in rugged Afghanistan. Indeed, because of the limited transportation network beyond the immediate border area, they have had some problems supplying the troops there now--particularly during periods of sustained combat.
Soviets in Combat in 1987. Soviet combat forces may have increased slightly since last year. A few new artillery units and slightly higher personnel levels in units already in the country, raised overall Soviet troop strength to about 120,000. According to most estimates, some 30,000 troops in the U.S.S.R., primarily just across the border, support combat operations, including flying combat air missions from the U.S.S.R. Most Soviet troops remain in static defensive/security deployments. The performance of the average conscripted Soviet soldier remains unimpressive.
During the past year, the Soviets drastically altered their tactics in the face of the resistance's improved air defense. While small sweep operations continued on the ground, they no longer had ample air support. Operations now include massive amounts of artillery and appear to develop more slowly. Heliborne assaults by elite troops also decreased as casualties mounted.
Aircraft losses have soared over the past year. For some periods the Soviet/Afghan side lost an aircraft a day--or more--to resistance fire. Aircraft downings were particularly high in the early part of the year, then declined as pilots began to stay out of the reach of mujahidin gunners. Total Soviet/Afghan losses were in the range of some 150-200 aircraft for the year. These losses forced the Soviets to reevaluate their tactics. In some areas there has been a marked decrease in Soviet air activity with a resulting drop in air losses.
Soviet and regime aircraft are flying higher and faster, which reduces the accuracy with which they can deliver their ordnance. They also employ countermeasures which degrade their performance. The Soviets may be more reluctant to use their devastating helicopter gunships, relying instead on faster--but less accurate--fixed-wing aircraft. Yet, even fixed-wing pilots have become more reluctant to challenge mujahidin air defense.
The Soviets have made efforts to reduce casualties--even though combat operations increased--and over the past year probably another 3,000 Soviets were wounded or killed, bringing the total number of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan since 1979 to at least 33,000-38,000, more than one-third of whom were killed. These estimates do not include heavy losses to disease. Total losses may be significantly higher; some Soviet sources cite 50,000 or more, or 25,000 killed over the course of the war. Despite publication of numerous requests for casualty data in Soviet media over the last year, Soviet authorities have only hinted that the numbers might be released after a Soviet withdrawal.
Moscow continues to place great faith in deploying Spetsnaz troops. With reduced air support, and increased mujahidin awareness of their tactics and methods, however, Spetsnaz troops have not been as successful as they were initially. Casualties have increased, morale has suffered, and they have been fought to a standstill and sometimes defeated. Spetsnaz performance is now at about the same level as other regular forces in Afghanistan.
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Throughout 1987, the Soviets continued to pour new equipment, especially artillery, into the country. Many of the new weapons were the best self-propelled artillery pieces in the Soviet inventory. For example, two types of sophisticated 152mm cannons, a 122mm howitzer, and a new automatic 82mm mortar have all been sent to Afghanistan to compensate for reduced air support. Most of it was destined for Soviet forces, but Kabul's forces received a share.
Infrastructure improvements continued unabated--airfield runways are being improved, revetments made for aircraft, and fuel and ammunition storage sites expanded to include the construction of mountainside and underground bunkers. Security zones around Kabul and other major cities are being increased. These defensive installations are key to the Soviet strategy of protecting the cities. These measures indicate Soviet plans to depart the country, if any, have not yet been reflected in actions on the ground.
Soviet forces continue to suffer serious morale problems in what returning veterans have called "a dirty war." Soviet propaganda cannot obscure from their own troops the reality that they are fighting a war against the Afghan people. Disease is rampant, particularly dysentery and hepatitis caused by poor hygiene. Defectors report severe abuse of conscripts by other troops, including male rape, extensive black marketeering, and alcohol and drug abuse. Some defectors fight alongside the mujahidin. The Soviets have made greater efforts to exchange captured mujahidin for Soviets held by the resistance.
Soviet Political Moves Soviet diplomacy in 1987 has concentrated on a single theme: Moscow's alleged desire to find a political solution to the conflict. The Soviets have announced repeatedly that the "political decision" to leave Afghanistan has been made. At the same time, they have not backed down from their insistence that the PDPA play a leading role in any postwithdrawal regime. In essence, the Soviets have been pushing hard at the negotiating table for the victory that is becoming increasingly elusive on the battlefield.
There have been several different expressions of Soviet policy on Afghanistan over the past year, suggesting that Gorbachev's search for a solution in Afghanistan is a continuing process and that the Soviets are ready to consider less optimal solutions than in the past. However, there still is no sign that Gorbachev has made the hard decision to leave Afghanistan and let his PDPA clients depend on the will of the Afghan people for their political survival.
The past year has seen Soviet movement on a number of questions related to Afghanistan. On the issue of a withdrawal timetable for Soviet forces, for instance, the Soviet position has moderated considerably. Whereas in 1986, the Soviet/regime insisted on a 4-year timeframe, in February 1987, they reduced it to 18 months and in September to 16 months. In December, leading up to and during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington, Soviet spokesmen spoke repeatedly of a 12-months (or less) timeframe. They also referred to Najib's conditional offer of 12 months (or less). No formal offer has been tabled at Geneva, however. Also, there is no agreement on the important questions of when the timetable would begin or how the withdrawals would be scheduled.
The Soviet position that an end to "outside interference" must precede any withdrawal of Soviet troops would appear to be satisfied in the draft Geneva text on "mutual noninterference." The key question here is one of definition. As long as Moscow maintains that fighting in Afghanistan is prima facie evidence of "outside interference," they are saying, in effect, that their troops will not leave until the war is won on Soviet terms.
Over the past year, Soviet officials have discussed Afghanistan in many forums, although thus far they have been unwilling to deal directly with mujahidin representatives. U.S. and Soviet officials have been holding regular exchanges on Afghanistan since 1986, and in late 1986 and early 1987, Soviet and Pakistani officials met for discussions as well.
In early November 1987, in a departure from past practice, a retired Soviet military officer appeared at a public forum in The Hague with a representative of a resistance party. This may foreshadow a Soviet willingness to deal directly with mujahidin leaders in the future. Soviet officials also have become more willing to consider alternative political arrangements for Afghanistan than before. In line with Kabul's "national reconciliation" policy, Soviet officials now call for a coalition government in Kabul, although they still insist that their clients--the PDPA--must control the presidency and major ministerial portfolios, thereby ensuring a dominant PDPA role in any such arrangement. During the past year, Soviet officials have shown an interest in some role for the former king, Zahir Shah.
Growing Unhappiness on the Home Front Concern about the fighting in Afghanistan and its impact on life appears to be increasing, but there is little evidence of widespread opposition to the war. Complaints, however, have become more frequent, and Moscow is responding with vastly expanded and more realistic press coverage of the war and special counterpropaganda campaigns throughout the country.
This effort now appears to have backfired. These campaigns have had the unintended consequence of making Soviet citizens even more worried and ever more willing to question Moscow's policy. A letter published in Pravda on November 25, 1987, is typical: it stated that "There is talk that the war in Afghanistan would have ended long ago if along with the sons of [ordinary people] the children of the leaders were sent there as well."
Cynicism and anger are especially widespread among combat veterans and those who might be sent to Afghanistan. While many officers may have benefited from Afghan service, enlisted personnel have not. Many have returned home openly hostile to the war, bringing with them psychological, drug, and a wide variety of other problems. Efforts to help veterans or to draw them into patriotic propaganda work have generally failed. In the November 1987 Ogonyek, for example, one veteran urged journalists to "call a dirty war a dirty war," and another said: "The main question about Afghanistan is not the truth about the horrors and the deaths, but why are we there?" Partially as a result, draft evasion has increased to the point where military journals discuss it openly.
The Kabul Regime
Military and Security Forces After massive infusions of equipment, training, money, and advice, the regime's armed forces cannot defend the government without major Soviet assistance. Combat experience over the last 9 years has not improved performance, which appears to have reached a new low.
Under Najib the armed forces have made no significant improvements. The army continues to retain about some 40,000 men, less than half its preinvasion level. The air force has approximately 10,000. The members of paramilitary, militia, Secret Police (KHAD), and border guards fluctuate with a total strength probably less than 100,000. Kabul can take little comfort in the questionable abilities and loyalties of its personnel.
In combat operations, Kabul's forces depend on Soviet air and artillery support and Soviet advisers. Regime troops have been unable to hold their own on any significant scale this past year. Indeed, the regime continues to lose numerous outposts as the mujahidin nibble away at Kabul's eroding authority. Afghan air force pilots occasionally have refused to fly.
Conscription and Desertion. Recruitment remains a serious problem, especially with regime control ebbing in many areas. Those party cadres still in the countryside also are charged with helping the conscription effort. A regular conscription cannot raise enough troops; the regime is forced to rely on forced conscription--press ganging. Young men throughout Afghanistan continue to leave school, invoke family connections in the party, go underground, or flee the country to avoid the sweeps of army units to dragoon new recruits.
Draftees are thrown into battle with little or no training and with predictable result: high casualties and desertions. Most officers are poorly trained, with party loyalty being more important than professionalism. High casualty rates further reduce manpower, since medical care is rudimentary.
The most serious problem facing Kabul's forces is desertion. Troops desert by the hundreds. Several times Afghan units deserted as a whole. Other units were only prevented from deserting force. Inductees from Kabul comprise an increasing part of the military since it is only in the capital that the army can capture enough youths.
Factionalism remains a chronic problem within Afghan units. Differences appear to have been accentuated in the aftermath of Karmal's removal, easing the way for increased mujahidin penetration. Karmal loyalists have largely been purged from key military and security positions.
Militia. Najib has placed more emphasis on the militias and directed more resources to them. Nevertheless, militia elements have even worse training and equipment than the regular army and have not significantly added to regime strength.
Police. The Ministry of the Interior, headed by Khalq faction chief Gulabzoi, includes some 30,000 police. Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces, the Sarandoy, are equipped as a light infantry force. In 1987, Sarandoy were increasingly posted outside Kabul in order to reduce their threat to the Najib regime and reinforce depleted military. On its limited combat operations, the Sarandoy suffered severe casualties. The Interior Ministry also has control over regional militias (revolutionary defense groups and civil defense youth militias).
Tribal militias are undependable, often remaining on the regime payroll only for the winter months. Under the nominal control of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, these elements are normally used near the border with Pakistan in an attempt to limit infiltration. Some of the tribal militias facilitate regime military operations in their areas, which they know better than regular troops.
The Secret Police (KHAD). The Secret Police continues to be known by the Afghan acronym KHAD, from the days when Najib was its chief. When he was promoted to head the regime, he boosted the former State Information Service to cabinet status as the Ministry for State Security (Dari acronym WAD). KHAD maintains a reputation for brutality and ruthlessness, including the use of torture.
KHAD now is led by Najib protege Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, who was promoted both to Politburo status and to the military rank of Colonel General, the highest held by regime military. Numerous Soviet KGB advisers are reportedly very influential. KHAD has some 20,000 personnel. These numbers are maintained, in large part, because KHAD personnel are extremely well paid.
KHAD is responsible for regime security, counterintelligence, and the suppression of opposition--both in the resistance and among Afghans who continue to live under regime control. It has military forces under its command, which have played a small, but growing, part in the war. KHAD operatives are present at Afghan military installations to try to prevent desertions or defections to the resistance. KHAD also is responsible for foreign intelligence and, in large measure, for the terrorist campaign in Pakistan.
National Reconciliation The new year began with an announcement from Najib that the PDPA was willing to share power with its opponents. His January 1 call for "national reconciliation" had three main elements.
First, the regime (and Soviets) and the opposition would observe a ceasefire.
Second, opposition representatives would be invited to participate in the regime, creating a "national unity government."
Third, about 5 million refugees would be asked to return.
Ultimately, the purpose of the "national reconciliation" campaign was to convince the Afghan people to "reconcile" themselves to continued PDPA domination.
Phanton Cease-fire. Key to Najib's plan was a cease-fire, which he said the government would observe for 6 months from January 15, 1986. Najib said the opposition must not fight, plant mines, transport, and store weapons and must refrain from subversive action. Afghan troops would return to bases but could conduct security tasks, without restrictions on supply and transport.
Afghan and, to a lesser extent, Soviet troops for a short time did observe a cease-fire, but there were always some troops in action. Within 2 weeks, major operations were again underway, in contrast to Najib's claims that the regime observed the cease-fire for about 50 days. The mujahidin responded with a greater level of activity over the winter, which increased throughout 1987. Najib extended the cease-fire for an additional 6 months in June and again at the Loya Jirga in November. The regime and Soviets did not reduce operations after either of these extensions.
The offer to share power was a departure from previous regime initiatives which had sought to "broaden the base," or include nonparty or neutral figures under the regime. The appeal was traceable to Gorbachev's July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, which called for an opposition role in the regime. Najib made his New Year announcement shortly after returning from his first trip to the Soviet Union as Kabul's leader.
To induce refugees to return, Kabul made a number of material concessions. It promised to restore property confiscated from those who had fled, return seized financial assets, provide relief from accrued interest and tax obligations, defer military service (and a halt to forced press gang conscription), and provide material assistance for resettlement. However, refugee return was less than Kabul's exaggerated claims (100,000 by year's end) and was exceeded by continued refugee exodus (see p. 20).
Few Afghans with political stature before the Marxist takeover have joined the regime. Those who have joined have not brought major constituencies with them. Appeals to expatriate Afghans in the West have similarly failed.
Despite regime claims about defectors (30,000 in August 1987), mujahidin commanders have almost universally spurned Kabul's reconciliation efforts. Regime announcements of local cease-fire areas can be read as an admission of widespread mujahidin control.
Reconciliation Offer Enriched. The failure of "reconciliation" to gain support led Kabul progressively to broaden its offer. After the rejection by the mujahidin of the January cease-fire call, Kabul's concessions increased.
In February, Najib offered to meet opposition representatives in a neutral setting--recognizing their status as equals. Kabul's offer to negotiate remains, but the resistance insists on talking to the Soviets rather than the "puppet regime." By mid-winter 1987, Najib had offered to accept an undefined role for former king Zahir Shah.
On July 14, Najib extended the so-called cease-fire for an additional 6 months beyond its July 15 expiration date. He offered specific posts to the opposition, including more than a dozen cabinet seats and the posts of vice president and of deputy prime minister. He also suggested that the post of prime minister could be negotiable. (This was later specifically offered.) Najib's offer did not include any of the ministries principally responsible for security, or the Foreign Ministry, or even the Ministry of Finance.
Najib invited royalists and members of the "moderate" parties to assume these high-level, but powerless posts. Kabul targeted these groups for its appeals, apparently hoping to split the resistance. Najib promised "genuine division of power" but asserted that it "does not mean the PDPA would lose its authority."
On July 15, the regime finally issued a draft constitution (see p. 15). It was designed to replace its Fundamental Principles, promulgated in 1980 but never ratified. The regime launched a national public relations campaign to garner support for the new constitution. Ultimately, Kabul claimed that 2 million Afghans approved the document and that it received 15,000 suggestions for changes. Many details, but little substance, were changed in the final draft, submitted to the November Loya Jirga, or assembly.
A Multiparty Facade. By mid-year, Najib also began to speak of a multiparty system. Parties (organized under regime auspices) would be required to support the state and "national reconciliation" but would be allowed some independence. The constitution appears to associate the parties with the PDPA-dominated National Front. Regime spokesmen noted that the new parties would have to respect Afghanistan's historic "friendship with the Soviet Union."
In November, the establishment of four new parties was announced. Two were leftist groupings that had earlier been "merged" with the PDPA. Just as Najib forecast in early summer, there also were two regime-dominated parties identified with the "peasantry" and "patriotic clergy." Najib later said that he would welcome a party for the "national bourgeoisie."
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The resistance (particularly the moderate leaders referred to by Najib) swiftly rejected the July 14 coalition offer, as it had his earlier proposals. Soon after, Najib was called to Moscow to meet Gorbachev. A communique announced that they discussed "further measures" along the path of reconciliation. Najib, at a subsequent press conference, said that he would give up not only his position but his life, if he personally became an obstacle to peace.
In the fall, the "national reconciliation" offer broadened still further. At the October party conference, Najib forecast the "Second Stage of National Reconciliation"--including leftist democratic unity, coalition, and the strengthening of posts offered to the opposition. Najib specifically named the "seven [Alliance] parties" in his appeals. The opposition would be allowed to open offices and publish newspapers if they renounced their resistance.
Following his admission that Soviet troops had pulled back from some hinterland posts, Najib said Soviet troops would leave, and regime forces not operate in, areas where the mujahidin ceased their attacks. He implied the resistance could run those areas. At the November Jirga, he said that Soviet troops could be withdrawn in 12 months or, less if the resistance would give up their fight against his regime.
"De-conciliation." Najib's "peace" campaign, combined with the modification of Soviet/Kabul positions on the timing of a withdrawal, have fed concern among Kabul regime supporters. There are numerous reports of regime members attempting to accumulate foreign exchange in preparation for an escape. Others established or upgraded contacts with the resistance.
The national reconciliation program exacerbated endemic PDPA factional disputes. Ideologically committed Marxists, particularly among the Khalq faction, opposed the offer to share power with the opposition and the tactical retreat on "progressive" policies. Although Najib acknowledged criticism from within the party of the reconciliation process, he repeatedly stressed that national reconciliation is "irreversible."
Hopes for Peace. Understandably, the "national reconciliation" campaign kindled sentiments in favor of return among the refugees and of hopes on both sides that the fighting might be ended inside Afghanistan. Ultimately, the refugees, by their refusal to return, and the mujahidin, by their continued resistance, maintain that there can be no peace while the Soviet occupation continues and the PDPA remains in power.
Changes in Government In 1987, the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul received a new name, a new constitution, a new head of state, and dozens of new faces. Most of these changes were associated with the "national reconciliation" effort. Despite a year of change, however, the regime remained under the thumb of the Soviets and their instruments of rule, the PDPA and Najibullah.
Najib continued to replace Karmal backers in the government as well as in the party. The Revolutionary Council, at a September 30 session, named Najib its chairman and head of state. He replaced nonparty H. M. Chamkani, acting chairman since Babrak Karmal's ouster a year before. Chamkani remained vice chairman, but the second in command was apparently shifted to PDPA politburo member Nur Ahmed Nur, who as deputy chairman ran the council in Najib's absence.
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) transformed itself into the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) at a Loya Jirga, held November 29 and 30. The vast majority of the more than 1,300 delegates were ruling party members or regime functionaries. The session was the second so-called Loya Jirga held by the Kabul regime and was no more legitimate than the council convoked by Babrak Karmal in 1985. Like that session, Najib's meeting was quickly condemned by the Afghan resistance and ignored by most Afghans.
The Jirga also adopted the new constitution proposed in July, completely transforming the formal structure of government, which had retained a revolutionary structure since the 1978 Marxist coup. In one of their last acts, the delegates elected Najib as president of the Republic of Afghanistan. But at his inaugural press conference, the new president was embarrassed when he was forced to admit that his own, albeit estranged, brother had defected to the resistance.
A Party in Disarray. Change also shook the party, as Najib continued efforts to consolidate his position within the PDPA. Several party plenums were held to elicit, or coerce support among reluctant cadre for "national reconciliation."
However, since Najib took over, factions have proliferated in the party, within and beyond the two major groupings: Babrak's and Najib's Parcham, and the Khalq--now led by Gulabzoi.
Former leader Babrak Karmal continues to withhold his endorsement from Najib. Despite increasing purges from party, military, and government positions, Babrak's faction, nurtured by 6 1/2 years of Soviet patronage, has not yet given up. A large demonstration by supporters of the deposed leader, at coup anniversary festivities in April, reportedly prompted the Soviets to "invite" Babrak to Moscow with his family a few days later. Babrak remained in the U.S.S.R. of the end of the year.
Action against Karmal's supporters continued throughout the year as the former president's brother Baryalai and close associate Anahita Ratebzad were removed from first the Politburo, then from the central committee. Ten additional Karmal backers were dropped from the central committee at the 17th plenum in October. Najib's protege Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, head of the Secret Police, and Foreign Minister Wakil earlier had been give full Politburo membership.
Party reorganization culminated in the second PDPA party conference, held in mid-October. Its goal was to improve party unity and discipline and promote "reconciliation." Efforts to hold the conference had bogged down in part because several local party sessions, including a Kabul precinct, tried to elect Karmal as a delegate. At the conference, Najib painted a stark picture of party disarray: "A number of leadership and party personnel have brought doubt, panic, and pessimism." The result, accordidng to Najib, was a party wracked with "factionalism, nepotism, and sometimes even revenge.
The Afghan Economy As the war in Afghanistan intensifies, so has the destruction and erosion of the economic base. While estimates differ, the latest figure cited in regime and Soviet media for wartime destruction is 50 billion Afghanis. Included in the estimate of damages, which the regime attributes exlusively to the mujahidin, are about 2,000 schools, several hundred mosques, and more than 100 medical establishments.
At the PDPA conference in November, Prime Minister Keshtmand, who is responsible for the economy, noted severe problems on the industrial side. In the last year, production of natural gas (Afghanistan's major export) and other basic goods slumped. Deficiencies in domestic production had to be made up by the Soviets.
Price levels depended on market conditions for a particular item or place. Inflation was noticeable but not dramatic for a wartime situation. Early in the year, anticipation of a settlement among the refugees and preparations for return drove the price of the Afghani (Afs) up in Pakistan. Toward the end of the year, erosion of the Afghani in part was due to efforts of regime members to accumulate foreign currency in case they fled the country.
The Afghani remains officially pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 55 Afs/$1. The rate on Kabul's unofficial but free money market fluctuated around 150-155Afs/ for most of the year. It rose to about 180Afs/$ late in the year.
Agriculture and Food Supply The wheat crop, Afghanistan's predominant food source, was generally the same and perhaps a little larger than in previous years. Yields in the subsistence, peasant agriculture that dominates in Afghanistan remain stable. There was no major crop failure anywhere in the country. However, the cities, especially Kabul, continue to be fed by imports. Regular commercial channel imports from Pakistan rose. Wheat continues to be imported from the Soviet union.
Food shortages continue to occur, in large part due to distribution problems or shortfalls in imports. Spot shortages often result from transport difficulties--the road system is severely degraded except for the segment between Kabul and the U.S.S.R. Shortages become most serious in late April-May before the harvest. Areas north of Kabul and Qandahar, Konduz, Paktia, and Paktika Provinces experienced the most problems. Land abandonment was aggravated by actual destruction of crops and agricultural infrastructure by Soviet/regime military operations.
Massive Soviet use of artillery and high-level saturation bombing caused total crop damage to increase, but overall damage remained a relatively small fraction of total area and production--probably 5%-10% of cultivated area has been damaged since the invasion. Fruit growing areas were particularly targeted by the Soviets.
There was significant damage to some agricultural areas in and around Qandahar, including grape arbors, that had previously been immune from damage. Sustained heavy fighting caused land abandonment near Qandahar, adversely affecting production. Konduz experienced serious damage, both in the spring and in August. Perhaps the worst hit area of the year was north of Konduz near the Soviet border, which was almost devastated. This was the site of reprisal raids for mujahidin activity in the Soviet Union. Shortages in Kabul were exacerbated by the city's growing population and because of destruction caused by heavy fighting in the nearby Shomali Valley, where Soviet forces destroyed grape arbor and other agricultural assets.
Despite destruction of both agriculture and industry, many Afghans continue their lives of subsistence farming, herding, and trading and are no worse off than before the coup and invasion. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world (see below). According to the most recent International Monetary Fund estimate, gross national product is about $200 a year (1986). According to some regime estimates, however, per capita income may be as low as $130-$150 per year.
The Private Sector Kabul continued to moderate disruptive economic reforms while continuing to promote, where possible, state enterprise. Efforts to stimulate the private sector continued. In February, Sayyid Amanoddin Amin, a businessman, was named vice chairman of the Council of Ministers (one of several deputy prime ministers). In April, the regime held a conference for private investors but failed to attract international or expatriate Afghan investors. An unusual development was the establishment of joint ventures between the Soviet Government and Afghan private businesses.
Trade Keshtmand told the party conference that Afghanistan's foreign trade totaled $1.4 billion in 1986-87. Of the total trade, 16% was with less developed countries and 68% with socialist countries (of which 60% was with the U.S.S.R.). Natural gas remained Afghanistan's major export, some 50% of total value. In the Afghan year ending March 1986, about 2.4 billion cubic meters were shipped north to the U.S.S.R., at the world market price, according to Kabul's Minister of Mines and Industries.
Soviet Aid in 1987 During the year, the U.S.S.R. continued its heavy budgetary support to the Afghan economy. In addition to about $220 million in development assistance, the Soviet Union pledged a record $405 million in grant commodities in 1987. Regime and Soviet media reported that this grant aid was intended to support the national reconciliation process.
Some of these aid commodities were, in fact, distributed in Afghanistan's towns and villages by Soviet troops or by Afghan military or party officials. On several occasions, Kabul and Soviet media directly chastised Afghan party and state officials for embezzling or misusing Soviet aid.
Moscow also made new allocations to projects already begun under some $750 million of outstanding credit agreements. Preliminary information indicates that Soviet aid disbursements rose substantially over the $205 million in 1986, possibly to the record 1980 level.
The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ushered in a more expensive era for the Soviet aid program in noncommunist developing countries. The grant package provided Kabul in 1987 brought total commodity support since 1980 to $1.4 billion. Until its first large-scale commitment of commodities to Kabul in 1980, the U.S.S.R. had steadfastly refused to provide more than token amounts of free commodities to any developing countries not associated with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In Afghanistan, Moscow was forced to provide consumer goods and food to support Kabul when it was cut off from other sources of imports and, more recently, to provide local funds for Soviet-sponsored projects.
The U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan signed a comparatively large number of agreements and protocols during the year. A protocol of cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet-bloc CMEA was signed in November.
A new economic and technical agreement in January 1987 also provides for increased assistance during Afghanistan's current 5-year plan (1986-91) to agriculture, water management, and power development, although it does not appear to provide new development credits. It mentioned aid for the centerpiece of Moscow's current program, a 10-year, $150-million project to connect Kabul and several adjacent provinces with the Soviet power grid by 1991. In addition, major irrigation projects at Jalalabad and Nangarhar, completed in the 1960s and 1970s, would be renovated and expanded to irrigate 600,000 hectares of crop and grazing land. Moscow is scheduled to complete 130 projects during the 5-year development plan; its total aid accounting for up to three-fourths of all annual economic aid flows to Afghanistan through 1991.
In a departure from the traditional Soviet/Afghan aid relationship, separate agreements were signed directly between Afghanistan's 29 provinces and republics in the U.S.S.R. These were particularly concentrated between the northern part of Afghanistan and the adjacent republics of Soviet Central Asia, but nearly all provinces were involved. For example, the Russian Republic made a direct transfer of agricultural machinery and fertilizer to Kabul City.
Social Developments
Youth and Education Kabul's educational system remains dependent on the Soviets. In June, Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. signed and education protocol "to ensure the teaching of various subjects," under which Soviet education advisers would be maintained in Afghanistan.
The Soviets continue to take Afghans of all ages to the U.S.S.R. for long-term education and training, in hopes of creating a loyal cadre. There are nursery schools specifically designed for Afghan children in the Soviet Union. About 1,700 Afghan children spent the summer at Pioneer (Komsomol) camps in the U.S.S.R. More than 10,000 Afghan youths are in the U.S.S.R. on long-term civilian and military training. Each year more than 1,850 are sent. At least 1,500 higher and professional students were sent to the U.S.S.R. for advanced training. There is no indication, however, that the regime's long-term efforts are producing a loyal communist political base among Afghans.
There continue to be credible reports that the regime is using child spies. In January, it was reported that children too young for the military were picked up in press-gang sweeps and then dispatched to the Kabul Police Academy for agent training.
Najib has claimed that some 40% of the teachers are members of the PDPA and that 30% of students either belong to the PDPA or to the Democratic Youth of Afghanistan (DYOA). DYOA Chief Farid Mazdak, a Najib protege, was elevated to the Politburo of the PDPA. Members or not, students must participate in forced labor; over the summer, several groups were dragooned in Kabul to assist reconstruction in Qandahar.
Health The health situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Facilities under regime control remain inadequate and overtaxed. During heavy fighting, when blood supplies ran low, Kabul's clinics forced patients to give blood. (Soviet media have reported intensive blood drives in Soviet Central Asia).
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded an agreement with the regime in January to resume humanitarian work. ICRC workers had been expelled just after the Soviet invasion and allowed to return only 2 months in 1982. The agreement is keyed to the resumption of Red Cross work among regime prisoners, which ICRC remained unable to fully implement.
Volunteer foreign doctors continue to provide some medical care in areas under resistance control, but they are subject to attack inside the country. Medical care is increasingly being offered by Afghan "barefoot doctors," trained by some of the same organizations that have sent expatriate doctors into the country. Commander Jallaluddin Haqqani of Paktia told an interviewer that, for the mujahidin, health conditions had recently improved 50%--100%.
Status of Women The regime continued to pay lip service to its commitment to improve the status of women and referred to women's rights in its constitution. In practice, however, the status of women within the regime has never been as high as Kabul claimed; indeed, it has declined over the past year.
Najib admitted to the party conference that women make up only 3.6% of the party apparatus and about 9% of trade union officials. Even in ministries such as education, where women are 43% of the workforce, the regime has promoted no women into leading positions.
he highest ranking woman in the regime, Anahita Ratebzad, was purged from the party leadership, because of her support for the deposed Babrak Karmal. There are now no women on the Politburo.
Religion Despite claims it has become more Islamic, the regime has failed to convince Afghans that it is still not dominated by the atheistic, Marxist PDPA. Najib cited the Koran and a newly formed Council of Religious Leaders and Ulema as the original sources of the policy of national reconciliation.
Regime efforts to assume an Islamic mantle are perhaps best illustrated by Najib's reassumption of the Islamic "-ullah" (name of God, as a suffix to his own name, upon being named president by the Revolutionary Council in September. Though he had not used his full name since he joined the party in the 1960s, Najib said he felt it was appropriate to reclaim it as leader of a pious nation.
One of Kabul's means of using religion to promote its control is by attempting to co-opt the clergy in areas under regime control. It claimed 2 billion afghanis were spent on mosques and to "help the prayer leaders," without mentioning that these sums come from the religious institutions' own endowments. Najib, speaking at the shrine of Ali in Mazar-e-Sharif, claimed 16,000 mullahs, preachers, and clergy receive salaries from the state. Monetary inducements are backed up by coercion against those clergymen who do not cooperate.
Kabul also attempted to use its new-found piety to promote its image in the Islamic world. The regime held an international contest for Koranic recital and opened an Institute of Islamic Scientific Research but has been unable to obtain support from religious institutions in the Muslim world. Cairo's Al-Azhar University closed a mission in Kabul.
Illegal Drugs Afghanistan remains a major producer of hashish and opium. Estimated hashish production in 1986 was 200--400 metric tons, one of the highest in the world. Afghanistan appears to be the leading producer of illicit opium in the Golden Crescent and the second largest producer in the world. The 1986 poppy harvest yielded an estimated 500--800 metric tons, a substantial increase from 1985. Good weather in producing areas suggests a similar figure for 1987. Some of the opium is refined into heroin, principally in Nangarhar Province on the Pakistan border.
Much of Afghanistan's hashish and opium and nearly all of its heroin are exported to or through Pakistan and Iran. Illicit drugs also have been smuggled into the Soviet Union--complicating the domestic Soviet drug problem--and through that country to Western markets.
Increased Soviet efforts against traffickers have produced evidence that the Soviet Union is used as a drug transit route. As a result of a joint Soviet-Canadian operation, approximately 5 tons of hashish were seized in Canada in August 1987. The hashish was unloaded from a Soviet ship docked in Montreal. On another occasion, authorities in Moscow announced they had seized $30-million worth of hashish bound for West Germany.
Current information on drug abuse inside Afghanistan is difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that there are over 100,000 chronic opium abusers. Regime officials have hinted that Kabul has its own drug problems.
All major resistance organizations in principle oppose narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse, and most individual mujahidin adhere to this policy. Invoking Islamic disapproval, some resistance groups are waging an active antidrug use campaign, but illicit crop destruction is limited.
Human Rights Abuse of human rights remain a key corollary of the unpopular Kabul regime's efforts to maintain power. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common; a fair trial is not. Some prisoners are held for years without access to legal assistance, family, or medical care. Prisons are overcrowded. Food, water, and sanitary facilities are in short supply, and many prisoners are chronically ill.
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Torture and mistreatment of prisoners continue to be widespread and systematic in the Kabul regime's prisons. During incommunicado detention, physical and psychological torture is used to extract "confessions" and to intimidate regime opponents. Prisoners are beaten; subjected to electric shocks; burned with cigarettes; immersed in cold water or snow; forced to watch other people being tortured; placed in cells with the corpses of other torture victims; and deprived of water, food, and sleep. Human rights groups continue to receive credible reports concerning executions of political prisoners.
Prisoners and Amnesty. A major component of "national reconciliation" was amnesty for prisoners, but the regime has not lived up to its promises. According to regime spokesmen, some 6,000 prisoners were released through November. Local observers reported only 320 prisoners were released in March, versus 1,300 claimed by the regime.
Among the released prisoners were members of the PDPA's Khalq faction, some in jail since the Soviet invasion, and members of leftist/nationalist organizations. Old people, women, and children also were released. Few resistance prisoners and no significant mujahidin have been released. For the regime, the most important category was those imprisoned for military offenses. They and other able-bodied detainees were conscripted immediately upon release.
Conscription. One of the first announcements made by the regime during the recent "national reconciliation" campaign was the end of forced conscription. Despite this promise, the regime has resumed the practice. In its current drive to swell the ranks of the military, the regime has extended its "recruitment" include 15- and 16-year-old youths along with recently returned refugees. Reports indicate that the regime gains recruits by surrounding high schools as graduation ceremonies take place. Parents have demonstrated at Kabul conscription centers in search of their lost sons. Some were themselves taken away, and the demonstrations ended by gunfire.
Human Suffering. The most serious violations of human rights in Afghanistan are the pervasive violence and dislocation inflicted on the population by Soviet and Afghan forces. These include apparent Soviet violations of the humanitarian rules of war. Killings of civilians have continued unabated as Soviet/Kabul forces retaliate and attempt to create secure zones. Some sources report that from the end of last year until August of this year, about 15,000 civilians have been killed.
Indiscriminate air and artillery attacks, time bombs set to detonate during peak travel hours along popular supply routes, and boobytraps cleverly designed to be attractive to children are but a few of the tactics used against noncombatants by the Soviets and their regime allies. Resistance forces also occasionally commit violence against noncombatants, mostly political figures associated with the regime, but sometimes in the course of operations.
The Kabul regime also denies the following human rights to the Afghan people: freedom of speech and press; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; the right to privacy; and the right of citizens to change their government.
The nearly 10 years of Marxist rule and Soviet occupation have wreaked unprecedented tragedy on the Afghan people, according to the "Preliminary Findings From A Survey of Afghan Refugees," conducted by Gallup Pakistan. The survey, based on interviews with 1,300 refugee families, found that over the past 10 years, 9%--or 1 in 11 members--of the Afghan families surveyed have been killed in the past decade. This is greater than the fatality rate in the Soviet Union during World War II.
Forty-six percent of those killed (mostly women) died in aerial bombing of civilian houses or while fleeing; 33% died as a result of wounds from bullets; 12% from artillery shelling; 3% from mines; 2% from exhaustion; and 4% from miscellaneous causes. About 5.5% of the refugee population died of natural causes such as aging or harshness of life as refugees. But the Afghans live on--about 24% of the present refugee population were born in exile in the camps.
UN Human Rights Commission. Each year since 1984, the UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur, Felix Ermacora, revealed overwhelming evidence of widespread massive human rights violations in Afghanistan. This year, the Kabul regime, which earlier tried to impugn the Special Rapporteur and his report, allowed Ermacora to visit Afghanistan for the first time. The regime thus acknowledged, also for the first time, the role of the Special Rapporteur. Ermacora paid a brief visit to Kabul and later to Peshawar, where Afghan refugees protested Kabul's attempt to cover up the ongoing use of torture in regime prisons.
Although Ermacora observed in his report that there has been some amelioration of human rights conditions in certain government-controlled areas in Afghanistan, he reiterated his previous statement that "there can be no meaningful self-determination for the Afghan people so long as the Soviet presence continues."
The Third Committee (Human Rights) of the UN General Assembly voted for a third consecutive year to adopt a resolution on human rights in Afghanistan. The vote was 85 for, 21 opposed, and 28 abstentions--an improvement over the 1986 vote of 79-23-36.
In the spring, at its 43d session, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted two resolutions on Afghanistan. One, on the human rights situation, extended the mandate of Special Rapporteur Ermacora. A resolution calling for self-determination in Afghanistan was adopted by a vote of 30-5-6.
Refugees Afghans in Pakistan are the single largest group of refugees in the world. The Government of Pakistan reports registration of more than 2.9 million Afghans. Numbers continue to grow, although at a much slower pace than in the early years after the coup and invasion. In 1986, refugee officials in Pakistan registered only about 70,000 new refugees. Preliminary estimates from 1987 are lower still. Many areas of heavy fighting are already heavily depopulated.
Afghan refugees are sheltered in more than 320 camps, primarily in the rural areas of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Relief assistance--including food, shelter, clothing, and medicine--is provided by the international community, primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program.
Although the number of new arrivals is lower in 1987 than in previous years, there is no indication that many refugees are returning to Afghanistan in response to the Kabul regime's national reconciliation campaign. UNHCR officials in Pakistan see no basis for Kabul's claim that 100,000 refugees have returned to Afghanistan in 1987. Neither UN nor Pakistani officials discerned a measurable drop in camp populations. It is unlikely that many would return under any PDPA-led, Soviet-sponsored regime. (Kabul also claims 37,000 refugees returned in the previous 7 years.) There were several reports in the summer and fall that some refugees have returned to newly secure resistance-controlled areas inside Afghanistan.
Despite considerable economic and political costs, the Government and people of Pakistan have extended an impressive welcome to the Afghans. The Pakistani Government estimates that the annual relief effort costs some $360 million and that its share of this effort comes to nearly half that amount, chiefly expenditures for program administration and transportation of relief commodities. Pakistan is further strained by refugee competition for local jobs, grazing, and water supplies.
Refugee relations with Pakistanis have been surprisingly good, largely due to the strong cultural and social ties between the indigenous population and the newcomers. Soviet/regime agents continue their efforts to raise Pakistani concern over the refugee presence.
Between 1983 and 1986, the World Bank, in conjunction with the UNHCR, committed $20 million for forestation, irrigation, and road-building projects that employ refugee and local labor in repairing environmental damage caused by the refugees. These projects were so successful that Phase II, a $40-million, 3-year project was begun in 1987.
The U.S. Government, the largest contributor to the relief effort, pledged nearly $68 million for Afghan assistance in fiscal year 1987 including $38-million worth of commodities through the World Food Program. To date, total U.S. contributions for Afghan refugee assistance exceed $551 million. Other major contributors are Japan, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and a number of West European nations.
The second largest concentration of Afghan refugees is in Iran. The Iranian Government estimates that up to 1.9 million Afghans are within its borders. Many Afghans in Iran have successfully integrated into the local population. The Iranian Government provides some assistance. The United States is not a contributor to the UNHCR effort in Iran.
Regional Environment
Pakistan After the Afghans themselves, Pakistan bears the primary burden of the war in Afghanistan. In 1987, the war continued to spill directly into Pakistan. Kabul's air raids on Pakistani and refugee villages intensified early in the year, climaxing during the opening days of the February-March session of the Geneva talks. Hundreds were killed and wounded. The cross-border raids stopped when Pakistan threatened to leave the talks, but the raids recommenced after the talks recessed. Within a month, however, as Pakistan actively pursued improved air defense, Soviet/Kabul tactics suddenly changed. Bombs that had been carried by planes were now delivered by Kabul-sponsored terrorists. At the same time, Kabul continued to destabilize the Pakistani frontier areas by providing arms to exacerbate local, tribal, or communal disputes. More people were killed and injured in 1987 by Soviet/Afghan attacks in Pakistan than ever before (see p. 22).
The Soviet/Afghan terror and subversion campaign in Pakistan was already more than 1 year old. Bomb explosions have become an almost familiar sound in Peshawar restaurants, hotels, cinemas, and other public places. Kabul-directed saboteurs also detonated bombs at bridges and public places elsewhere in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, where the bulk of refugees are concentrated.
In 1987, Kabul agents for the first time exploded several bombs in the Pakistani heartland. The capital, Islamabad, and its sister city, Rawalpindi, Lahore in Punjab, and even distant Karachi on the Arabian Sea, suffered civilian casualties from the terror campaign. The bombings are particularly frightening because Kabul's agents target public facilities like shopping centers and schools. A single bomb blast in Karachi in July killed more than 70 people.
More than 1,000 saboteurs have been arrested in Pakistan in connection with the terror campaign. Some have been tried and sentenced, some of them to death. Most are Pakistani citizens. Many have confessed that they were paid, trained, and given targets by Afghan intelligence officials.
The public's fear of the bombs increased suspicion among Pakistanis toward the Afghan refugees, despite the fact that the public is generally aware that the bombs are Afghan/Soviet in origin. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to be steadfast on the Afghan issue. Some politicians have advocated accommodation with Kabul, but the government and principal opposition figures continue to back the national consensus in support of the Afghan people.
In 1987, Islamabad intensified its efforts bilaterally with the Soviets and through the United Nations and other channels to find a political, negotiated solution to the Afghan conflict.
Iran Tehran has maintained its basic policy calling for the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops. Iran refuses to participate in the Geneva talks on the grounds that the mujahidin are not represented. In 1987, however, Iranian policies on Afghanistan fluctuated.
Iran's rejection of the Soviet occupation is an "Islamic" issue that has wide domestic support. Tehran's day-to-day Afghan policies, however, have always been subsidiary to the greater considerations of the Persian Gulf war, its overall Middle East/Islamic strategy, and the general state of relations with the U.S.S.R., with which Iran shares a long border.
Until 1987, Iran's Afghan policy was coordinated within Iran by Ayatollah Montazeri. In the beginning of the year, Iran apparently increased support for the resistance. Iran improved ties with the Sunni (Peshawar) resistance parties, as well as its traditional clients, Shia groups based in central Afghanistan. (Iran hosts the "Alliance of 8," mostly Shia Afghan resistance parties.) In January, for the first time, the Iranian Foreign Ministry invited Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami head Rabbani for an official visit to Tehran. His previous visits to Iran had been under quasiofficial clerical auspices.
Iran also launched its own "regional" peace initiative in February, when it proposed roundtable talks involving the Soviets, Pakistan, Iran, and the mujahidin. The Kabul regime was excluded from the offer. The proposed participants did not take up Tehran's offer.
Iranian-Afghan tensions continued as Kabul protested instances of violence against its diplomatic personnel by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In August, both Iran and Afghanistan protested the violation of each other's territory at the main border crossing between Mashhad and Herat. Tehran charged its border post was hit by artillery shelling from the Afghan side. The Iranian pro-Soviet Marxist opposition groups, Tudeh and Fedayeen-e-Khalq, continue to be active in Kabul.
By late summer, the Iranians showed some accommodation toward Kabul in the wake of their improving relations with the Soviet Union. In the fall, Iran's ambassador in Kabul attended an official state function for the first time since the invasion. Support for the mujahidin and relations with the Sunni resistance parties also diminished. Nonetheless, Tehran continued to publicly condemn the Soviet occupation.
China China continues to cite the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a threat to regional security and a major obstacle to the improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union. China raised Afghanistan in its renewed bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R.
During a June visit to Islamabad, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang "confirmed China's support for Pakistan's principled position" on the Afghan issue. During the June visit, it was announced that the Chinese Government had donated a large quantity of goods for the refugees, including 1,250 tons of rice and a million yards of cloth.
International Concern The plight of the Afghan people continues to attract the world's attention. Demands for an end to the occupation can be heard year round. In December 1986, newspapers of varying ideological stripe (including communists) from numerous countries sharply criticized the Soviets for the occupation. Support was limited to a few editorials in papers published by pro-Moscow communist parties.
India India maintained its interest in a political solution to the Afghan problem and continued to call for an end to foreign intervention and interference in Afghanistan. India maintained good relations with the Kabul government and continued its modest pre-1979 program of foreign assistance. In 1987, India's contacts with Kabul became more visible. An early summer Indian trade fair in Kabul was one of the largest non-Soviet foreign-sponsored spectacles since the invasion.
India welcomed Kabul's "national reconciliation" effort. An unprecedented exchange of high-level official visits began with the visit of Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil to New Delhi in February. In July, Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari became the highest level non-Soviet-bloc official to visit Kabul. Several regime delegations were subsequently received in New Delhi. Politburo member and Communications Minister Watanjar signed an agreement on communications assistance. Other technical assistance agreements were also initialed by New Delhi. In November, Indian efforts to obtain a "consensus" UN General Assembly Afghanistan resolution came to naught. Subsequently, India again abstained on the UNGA resolution.
Islamic Countries In January, the leaders of the resistance alliance attended the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Kuwait and then-spokesman Abd alSayyaf addressed the delegates. The summit once again issued a resolution supporting the Afghan refugees, the mujahidin, and Pakistan; calling for a withdrawal of Soviet forces; and suggesting that an end to the Soviet occupation would remove a major barrier to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic countries. Kabul was rebuffed in its yearlong effort to reclaim Afghanistan's seat in the conference. It also failed in its effort to gain entry to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
At the third general Islamic conference in Mecca in October, Abd al Rahman Abd al Khaliq from Kuwait called upon Islamic states to sever relations with the Soviet Union for its continued occupation of Afghanistan.
European Support Afghanistan remains a primary source of European criticism of the Soviet Union, both official and from groups otherwise sympathetic to Soviet policies. Kabul was moved to protest when French Foreign Minister Raimond met with resistance alliance leaders during a May visit to Pakistan.
In December, the European Community (EC) issued a statement calling for an immediate end to the occupation of Afghanistan, including a Soviet withdrawal completed before the end of 1988. This followed a statement earlier in the year in which the EC provided the basis for a European diplomatic effort on Afghanistan, focused on the United Nations.
Soviet Efforts To Curb Press Coverage International public interest in the Afghan war remains high. It has never been easy, however, to get the news out of Afghanistan. Kabul permitted more foreign journalists to visit, but mostly for regime events. Although they are now allowed to move about freely, journalists often witness evidence of regime frailty, such as the mujahidin shelling and the internecine shootout that plagued the so-called Loya Jirga.
In contrast to the dramatic increase in the quantity and realism of Soviet media coverage, there has been an effort on the part of the regime and the Soviets to intimidate foreign reporters traveling with the resistance. Because of improved resistance air defense, however, there may have been more foreign correspondents inside Afghanistan in the summer of 1987 than previously.
In October, antipress efforts intensified. The regime protested the visit of a group of Pakistani journalists to Paktia Province. Near Kabul, a BBC-TV crew, which was invited by the regime, was threatened and detained by Soviet troops, who also detained diplomats who tried to intervene. A French journalist, Alain Guillo, was captured in November. He was still imprisoned at the end of the year, charged with trying to obtain military secrets. An Italian journalist was reported captured in December.
The campaign to target foreign journalists had more tragic results. Two American filmmakers, Lee Shapiro and Jim Lindelof, were apparently killed by a regime attack while traveling with the mujahidin. In 1986, Lindelof had been named paramedic of the year for his efforts training Afghan medical workers. In response to protests, Kabul stated it could not "guarantee the security of foreign subjects" who enter illegally, whose presence it views as "evidence" of "external interference."
Kabul's Diplomatic Offensive Kabul made only limited gains in its Soviet-supported worldwide effort to gain international legitimacy. The regime sent representatives to 52 countries in hopes of upgrading relations. Many countries turned away Kabul's representatives.
One of Kabul's major diplomatic triumphs was the June visit of Prime Minister Keshtmand to Iraq. Keshtmand was seen by Saddam Hussein, the highest level at which a regime functionary has ever been received outside the Soviet bloc. They signed an agreement on trade and technical cooperation, ratified in September.
During 1987, the regime managed to established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe and Cyprus and reached agreements on opening embassies in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, and Austria, the regime's first embassy in Western Europe. Kabul Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil was received at the Astrian Foreign Ministry when he journeyed to Vienna in September to open the embassy. Several African countries, under pressure from Moscow, agreed to exchange nonresident ambassadors.
Kabul's limited successes cost the Soviets some diplomatic capital, if not also tangible resources. However, the net effect inside Afghanistan or on the Afghanistan-tarnished Soviet world image was limited. More importantly, even those countries that in some way responded to Kabul's diplomatic entreaties did not budge on the UN General Assembly resolution, the major objective of Kabul's diplomatic efforts.
UN Negotiations Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly has voted nine times, by overwhelming and generally increasing margins, for a resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the restoration of Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status, Afghan self-determination, and the creation of conditions that would enable the refugees to return home with safety and honor.
At the 42d UN General Assembly, introduced as in the past by Pakistan and cosponsored by 47 countries, the resolution passed on November 10 with a record vote of 123 (U.S.) to 19, with 11 abstentions, a one-vote increase over the 1986 affirmative vote total of 122. The vote was considered a decided defeat for the Soviet Union, in the wake of its year-long effort to erode support for the resolution.
In addition, the Soviets, the Kabul regime, India, Syria, and Democratic Yemen made last-ditch attempts to amend Pakistan's Afghanistan resolution with so-called consensus language on the eve of the November 10th vote. The Soviets and others, realizing that the lacked the necessary votes, withdrew their amendments just prior to the final vote.
UN attempts to negotiate a settlement date from a November 1980 mandate of the General Assembly. Negotiations are led by UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez, the Secretary General's personal representative. Talks have been held periodically since 1982 in Geneva. Cordovez shuttles between delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan, officially informing Iran of the discussions while unofficially informing the Soviets.
The UN Secretary General has reported that the four instruments that would comprise the agreement are "virtually complete." The text is largely settled on three of four proposed instruments, the first dealing with mutual noninterference in Afghanistan's affairs, the second encompassing international guarantees, and the third governing the voluntary return of the refugees.
The fourth agreement, which is to address the key issue of a Soviet troop withdrawal and the interrelationship between that document and the other three, is unfinished. The principal outstanding issue remains an agreement on a realistic timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Two sessions of the seventh round of the indirect talks were held in Geneva in 1987. The first, convened February 25, lasted until March 9. At the end of August, Kabul suddenly requested an early resumption of the talks and a second session was held September 7-10.
The first session was held during heavy cross-border attacks on Pakistan. For a week Afghan planes bombed and rocketed Pakistani villages, killing and wounding hundreds. On March 2, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan threatened to leave the talks if the attacks did not cease. The raids stopped, and after some preliminary negotiation, newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil tabled a proposal that would reduce the period required for Soviet troop withdrawal to 18 months, less than half the 4-year position it maintained in 1986. Pakistan offered to accept 7 months, up from 4 months.
Kabul's insistence that a September round be convened at short notice fed widespread speculation that Kabul would table a 12-month timetable. Instead, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil reduced the offer only 2 months, to 16 months. Pakistan countered with 8 months, but there was no Afghan counteroffer. Both Cordovez and Yaqub expressed disappointment with Kabul's intransigence, particularly since the session had been proposed by Kabul.
In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Wakil said that "the policy of national reconciliation and the Geneva talks, as two separate processes, are contributing toward the achievement of a single objective." His implication of linkage between Kabul's futile efforts to gain domestic support and a Soviet withdrawal was rejected at the UN General Assembly by Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo, who charged that the Afghan call to Geneva was "false propaganda" aimed at the UN vote.
In his annual report on Afghanistan, the UN Secretary General reported that negotiations had reached "an advanced stage" and that "substantial, but not sufficiently sustained progress" had been made. He urged all Afghans "inside and outside their homeland" to look beyond a settlement and identify "processes and policies that they might deem appropriate to ensure continued peaceful conditions in Afghanistan and the region." All sides are committed to continuing the talks, which are expected to resume early in 1988.
U.S. Policy The United States seeks a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan which brings about the complete and prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops and self-determination for the Afghan people as outlined in the UN General Assembly resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities each year over the past 8 years. The United States supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General's personal representative to achieve a settlement. The single remaining issue to be agreed to is Soviet troop withdrawal. So long as the Soviet Union continues to occupy Afghanistan, the U.S. Government will maintain its strong support for the Afghan people's cause. The United States has noted recent Soviet professions of intent to withdraw from Afghanistan. The U.S. Government urges the Soviet Union to match its words with deeds at the earliest possible time.
This was the primary thrust of President Reagan's message to Gorbachev at the December 1987 summit in Washington. The President urged the Soviets to agree to a short timeframe and declare a "date certain" for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
Humanitarian Assistance The U.S. Government contributes heavily to a sizable humanitarian assistance program designed to minimize the suffering of those who have chosen to remain main in the villages of the war-ravaged Afghan countryside. Congress provided $15 million for the program in FY 1986 and $30 million in FY 1987. The projected funding for FY 1988 is $45 million. In addition, the United States is donating wheat and vegetable oil to support the cross-border program. In FY 1988, a minimum of 40,000 metric tons of wheat, valued at $7.6 million, will be provided.
The humanitarian assistance program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Through the program, hundreds of tons of food, medical supplies, cold weather clothing, and other humanitarian goods have been provided to war-affected Afghans to counter the ongoing, systematic destruction of their crops and property. The program also seeks to develop the capabilities of the Afghan resistance Alliance to provide education, health, and agricultural services to the people inside Afghanistan. To plan and implement its activities, the Alliance has set up technical committees.
Although still in the nascent stages of development, each of the committees can claim significant achievements. The Education Committee is implementing a program through which almost 660 schools inside Afghanistan are being supplied with textbooks, instructional aids, and administrative materials. It also has initiated a literacy program for adults which has thus far attracted an estimated 8,000 participants.
The Health Committee has developed a training program which is graduating 240 basic health workers every 3 months. It is establishing and supplying hospitals and clinics inside Afghanistan and planning a major immunization campaign that will begin in early 1988. With less than a year of operational experience, the Agriculture Committee is already sponsoring the preparation and radio broadcast of agricultural extension programs and the rehabilitation of a number of irrigation canals.
To complement the activities of the Alliance committees, the U.S. Government supports private voluntary agencies from the United States, France, West Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, and Sweden. In FY 1987, $9 million was provided to 12 voluntary organizations for 15 activities. More than half of these funds were granted to support health activities. The remaining funds finance food, agriculture, and education activities.
A separate program created by Congress in FY 1986 to help improve the living conditions inside Afghanistan is the Humanitarian Relief Program. Through this program, the Defense Department and the Agency for International Development provide nonlethal, excess Defense Department property as well as transport humanitarian goods donated by private sector organizations to the Alliance. Under the same program, war wounded Afghan patients are transported to the United States, Europe, and Middle East for free medical treatment. To date, an estimated 450 patients have been placed, 270 of them in U.S. medical institutions.
THE END OF THIS ARTICLE
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You guys can find more than 300 pictures right HERE (http://www.pbase.com/rusastan/inbox)
Sovietīs helos (mostly HINDs) in Afghanistan - gallery. The link bottom guides you to the page that is unfortunatelly on Czech language but clicking on images you get hi-res versions, sometimes very interesting.
http://www.vrtulnik.cz/cizina/helo1892.jpg
http://www.vrtulnik.cz/cizina/helo1886.jpg
http://www.vrtulnik.cz/cizina/helo1869.jpg
Gallery (http://www.vrtulnik.cz/cizina/afghanistan.htm)
airbornelawyer
17 June 2005, 11:54
I know that militaryphotos.net has a bad reputation over here at SOCNET but it would be silly to leave out this excellent thread (link bellow). Besides many kids there are also experienced servicemen and member 16 OBr SpN is one of those few. I wish he paid a visit to SOCNET as well ... if he is not here already :)
Link (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=7201)
He is member Siberian, and has posted on occasion on Russian military matters.
He is member Siberian, and has posted on occasion on Russian military matters.
Thank you very much. Why am I not surpised? ;)
Another great gallery (http://www.aviaforum.ru/album_personal.php?user_id=1050) (personal one of HIND pilot)
Afghanistan 1984, color photos here (http://www.lenvoku.ru/index.php?p=4&a=122)
Doogie320
27 July 2005, 19:00
What was interesting to me was one of the photos in the above links showed a Hind being rearmed at Bagram. The steel planking in the picture is the same stuff that makes up "Steel Beach" today. The Army is slowly removing it and pouring concrete in it's place, but the Soviet stuff is still there.
Thank you for the links.
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