Jedburgh
15 May 2008, 11:53
The Philippines: Counterinsurgency vs Counterterrorism in Mindanao (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/152_counterinsurgency_vs_counter_terrorism_in_mind anao.pdf), ICG 14 May 08
....Counter-terrorism’s proper goal in the Philippines is to separate jihadis from insurgents – not to separate insurgents and jihadis, conflated together, from the population at large. To attempt the latter is to fall into the trap of identifying the counter-terrorist cause with domestic counter-insurgency. This makes enemies of potential allies, reinforces insurgent-jihadi bonds, and may even lend jihadis popular legitimacy otherwise reserved for mainstream insurgents. It makes the international community’s stake in counter-terrorism hostage to domestic civil wars in ways that can make the latter even more intractable.
Properly understood, counter-terrorism and domestic conflict resolution are mutually reinforcing. The MILF model, demonstrated during Oplan Tornado, expelled local and foreign jihadis from the front’s midst, strengthening its moderates and boosting mutual confidence in the peace process at the same time. Because no equivalent mechanisms were built into the relationship between the Philippines government and the MNLF, however, the fugitives found sanctuary in Sulu. As joint U.S.-Philippines security operations continue, there is an urgent need to replace failed informal arrangements in Sulu with robust ceasefire and intelligence-sharing structures....
...a different perspective on the solution in Mindanao, from the May-Jun 08 Military Review:
From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun08/MoreaEngMayJun08.pdf)
....Counter-terrorism’s proper goal in the Philippines is to separate jihadis from insurgents – not to separate insurgents and jihadis, conflated together, from the population at large. To attempt the latter is to fall into the trap of identifying the counter-terrorist cause with domestic counter-insurgency. This makes enemies of potential allies, reinforces insurgent-jihadi bonds, and may even lend jihadis popular legitimacy otherwise reserved for mainstream insurgents. It makes the international community’s stake in counter-terrorism hostage to domestic civil wars in ways that can make the latter even more intractable.
Properly understood, counter-terrorism and domestic conflict resolution are mutually reinforcing. The MILF model, demonstrated during Oplan Tornado, expelled local and foreign jihadis from the front’s midst, strengthening its moderates and boosting mutual confidence in the peace process at the same time. Because no equivalent mechanisms were built into the relationship between the Philippines government and the MNLF, however, the fugitives found sanctuary in Sulu. As joint U.S.-Philippines security operations continue, there is an urgent need to replace failed informal arrangements in Sulu with robust ceasefire and intelligence-sharing structures....
...a different perspective on the solution in Mindanao, from the May-Jun 08 Military Review:
From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun08/MoreaEngMayJun08.pdf)