Coast Guard fatalities

[rmediver2002]

Any more info on this?


http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/21/129213/

The Coast Guard has one of the smallest diving programs (less than 100 service wide), the divers come through the Navy school in PC.

In the past they would come through second class diver training but a shift to first phase of EOD was made some years back.

I had one in my class in 1993 and continue to work with another who is retired now.

RIP divers...

Jeff

[tova]

RIP, Godspeed & PBS....

[Frog]

Tragic.

approximately 500 miles north of Barrow, Alaska.
I wouldn't want to dive anywhere with the word "Alaska" in it, let alone "north of it"

[Carl Spackler]

RIP Fair winds, following seas.

Did a bunch of that ice diving crap in New London. Cold as a MF.

[0699]

"Healy was engaged in a science mission when the accident occurred. The dive was intended to be a cold-water familiarization dive near the bow of the ship, a routine activity when the ship is operating in Arctic ice. During this type of dive, the ship sits idle and hazardous pumps and propellers are disengaged."

I don't know that I'd call diving under Arctic ice routine...

RIP Guardsmen.

[rmediver2002]

The investigation is ongoing. A friend of mine is going to forward the results when complete.

He stated the last diver CG lost was 1979.

The one I went to training with was going right to the Pacific Ice Breaker, they do the cold 6 months up North and then head South for the cold... Not my idea of a good tour...

I would assume this is fairly routine for that type of vessel, having the hull inspected during the tour in the ice.

I know the divers were on SCUBA.

Personally I would prefer hot water and a helmet in those temperatures...

[0699]

A link to the ship's web site appears to have more information...

http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/healy/

[SOTB]

Apparently, less than a month ago, BM2 Duque was sworn in again in a re-enlistment ceremony by Lt Hill.

Fuck, sad indeed.

RIP....

[Dutch8654]

The investigation is ongoing. A friend of mine is going to forward the results when complete.

This was my first thought. Someone on the ship "switched on" something they shouldn't have.

RIP Divers

[SOTB]

RIP MenAnd WOman....

[Dutch8654]

And WOman....

edited post

[timmah5]

RIP

[Carl Spackler]

SCUBA in ice conditions has to be supervised VERY closely. For one, once the 1st stage enters the water it had better not hit air again until the end of the dive or freezing up is the norm. Kinda hard diving rough seas and treading water and not letting your 1st stage hit air. Most Navy dives in those environs called for special operational planning. Usually surface supplied was the MO.

[Sdiver]

Awwww FUCK !!!!

Truly a very tragic incident.

My respects to the Families and all Coasties.

[johca]

SCUBA in ice conditions has to be supervised VERY closely. For one, once the 1st stage enters the water it had better not hit air again until the end of the dive or freezing up is the norm. Kinda hard diving rough seas and treading water and not letting your 1st stage hit air. Most Navy dives in those environs called for special operational planning. Usually surface supplied was the MO.Current technology has remedied how bad the design problems were back in the 1970s and 1980s concerning this problem.

I supervised and conducted Air Force Dive operations in Iceland, Alaska, Greenland, and other cold and high elevation locations (above 8,000 feet before the Navy even published high altitude dive tables) back in the 1970s and 1980s and have much familarity with this problem and also the equipment that should be used in these environments.

Saying this, it doesn’t mean that an iced up or frozen first stage regulator wasn't the cause and I'd certainly be interested in seeing the causes put forth by the official accident report.

The type of regulator being used should have been designed for cold water operations. An example would be The Sherwood Blizzard, PN SRB7900 (http://www.sherwoodscuba.com/manuals/SRB7900_Blizzard.pdf)

Regarding Lt. Jessica Hill and Petty Officer 2nd Class Steven Duque--RIP my condolences to the families.

[rv808]

RIP

[TP2165]

RIP

[slowloud&harmless]

RIP Divers.

[brewmonkey]

Rest In Peace.

Truly a sad day for the Coast Guard.

This is a pic from the re-enlistment mentioned above.

[Savoy6]

Rest in Peace. May they always have Blue Skies and Calm Seas.

[Trip_Wire]

RIP USCG Divers!

[Trip_Wire]

Any more info on this?


http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/21/129213/

The Coast Guard has one of the smallest diving programs (less than 100 service wide), the divers come through the Navy school in PC.

In the past they would come through second class diver training but a shift to first phase of EOD was made some years back.

I had one in my class in 1993 and continue to work with another who is retired now.

RIP divers...


Jeff

Yes, today's Seattle Times.:

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003235424_webhealy30.html

Captain's duties suspended following diving deaths.

[SN]

RIP-

[SOTB]

Today (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060924/ap_on_re_us/diver_deaths_2) in the news....

[Viking]

Update:
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/11/22/diver.deaths.ap/index.html

SEATTLE, Washington (AP) -- One of two Coast Guard divers who mysteriously died during a training dive in the Arctic last summer sank uncontrollably as far as 190 feet below the icy surface and suffocated, according to an autopsy summary obtained by The Associated Press.

The divers had slipped into a patch of open water near the ship's bow and were planning to dive to a maximum depth of 20 feet, said William Hill Jr. His daughter Lt. Jessica Hill, along with Boatswain's Mate Steven Duque, died August 17, 500 miles north of Alaska.

A support team supposedly held ropes attached to them lest they became disoriented under the ice, Hill said. "Why in the hell did they let out that much rope?" he asked. "It was only scheduled for 20 feet."

The Coast Guard has released little information about the deaths but relieved the Healy's commander, citing a loss of confidence in his ability. A spokesman said the Coast Guard would not discuss Hill's autopsy report -- given to the AP by Hill -- pending the outcome of its investigations, expected next year.

The autopsy summary, written by Armed Forces Regional Medical Examiner Stanley D. Adams, said Hill suffered "an uncontrolled descent to a possible depth of 189 feet."

The amount of air in the divers' tanks would have lasted a half-hour at 20 feet, but only 10 minutes at 180, the report said. By the time Hill, 31, and Duque, 22, had been pulled up, their air tanks were empty or nearly empty, the report said.

The dive support team reportedly pulled the divers to the surface after becoming concerned; attempts to resuscitate the two failed.

The autopsy ruled Hill's death an accident. The cause was asphyxia, lung trauma caused as pressure decreases during ascents, and possible air bubbles in the blood. Duque's family could not immediately be reached to confirm whether he died of the same causes.

"It is quite likely the divers lost consciousness prior to or during the ascent," Adams wrote.

The autopsy summary also noted that a third diver planned to take part, but "immediately aborted the dive" for reasons that are not mentioned.

Healy was sailing through the Arctic with about 35 scientists to collect data that would help them map the ocean floor. Hill was the ship's dive officer as well as the liaison between the scientists and the crew.

Adams added that his findings must be squared with investigations into the state of the divers' equipment and into the circumstances of the dive.

Hill, of St. Augustine, Florida, said he plans to ask an independent pathologist to review the autopsy results.

His daughter's birthday would have been Monday.

"Right now, I'm just waiting to get the Christmas holidays over and wait for the New Year," he said. "Then I can expect the next report."

[Trip_Wire]

There are many conflicting reports surfacing on this incident, to include the womens Fathers statements.

One report that rang my bell, was that both divers went down to 200 ft.! Another that also alarmed me was that she had only been in a Dry Suit, once before at the dive school in Panama City BH. Dry suit diving can be trickey, without diving in them often.

Given the cause of death, I would venture to say that panic was involved. Perhaps her dive partner tried to save her from a runaway assent with her air filled dry suit and both panicked and held their breath or couldn't release it fast enough.

In anycase IMHO, there is more then meets the eye in that accident report and the actual incident.

[Cass]

The investigation is ongoing. A friend of mine is going to forward the results when complete.


.

Let us know. My news clip said some heavy down force did not allow the safety men to pull the divers up from 200' with safety lines.

[johca]

Dry suit diving can be tricky, without diving in them often. Agree 100%, most common error is wearing to much weight to compensate for buoyancy at surface. Then as decent happens either compression of air trapped in the suit is not compensated for quickly enough. This results in either an ever increasing rate of descent if loss of situational awareness happens or the weight belt sliding off of diver at depth causes an uncontrollable and increasingly faster buoyant accent.

Most common error I saw when giving pool training using dry suits happened while still on surface. The diver would fail to bleed off (vent out) air in the suit before starting decent, air would shift to feet and legs and diver would be bobbing head down with feet in the air. One day of familiarization training in a pool (no open water and warm water-probably not wearing the thick rubber extreme cold water mittens) is looking for trouble.

[Dutch8654]

In anycase IMHO, there is more then meets the eye in that accident report and the actual incident.

Thats what I thought from Day 1. Insufficient familiararity with the gear/environment for at least one diver is my bet.

[yldbill]

If the dry suit was not properly donned and became "compromised" once in the water it would have filled quickly with sea-water. Along with the aforementioned weights, buoyancy control would have been very difficult.
The warm undergarments would have provided a layer of insulation but the cold water around the suit still feels cold and as it filled the suit the diver might have had the false sense that what they were feeling was all outside of the garment. If they started to descend from the added weight of the H2O, then they would have used up their minimal air supply trying to compensate (if the suit was fitted with an air compensation valve) even faster. Probably one diver had the malfunction and the other stayed with their buddy to help. Why DID the tenders pay out so much line?
Every fatal diving accident I have ever reviewed was due to multiple problems, none terminal singularly, but in combination...
Without being there, one might imagine this scenario.

US NAVY diver's prayer for my Coast Guard Sister and Brother:
The Iron Men (Women)

It’s said that IRON MEN are gone for good

Living in memories of sunken ships and old books.

But listen now and I’ll tell you the truth

That IRON MEN still wear the Navy blue.

For when the cry rises to succor and to save,

The Navy’s Salvor’s are the first of the brave.

Steels ships ripped on coral reefs below,

Need men to repair them, so they can still go.

Ten fathoms down a diver grows chill

while working with his heart and unwavering will.

When at last the toilsome deed is done

And the fearless struggle with the sea is won,

The Salvor sighs a great...AMEN.

And takes his place in history with the other IRON MEN!

"I wish to be useful, and every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary."

- Nathan Hale

[rmediver2002]

link:http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2790767&page=1

Jan. 12, 2007 — A new report has shed new light on the mysterious deaths of two U.S. Coast Guard divers killed during a training dive in the Arctic last summer. According to the report, the divers may have carried too much weight that they could not easily jettison in an underwater emergency.

The Coast Guard, in a report to be released later today, said the tragedy was preventable and resulted from a "failure" of the command staff and dive team to "properly plan for and execute a standard cold water dive."

A copy of the report's executive summary was obtained by ABC News.

Thirty-one-year old Lt. Jessica Hill and 22-year-old boatswain's mate Steven Duque were killed Aug. 17, 2006, during what was supposed to be a routine training dive. The deaths — the first Coast Guard diver deaths in 30 years — occurred about 500 miles north of Barrow Alaska. The divers were assigned to the Coast Guard icebreaker Healy.

'Numerous Violations'

The report cited "numerous violations of [Coast Guard] and Navy diving manuals, " including inadequate preparation, improper use of the diving equipment, inadequately trained diver tenders, and a failure to ensure proper supervision and " redundancy " of the "dive capability in case of emergency."

Each of the divers carried approximately 60 pounds of weight in the pockets of their buoyancy compensation devices, or BCDs, the report says. The BCD provides neutral buoyancy underwater, using a combination of air pockets and weights.

Hill and Duque "filled not only the weight pockets but also the equipment pockets of the BCD. Thus, much of the divers' weight could not be easily jettisoned," the report says.

Soon after beginning the dive, Hill and Duque rapidly descended as much as 220 feet, according to the report. Dive tenders on the surface, who monitored ropelike lines connected to the divers, became concerned that too much tending line was being let out too quickly. They brought the divers to the surface. Despite efforts to resuscitate them, both divers died.

An autopsy found the cause was a "lack of oxygen with severe air pressure damage to the lungs," according to the report, which notes that Hill and Duque were still carrying all the weight they had when they started the dive.

It is not clear whether Hill and Duque miscalculated the amount of weight needed on the dive or if there are other factors involved.

Harsh Words for Command Staff

The report notes that neither diver wore weight belts, as required. In addition, the investigation found that not enough qualified dive staff was on hand during the dive. The dive tenders, for example, were not qualified.

But the report also has harsh words for the Healy's command staff. The ship's captain, executive officer and operations officer "failed to exercise leadership and supervision expected," in the words of the report.

"Their actions demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the Coast Guard's dive program, and a lack of knowledge and disregard for the high level of risk of cold water diving," investigators found.

The ship's captain, Cmdr. Douglas Russell, was removed from command shortly after the incident.

The Coast Guard, according to the report, has taken actions to improve leadership and dive training "to eliminate the shortfalls that led to this tragedy."

Phone calls to the Coast Guard were not immediately returned to ABC News.

In a statement, Hill's family said that "no one failure can be blamed, but each contributed to a series of events resulting in a tragic loss to the families, friends and the Coast Guard. Their deaths will not be in vain if the actions proposed by the Coast Guard resulting from this investigation are implemented and no other family will go through what we have experienced."


RME

[Trip_Wire]

In the end, and/or the bottom line it was the divers who were at fault here, as they plan and do the dive. (IMHO.)

Yes, there are always mitigating circumstances and other excuses; however, as I said, in the end, it is the individual diver and especially the more experienced diver, who must make these safety decisions. It's your butt, not theirs!

How they got to the depths involved, when 150 Ft. is the normal military diving depth with SCUBA gear as well as the fact, they planned 20 Ft. dive, is beyond me.

Also, putting weights into non-dumpable pockets as well as the total weight they are talking about 60+ pounds, seem to me to be a bit overweighted to me.

I use a DUI harness with dumpable weight pockets and the dumpable pockets in my Ranger BC, as a combination of weight, when I use a dey suit in cold water. I dislike regular weight belts, because of the air in the suit changing and at times loss of the belt, etc.

In most cases, I'd like to have the option of keeping some weight, most likely in the BC, to keep from blasting to the surface without any weight in an emergncy.

I think these two divers, lacked proper training and experience in cold water diving, especially in the use of dry suits, etc.

It was a tragic loss of life, for no reason! I hope that the USCG, will learn something from this incident and check log books and or other training data to ensure that the divers making such a cold water dive, are trained and exprienced dry suit divers.

[Savoy6]

Certainly a lot of good and valid points made throughout this thread on the leadership responsibilities to exercise proper control of training events. We can all learn from this tragic lesson for future airborne, dive, and live fire events by utilizing the time proven technique of the crawl, walk, run methodology.

[DBLTAP57]

RIP Divers. Let's hope that the lessons learned from this tragedy eliminate the possibility of a repeat.

[T-Rock]

Agree 100%, most common error is wearing to much weight to compensate for buoyancy at surface. Then as decent happens either compression of air trapped in the suit is not compensated for quickly enough.

Ain't that the truth.


Also, putting weights into non-dumpable pockets as well as the total weight they are talking about 60+ pounds, seem to me to be a bit overweighted to me.


With the NCDOT we routinely used 100-120lbs of weight with Viking Drysuits in the SHALLOW swift water of western NC doing repair work on footings of bridges spanning the Nantahala, French Broad, Little Tennessee, etc. However, at depths > 30-40' with that much weight, Diver beware!


In the end, and/or the bottom line it was the divers who were at fault here, as they plan and do the dive. (IMHO.)


Agree 100%......Nevertheless, RIP Divers.

[noke84]

http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/all_hands/message6.asp

[Dutch8654]

I may be a FOG but I always liked the ability to dump EVERYTHING quick and use the UDT vest to take me home.

[Dumpsterchair]

Our MDV just read us the official report the other day. The negligence was mind boggling. The tenders were untrained, non-dive qualified Coasties and they were boozing. They should have never let the line pay out more than 30 feet (the planned dive profile was 20’ for 20 min). But I don't blame the tenders so much as the LT. The LT in charge was criminally negligent.

The tenders reported getting line pull signals they thought meant to let out more line. In fact, it is more likely that it was the BM2 trying to climb up his tending line because he had a serious suit squeeze and was unable to fin his way to the surface with all of that non-ditchable weight. The two depth gauges read 180’ and 220’. They were wearing single steel eighties. The LT surfaced with 90 psi (which would be of little use at 220’) and the BM2 surfaced empty. What were they doing wearing BCD’s in dry suits? The BCD probably prevented them from reaching their inflator valve on their dry-suits.

They had no standby diver and no dive supervisor on the surface, just 2 divers in the water and several untrained tenders topside, boozing (along with a command barbecue). They actually had a third diver in the water but her suit got a leak so she surfaced and left. No possible way to get to a chamber. This was criminally negligent and there are some great lessons to be learned.

And yes, I do blame the LT more than the BM2. She planned the entire dive, ignoring every regulation in the book. However, it is unfortunate that Boats didn’t put an end to it before the tragedy occurred. Any diver is obligated to halt an evolution when they deem conditions unsafe. This is not the same as a platoon commander telling Private Snuffy to attack a position, and the private refusing, claiming “unsafe” conditions as the premise. Apples and oranges.

[johca]

FINAL ACTION ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DIVING MISHAP AND THE RESULTING DEATHS OF USCGC HEALY'S CREWMEMBERS THAT OCCURRED ON 17 AUGUST 2006 (http://www.uscg.mil/ccs/cit/cim/foia/Healy/HEALY_FAM.pdf)

[Trip_Wire]

Dumpsterchair:

I'm having a little trouble with your comments on why the divers were wearing a BCD when using a 'Dry Suit.'

Where I dive (Puget Sound) and other Cold water areas we all use BCDs with both wet (brrrrr) and dry suits. Most civilian Dive training agencies PADI, etc. teach using the BCD to take care of buoyancy and the dry suit valve to handle the squeeze at depth.

(Side Note) I dove with dry suits before they had valves and at times looked liked I had been whipped with a cat-o-nine tail where the suit had a crease. We didn't have BCDs either. ;)

Of course, some experienced divers like to use the Dry suit for both; however they still wear their BCD.

Note: I use a DUI 2000 Dry suit and a Zeagle Ranger BCD, I can not imagine anyone not being able to reach the air supply valve on the chest or the air exhust valve on the right arm. The chest strap on my BCD is adjustable and when I adjust it, to a position below the valve there is no problem at all using the valve. I wouldn't dive with a BCD that wouldn't allow free access to either valve, would you?

http://www.dui-online.com/

http://home.flash.net/~table/Mens_BCs/ZeagleRanger.htm

Did I misread something?

[Dumpsterchair]

Did I misread something?

No, I should have clarified that statement better. The question should have been stated as, why wear BCDs and not hook up the LP hose? Then they were forced to reach their inflator valve on the suit if they wanted to ascend. Don't wear the thing if your not going to use it properly. That, I don't understand.

[Dumpsterchair]

Oops...double post.

[sarc88]

ALCON,
Let's keep our fellow divers and their families in mind; these divers will never again Reach Surface.

I respectfully and strongly suggest that we open a new thread on cold water diving to discuss gear, techniques and training. Let's keep this one in memory of the USCG crew.

RIP Divers - we have The Side.

[Trip_Wire]

I don't have any heart burn with what you say. There are so many tragic mistakes with this particular dive, I doubt that further discussion would do anything for other divers.

The whole incident takes away from the professionalism, of the USCG diving program.

[sarc88]

No heartburn intended brother - concur strongly w/your stmts.