Super Bunker-Buster Bombs Fast-Tracked for Possible Use Against Iran and North Korea

[bmbsqd]

Besides wondering what the RSP would be on this big bastard.....I'd hate to have to do the rigging and digging to get to a dud!! :eek:

http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11609

Super Bunker-Buster Bombs Fast-Tracked for Possible Use Against Iran and North Korea Nuclear Programs (http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11609&pageid=&pagename=)

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=byline>Edwin Black <TD align=right width=180>September 21st 2009</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
<TABLE style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 4px" cellSpacing=0 align=left border=0><TBODY><TR><TD>http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/uploads/cmimg_12593.jpg <TR><TD class=imagecap>GBU 57 A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator </TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
The Pentagon is accelerating by three years plans for a super bunker buster, the GBU-57A/B or Massive Ordnance Penetrator or MOP, a powerful new bomb aimed squarely at the underground nuclear facilities of Iran and North Korea. The gargantuan bomb—longer than 11 persons standing shoulder-to-shoulder or more than 20 feet base to nose, weighs 30,000 pounds. Some 18 percent of its total weight is comprised of explosives. Guided by a precision GPS system, the MOP can penetrate an unprecedented 200 feet down before exploding with devastation into an underground bunker, such as those buried in Iran and North Korea currently used to shield rogue nuclear programs. Now Congress has quietly advanced $68 million into the 2009 budget to accelerate the purchase and deployment of ten such super bunker busters making clear they are for possible use against the regimes in Iran or North Korea. Pentagon planners are rushing to beat by months the latest June 2010 deadline for just four such bombs, and have been subsequently directed to increase the number of MOPs to at least ten.

In early July 2009, the Defense Department told a Congressional committee that the MOP was the "weapon of choice" for an “urgent operational need” enunciated by both the U.S. Pacific Command, tasked with North Korea, and the Central Command, tasked with Iran. In doing so, the Pentagon accelerated the program by three years.

The GBU-57A/B MOP is so immense it can only be carried by either a B-52 or a B2a Stealth bomber. The weapon’s explosive power is 10 times greater than its predecessor, the BLU-109. Moreover, the GBU-57A/B MOP is one third heavier than the MOAB dubbed the Mother of All Bombs.
Following successful tests in deep New Mexico caverns, and a B-52 test drop, a crash program has been approved to modify a B-2a Stealth bomber to carry a payload of two GBU-57A/B MOP bombs. The speed and urgency comes at a time when Iran, NATO and Israel are approaching a denouement over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, its development of long-range, multi-stage missiles and a new awareness that it is clearly developing a nuclear bomb.

A consortium of defense agencies and air force units, are now working on the project. They include members of the recently-disbanded 417th Flight Test Squadron at Edwards Air Force Base in California who last year safely managed the first test drop from a B-52, dubbed FT-1 MOP for Flight Test1, according to sources at the base. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio and the AFRL’s Munitions Directorate and the Air Armament Center, both headquartered at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, are now rushing to modify the bay of a radar-evading B2a Stealth Bomber to deliver the bomb, according to base sources interviewed. A collage of private sector subcontractors is also working on effort, from Stealth bomber manufacturer Northrup-Grumman to Boeing’s “Phantom Works,” maker of the bomb itself and prime contractor for the entire project. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Virginia has been coordinating among the various air force groups from the beginning.

The Pentagon has been working on the GBU-57A/B MOP for years since Congress long ago cancelled funding for the highly portable “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” based on the lightweight M-61 nuclear bomb adapted as a bunker buster. Congress feared the consequences of radioactive fallout and worried over the inherent limitations of a nuclear blast radius on deeply buried facilities. In September 2003, a bi-partisan group of senators led by Diane Feinstein (D-California) tried to bar further funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. As she introduced the Amendment 1085, Feinstein held high pictures of destroyed Hiroshima and spoke of the carnage and suffering America’s atomic bomb had caused. Her efforts to defund the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator were defeated in a senate voice vote. Only after a second attempt the next year, was the small nuclear weapon fully defunded.

In the meantime, with the nuclear option clearly problematic for bunker busting, a 2003 study by the Defense Science Board Task Force on “Future Strategic Strike Forces,” submitted in February 2004, recommended a replacement approach. It would be MOP—that is, massive conventional explosives sent burrowing deep into an enemy position using GPS guidance and the power of its own ground-crashing weight. The caves at Tora Bora in Afghanistan which protected Osama Bin laden, had been examined by the special defense team. Their report admitted: “A deep underground tunnel facility in a rock geology poses a significant challenge for non-nuclear weapons. Such a target is difficult to penetrate…and the likelihood of damaging critical functional components deep within the facility from an energy release …is low. Our past test experience has shown that 2,000 lb. penetrators carrying 500 lbs. of high explosive are relatively ineffective against tunnels, even when skipped directly into the tunnel entrance.” The new approach would be for “a bomber-delivered massive penetrator. A family of massive ordnance payloads (20,000 to 30,000 pounds), both penetrator and blast variants, should be developed to improve conventional attack effectiveness against deep, expansive, underground tunnel facilities.”

On November 1, 2004, shortly after Congress approved MOP, the AFRL awarded a $30 million MOP contract to Boeing. The warhead case was to be fabricated from a special high performance steel alloy, thus allowing it to survive a high-speed impact into hardened concrete bunker facilities. The warhead design and internal cavity were also optimized for case survivability. Progress Ellwood National Forge of Irvine, Pennsylvania created the casing according to a design created by General Dynamics’ Ordnance and Tactical Systems division in Niceville, Florida.

By March 2007, a MOP prototype had been exploded deep under the rugged mountains of the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico in the caverns of the little-known “Weapons of Mass Destruction National Testbeds.” A slender orange-colored MOP prototype was vertically hung, nose down, just inches from the floor of a narrow cavern and then detonated. Its sheer explosive power was demonstrated. By the end of 2007, a full-size dummy mock-up of the eventual GBU 57 A/B MOP was loaded into the bay of a B2 at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. A member of the 509th Maintenance Group personally handling the bomb remarked, "I couldn't help but notice how enormous the bomb was hanging in the weapons bay.”

Early in 2008, as concern about the nuclear programs of both Iran and North Korea began intensifying, the defense establishment started focusing more attention on a delivery system. By February, 2008, the Pentagon proposed a contract to integrate the bomb into B2 stealth bombers. In May 2009, the project was fast-tracked via “Quick Reaction Capability” purchasing rules that allow an accelerated defense contract for urgent needs. In mid-July 2009, Boeing’s McDonnell Douglas Corporation was awarded a $12,100,000 contract to provide MOPs for B-2 bomb bays. In mid-August, McDonnell Douglass Corp. was awarded a second contract, this one $12,500,000 cost plus fixed fee contract with performance incentives to provide for three MOP separation test vehicles, associated aircraft and handling equipment and technical support for release on a B-52 bomber.

In describing the accelerated program, Lt. Gen. Mark Shackelford, who heads weapons acquisition for the Air Force was quoted as saying, “These are purchases beyond just those needed to test the capability," adding, "In other words, build a small inventory.”

[Jazz]

America.... FUCK YEAH!!!

[poison]

I'd dearly love to witness a detonation.

[Tracy]

I'd dearly love to witness a detonation.

We will.

But we need more hand-wringing from the UN to "do something". I want to see the IAEA on their knees begging for intervention first. Then, we can ask our esteemed Defense Expert Senator Feinstein what her thoughts are....:smile:

The next step is to make a UAV that can deliver the MOP....

[Massgrunt]

Seems like this is the kind of thing we'd be better off learning about when it debuts.

"Nice bunker you had there, sorry 'bout that."

[grog18b]

I'd dearly love to witness a detonation.

Book a flight to Iran... :smile:

[24/7]

It's got to happen, but I'm not looking forward to the ripple effects.

[Tracy]

It's got to happen, but I'm not looking forward to the ripple effects.

Neither am I. However, it's time we played Cowboys and Terrorists...

[MakoZeroSix]

Looks like it really is going to go down, huh? How many days after Nantaz gets bitch slapped do you think the Straight of Hormuz will be filled with burning oil tankers and gas here goes up to $10 a gallon here? Or do you think the Navy could prevent that from happening?

[Tracy]

Looks like it really is going to go down, huh? How many days after Nantaz gets bitch slapped do you think the Straight of Hormuz will be filled with burning oil tankers and gas here goes up to $10 a gallon here? Or do you think the Navy could prevent that from happening?

I think it's an even-money bet the Navy can stop it. 20 years ago the Boghammer boats they were using were a PITA, but the Blue Forces adjusted and smoked them.

Here's the counterpoint: We can easily embargo Iran from the Persian Gulf. Iran is a net importer of goods and petroleum. They can't refine their own oil. So the options would be to trade with Russia; albeit at a greater cost.

Truthfully, I wish it would come to that. The World needs a reminder of exactly what the US Navy is capable of. Burning the Iranian Navy to the waterlines and blockading their ports are apt enough reminders.

The LCS protypes can get in a work-up too....

Let Us Prey.

[Balls]

Anybody else take one look at the picture of that MOP and say ":whistle: Oooohoooie Godd Damn!!!! :biggrin:" :cool:

[bmbsqd]

I'd love to get a pic of my Hobby Lobby Piper Cub sitting on top of that bad boy, UAV style.
As for when or if we drop it on Iran or NK, I'd bet never. Unless we can figure out a way to get it to the Israelis, mount it to their aircraft, then promise NOT to shoot them down over Iraq, I don't think it will happen. And until we could figure out a way to prevent NK from barraging Seoul with 15,000 artillery pieces in retaliation, it ain't gonna happen.
But if we do I'd put my money on dropping it just after the health care bill goes south, or maybe an October Surprise in 2010.

[SN]

It'll get dropped, but only after NK or Iran demonsytate their capability. We pretend to support per-emptive strikes; but the hand wringers come out in droves after any pre-emptive mission.

[Tango Chaser]

Modern version of the 8" cannon tubes filled with TNT we used in Desert Storm.

[Ole crusty bastard]

If the program for the GBU/28 is any indication, I'd guess that the target, delivery system and timetable have already been programed for this puppy too.

I'd sure like to see the super/slow/mo of the detonation.

[Looon]

I don't know how effective it will be, but Israel is going to make a move while we are writing the next letter with harsh words in it..............:smile:

If Israel does it, the world will blame us and the Jews. If we do it, the world will blame us and the Jews.

If we do nothing, the world will blame us and the Jews.....

And I agree that the world needs a little reminder of what our Navy is capable of.

GO JEWS!!!

[ET1/ss nuke]

This is a very useful tool, but only if you've been foolish enough to let your enemy finish constructing facilities that require such a weapon to blow them up. The rationale of such a bomb is that you are going to try to make up for past inattention to easily fixable problems by finding a technological solution to the hard problem you let develop. But after using it, what then? Why blow up the ten weapons already completed and stored in hardened underground facilities if you aren't going to take out the capability to make more? Bombing Iran is not cost effective nor anything like a solution to the problem unless we are willing to remove their capability to produce more weapons, which entails destroying their electrical grid, their economy, and their educated population. If Iran isn't worth nuking, then I don't know what point there is in keeping most of our nuclear arsenal. If Iran isn't worth nuking, then they aren't worth bombing at all. One D-5 missile, three at most, launched from the Indian Ocean on a low trajectory, will turn the whole place into a glass parking lot before their government even knows they are in danger. If we won't play to win, I hope we don't get involved at all. It's not worth the life of one American airman, soldier, sailor, or Marine who might die in a war we could have ended in a moment but chose not to.

[Spinner]

Modern version of the 8" cannon tubes filled with TNT we used in Desert Storm.

I remember reading about the R & D that went into their development after the war. They put together an ordnance skunk works of sorts to figure out the best combinations.

Bunker busters have certainly come a long way since then.

[Miguel]

Or, it could be part of the "saber ratteling" strategy?

When I read "Iran and North Korea" multiple times in the first paragraph of an article,as an example of employment for a new weapon system, I get skeptical.

[Remington Raider]

only the WILL to so. (Dr. Stranglove)

[Greenhat]

Seems like this is the kind of thing we'd be better off learning about when it debuts.

"Nice bunker you had there, sorry 'bout that."

You would think so. Can you imagine this sort of article on the Manhattan project?

Or, it could be part of the "saber ratteling" strategy?

When I read "Iran and North Korea" multiple times in the first paragraph of an article,as an example of employment for a new weapon system, I get skeptical.

There is no question in my mind that this article is intended to do a bit of saber-rattling and get both NK and Iran reacting to this weapon system.

[Armageddon]

If we won't play to win, I hope we don't get involved at all.

X10

[SOTB]

The Pentagon has been working on the GBU-57A/B MOP for years since Congress long ago cancelled funding for the highly portable “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” based on the lightweight M-61 nuclear bomb adapted as a bunker buster. Congress feared the consequences of radioactive fallout and worried over the inherent limitations of a nuclear blast radius on deeply buried facilities. In September 2003, a bi-partisan group of senators led by Diane Feinstein (D-California) tried to bar further funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. As she introduced the Amendment 1085, Feinstein held high pictures of destroyed Hiroshima and spoke of the carnage and suffering America’s atomic bomb had caused. Her efforts to defund the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator were defeated in a senate voice vote. Only after a second attempt the next year, was the small nuclear weapon fully defunded.This entire paragraph is troubling (to ME). I don't know enough about nukes to comment on the limitations of the blast radius -- but the layman in me says to simply put in a bigger warhead. I could give a fuck about fallout over Iran (or it's neighbors). Ms Feinstein is -- well -- traitor may be the right word.How many days after Nantaz gets bitch slapped do you think the Straight of Hormuz will be filled with burning oil tankers and gas here goes up to $10 a gallon here? Or do you think the Navy could prevent that from happening?For the first part -- I think the price of gas would increase solely on speculation of supply issues, with or without actual moves on the part of Iran to block the Straight. While the capitalist in me smirks at the ease at which consumers can be moved to pay higher amounts for something STILL readily obtainable, I personally WANT prices to climb to this height. We NEED high prices. Only with pain can we finally get back to bringing energy resources to the forefront of our national security and interests. On a side note, I would like to see us come up with alternative resource options that would allow us to simply ignore the entire Middle East and let them all die a lonely and miserable death starving in the desert.

For the second part -- no, I don't think our Navy (or anyone's Navy) can prevent tankers from being destroyed, or the Straight from being blocked.If Iran isn't worth nuking, then they aren't worth bombing at all. One D-5 missile, three at most, launched from the Indian Ocean on a low trajectory, will turn the whole place into a glass parking lot before their government even knows they are in danger. If we won't play to win, I hope we don't get involved at all. It's not worth the life of one American airman, soldier, sailor, or Marine who might die in a war we could have ended in a moment but chose not to.Very well stated. I agree with the intent of the quote (or my perception of the intent). But I also think Iran is very much worth (deserving) of being nuked. No I don't care about the "innocents." Ms Feinstein and pretty much anyone who has stood in the way of wiping Iran off the face of the planet are responsible for the blood of many American warriors who've been fighting in Iraq (and apparently Astan as well), and arguably a number of terrorist acts elsewhere. In addition to this, she also has the future blood of Americans on her hand -- I hope her political aspirations don't result in my daughter being harmed....

[RGR.Montcalm]

Modern version of the 8" cannon tubes filled with TNT we used in Desert Storm.

This one looks more like the breech section of a 16" gun...

I'm surprised they didn't use DU for this...

[MDH]

My guess is that these have already been manufactured in numbers; this story was to get the attention of the Iranians.

I in my cynical view, I see this as a way for the Obama administration to handicap the Israelis.

This administration is not supportive of Israel, and really don’t care about Israelis concerns for safety. The Israelis know that they will have to go it alone as long as Obama is in office; the Obama administration doesn’t want Israel going after Iran.

One of the keys to Israeli success is by the Iranians keeping nuclear weapon production consolidated in half a dozen or so sites, letting them think it’s safe under a couple of hundred feet of dirt. Now that we’ve told the Iranians that underground is not safe… the Iranians will disperse their weapon production even more, greatly reducing the odds of a first strike success.

The serious down side to this…is the old “law of unintended consequences”. So you are an Israeli military planner, you see that your first option: Surgical strike using bunker busting weapons will not guarantee success.

Option II: You look at the map or Iran, Iran only has 18 or so population/military centers. Does Israel have more than 18 nuclear weapons…probably so. So option II becomes not so surgical nuclear strike. The up side: you’ve dismantled Iran’s nuclear threat for good. The down side: The UN will condemn your actions (like anybody cares) Arab countries will get mad at you.

[smp52]

IMHO, discussions of nuking Iran as a solution are a non-starter. If we didn't nuke the chinese when we held a significant edge during the korean war, or turn Afghanistan into glass after 9/11, I do not think ANY political leader of this country will sign up to using nuclear weapons as a first strike option unless we know 100% that a WMD is coming our way. This does not matter if its a republican or democrat, they will not do it.

The bunker buster is a tool (a neat one). It is not a strategic weapon.

This is no real long term strategy to deal with the middle east because if there was one, we'd we pouring money into energy development in our country to de-couple the symbiotic relationship we have. If we want Iran to spend their way into ruin, we'd better start soon with an active campaign sabotoging their industrial capabilities, infrastructure, etc.

[Remington Raider]

but since Israel has no BUFFs or B-2 (that I know of?) this new bomb will make a nice paperweight. The U.S., ESPECIALLY the current adminstration, lacks the will to employ it against Iran. Period. No matter what. Really. End of story. Fin.

[poison]

Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman
Related Special Topic Page

* The Iranian Nuclear Game

During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, now-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that like all U.S. presidents, Barack Obama would face a foreign policy test early in his presidency if elected. That test is now here.

His test comprises two apparently distinct challenges, one in Afghanistan and one in Iran. While different problems, they have three elements in common. First, they involve the question of his administration’s overarching strategy in the Islamic world. Second, the problems are approaching decision points (and making no decision represents a decision here). And third, they are playing out very differently than Obama expected during the 2008 campaign.

During the campaign, Obama portrayed the Iraq war as a massive mistake diverting the United States from Afghanistan, the true center of the “war on terror.” He accordingly promised to shift the focus away from Iraq and back to Afghanistan. Obama’s views on Iran were more amorphous. He supported the doctrine that Iran should not be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, while at the same time asserted that engaging Iran was both possible and desirable. Embedded in the famous argument over whether offering talks without preconditions was appropriate (something now-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attacked him for during the Democratic primary) was the idea that the problem with Iran stemmed from Washington’s refusal to engage in talks with Tehran.

We are never impressed with campaign positions, or with the failure of the victorious candidate to live up to them. That’s the way American politics work. But in this case, these promises have created a dual crisis that Obama must make decisions about now.
Iran

Back in April, in the midst of the financial crisis, Obama reached an agreement at the G-8 meeting that the Iranians would have until Sept. 24 and the G-20 meeting to engage in meaningful talks with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1) or face intensely increased sanctions. His administration was quite new at the time, so the amount of thought behind this remains unclear. On one level, the financial crisis was so intense and September so far away that Obama and his team probably saw this as a means to delay a secondary matter while more important fires were flaring up.

But there was more operating than that. Obama intended to try to bridge the gap between the Islamic world and the United States between April and September. In his speech to the Islamic world from Cairo, he planned to show a desire not only to find common ground, but also to acknowledge shortcomings in U.S. policy in the region. With the appointment of special envoys George Mitchell (for Israel and the Palestinian territories) and Richard Holbrooke (for Pakistan and Afghanistan), Obama sought to build on his opening to the Islamic world with intense diplomatic activity designed to reshape regional relationships.

It can be argued that the Islamic masses responded positively to Obama’s opening — it has been asserted to be so and we will accept this — but the diplomatic mission did not solve the core problem. Mitchell could not get the Israelis to move on the settlement issue, and while Holbrooke appears to have made some headway on increasing Pakistan’s aggressiveness toward the Taliban, no fundamental shift has occurred in the Afghan war.

Most important, no major shift has occurred in Iran’s attitude toward the United States and the P-5+1 negotiating group. In spite of Obama’s Persian New Year address to Iran, the Iranians did not change their attitude toward the United States. The unrest following Iran’s contested June presidential election actually hardened the Iranian position. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained president with the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while the so-called moderates seemed powerless to influence their position. Perceptions that the West supported the demonstrations have strengthened Ahmadinejad’s hand further, allowing him to paint his critics as pro-Western and himself as an Iranian nationalist.

But with September drawing to a close, talks have still not begun. Instead, they will begin Oct. 1. And last week, the Iranians chose to announce that not only will they continue work on their nuclear program (which they claim is not for military purposes), they have a second, hardened uranium enrichment facility near Qom. After that announcement, Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a press conference saying they have known about the tunnel for several months, and warned of stern consequences.

This, of course, raises the question of what consequences. Obama has three choices in this regard.

First, he can impose crippling sanctions against Iran. But that is possible only if the Russians cooperate. Moscow has the rolling stock and reserves to supply all of Iran’s fuel needs if it so chooses, and Beijing can also remedy any Iranian fuel shortages. Both Russia and China have said they don’t want sanctions; without them on board, sanctions are meaningless.

Second, Obama can take military action against Iran, something easier politically and diplomatically for the United States to do itself rather than rely on Israel. By itself, Israel cannot achieve air superiority, suppress air defenses, attack the necessary number of sites and attempt to neutralize Iranian mine-laying and anti-ship capability all along the Persian Gulf. Moreover, if Israel struck on its own and Iran responded by mining the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would be drawn into at least a naval war with Iran — and probably would have to complete the Israeli airstrikes, too.

And third, Obama could choose to do nothing (or engage in sanctions that would be the equivalent of doing nothing). Washington could see future Iranian nuclear weapons as an acceptable risk. But the Israelis don’t, meaning they would likely trigger the second scenario. It is possible that the United States could try to compel Israel not to strike — though it’s not clear whether Israel would comply — something that would leave Obama publicly accepting Iran’s nuclear program.

And this, of course, would jeopardize Obama’s credibility. It is possible for the French or Germans to waffle on this issue; no one is looking to them for leadership. But for Obama simply to acquiesce to Iranian nuclear weapons, especially at this point, would have significant diplomatic and domestic political ramifications. Simply put, Obama would look weak — and that, of course, is why the Iranians announced the second nuclear site. They read Obama as weak, and they want to demonstrate their own resolve. That way, if the Russians were thinking of cooperating with the United States on sanctions, Moscow would be seen as backing the weak player against the strong one. The third option, doing nothing, therefore actually represents a significant action.
Afghanistan

In a way, the same issue is at stake in Afghanistan. Having labeled Afghanistan as critical — indeed, having campaigned on the platform that the Bush administration was fighting the wrong war — it would be difficult for Obama to back down in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has reported that without a new strategy and a substantial increase in troop numbers, failure in Afghanistan is likely.

The number of troops being discussed, 30,000-40,000, would bring total U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan to just above the number of troops the Soviet Union deployed there in its war (just under 120,000) — a war that ended in failure. The new strategy being advocated would be one in which the focus would not be on the defeat of the Taliban by force of arms, but the creation of havens for the Afghan people and protecting those havens from the Taliban.

A move to the defensive when time is on your side is not an unreasonable strategy. But it is not clear that time is on Western forces’ side. Increased offensives are not weakening the Taliban. But halting attacks and assuming that the Taliban will oblige the West by moving to the offensive, thereby opening itself to air and artillery strikes, probably is not going to happen. And while assuming that the country will effectively rise against the Taliban out of the protected zones the United States has created is interesting, it does not strike us as likely. The Taliban is fighting the long war because it has nowhere else to go. Its ability to maintain military and political cohesion following the 2001 invasion has been remarkable. And betting that the Pakistanis will be effective enough to break the Taliban’s supply lines is hardly the most prudent bet.

In short, Obama’s commander on the ground has told him the current Afghan strategy is failing. He has said that unless that strategy changes, more troops won’t help, and that a change of strategy will require substantially more troops. But when we look at the proposed strategy and the force levels, it is far from obvious that even that level of commitment will stand a chance of achieving meaningful results quickly enough before the forces of Washington’s NATO allies begin to withdraw and U.S. domestic resolve erodes further.

Obama has three choices in Afghanistan. He can continue to current strategy and force level, hoping to prolong failure long enough for some undefined force to intervene. He can follow McChrystal’s advice and bet on the new strategy. Or he can withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Once again, doing nothing — the first option — is doing something quite significant.
The Two Challenges Come Together

The two crises intermingle in this way: Every president is tested in foreign policy, sometimes by design and sometimes by circumstance. Frequently, this happens at the beginning of his term as a result of some problem left by his predecessor, a strategy adopted in the campaign or a deliberate action by an antagonist. How this happens isn’t important. What is important is that Obama’s test is here. Obama at least publicly approached the presidency as if many of the problems the United States faced were due to misunderstandings about or the thoughtlessness of the United States. Whether this was correct is less important than that it left Obama appearing eager to accommodate his adversaries rather than confront them.

No one has a clear idea of Obama’s threshold for action.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban takes the view that the British and Russians left, and that the Americans will leave, too. We strongly doubt that the force level proposed by McChrystal will be enough to change their minds. Moreover, U.S. forces are limited, with many still engaged in Iraq. In any case, it isn’t clear what force level would suffice to force the Taliban to negotiate or capitulate — and we strongly doubt that there is a level practical to contemplate.

In Iran, Ahmadinejad clearly perceives that challenging Obama is low-risk and high reward. If he can finally demonstrate that the United States is unwilling to take military action regardless of provocations, his own domestic situation improves dramatically, his relationship with the Russians deepens, and most important, his regional influence — and menace — surges. If Obama accepts Iranian nukes without serious sanctions or military actions, the American position in the Islamic world will decline dramatically. The Arab states in the region rely on the United States to protect them from Iran, so U.S. acquiescence in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons would reshape U.S. relations in the region far more than a hundred Cairo speeches.

There are four permutations Obama might choose in response to the dual crisis. He could attack Iran and increase forces in Afghanistan, but he might well wind up stuck in a long-term war in Afghanistan. He could avoid that long-term war by withdrawing from Afghanistan and also ignore Iran’s program, but that would leave many regimes reliant on the United States for defense against Iran in the lurch. He could increase forces in Afghanistan and ignore Iran — probably yielding the worst of all possible outcomes, namely, a long-term Afghan war and an Iran with a nuclear program if not nuclear weapons.

On pure logic, history or politics aside, the best course is to strike Iran and withdraw from Afghanistan. That would demonstrate will in the face of a significant challenge while perhaps reshaping Iran and certainly avoiding a drawn-out war in Afghanistan. Of course, it is easy for those who lack power and responsibility — and the need to govern — to provide logical choices. But the forces closing in on Obama are substantial, and there are many competing considerations in play.

Presidents eventually arrive at the point where something must be done, and where doing nothing is very much doing something. At this point, decisions can no longer be postponed, and each choice involves significant risk. Obama has reached that point, and significantly, in his case, he faces a double choice. And any decision he makes will reverberate.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

FWIW.

[Bravo_One_Three]

It requires only the WILL to so. (Dr. Stranglove)

I see your Dr. Strangelove quote, and I raise you with:

Of course, the whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost if you keep it a secret! Why didn't you tell the world, EH?

I believe we're not keeping this part a secret.

[grog18b]

This entire paragraph is troubling (to ME). Ms Feinstein is -- well -- traitor may be the right word.

For her to say this, proves beyond a shadow of any doubt, that she is indeed fully fucking retarded. Her statement basically shits in the face of every single person the Japanese empire murdered, raped, and/or tortured... Every single American POW that was tortured, every single American that did not return home because of Japanese aggression. I'm sure she would have preferred sending hundreds of thousands of young American boys to die in the invasion of mainland Japan.

Feinstein can go fuck herself. Traitor isn't strong enough Bro. Her stupidity amazes me to no end.

[spectr17]

Feinstein can go fuck herself. Traitor isn't strong enough Bro. Her stupidity amazes me to no end.

It's the dye in her hair treatment, it's seeped into her gourd and made her daft.

[Remington Raider]

I see your Dr. Strangelove quote, and I raise you with:



I believe we're not keeping this part a secret.

Well played, sir.

[ET1/ss nuke]

Option II: You look at the map or Iran, Iran only has 18 or so population/military centers. Does Israel have more than 18 nuclear weapons…probably so. So option II becomes not so surgical nuclear strike. The up side: you’ve dismantled Iran’s nuclear threat for good. The down side: The UN will condemn your actions (like anybody cares) Arab countries will get mad at you.

The problem with Israel carpet-nuking Iran is the delivery system. Israel does not have the IRBM capacity. They have a capable bomber fleet that would need IFF codes from the USA to transit airspace over Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and much of Saudi Arabia. Who knows how the Turks would respond to violation of their airspace? The Iranians are vulnerable to air attack, but they would be a lot less vulnerable if the Israelis lost the element of surprise, and in the current relationship between Israel and the Obama administration, there is no guarantee that the US State Department would not tip off the Iranians.

[HighDragLowSpeed]

The Iranians are vulnerable to air attack, but they would be a lot less vulnerable if the Israelis lost the element of surprise, and in the current relationship between Israel and the Obama administration, there is no guarantee that the US State Department would not tip off the Iranians.


Wowsa....I'd expect that from the French but not us. Then again, you may have a point....

[EchoFiveMike]

The problem with Israel carpet-nuking Iran is the delivery system. Israel does not have the IRBM capacity. They have a capable bomber fleet that would need IFF codes from the USA to transit airspace over Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and much of Saudi Arabia. Who knows how the Turks would respond to violation of their airspace? The Iranians are vulnerable to air attack, but they would be a lot less vulnerable if the Israelis lost the element of surprise, and in the current relationship between Israel and the Obama administration, there is no guarantee that the US State Department would not tip off the Iranians.

IDF has an overt delivery system(Jerico), tested under the auspices of their space program(Shavit) Depending on their level of micronization and whether they have boosted fission or true fusion weapons this could easily be a viable city buster. It certainly has much more utility for that than for targeting hardened underground facilities, for which I doubt they have either the high accduracy or high yields.

They also have cruise missiles from their sub force, which can range from the Gulf, however, I have no information regarding whether their subs are nuke capable or not. Assuming so, using cruise missiles to deliver strikes seriously decreases confidence of success considering the Iranians have made widely publicised purchases of premium Soviet SAM systems recently.

As for delivery of the MOAP, they can be delivered using a cargo plane, the stereotypical C130 out the back. However, they need alltitude to achieve high terminal velocities to achieve decent penetration and thus would be sitting ducks for any viable IAD network. A full strike package, to include tankerage/ECM support/etc, overflying US controlled airspace, is going to cause serious problems with the current Admin. To include the insanity of having US forces firing on the IAF to defend Iran. Now, I recall the USS Liberty, so shooting Israelis down isn't going to cause me to lose sleep at night in an of itself but in this case letting the IDF do our dirty work makes sense.

But I'll be fucking honest, the thought of the Israelis having the sack to do the right thing and nuking the fucking Iranians via IRBM makes me want to drop a case of Manischewitz off at the local synagogue. S/F....Ken M

[ET1/ss nuke]

IDF has an overt delivery system(Jerico), tested under the auspices of their space program(Shavit)


the thought of the Israelis having the sack to do the right thing and nuking the Iranians via IRBM makes me want to drop a case of Manischewitz off at the local synagogue. S/F....Ken M

I forgot about the Jericho. That would work just fine. If they are going the nuke route, they might as well get it over with and toss a couple into Gaza and other nearby stinkpots while they're at it, because you know that Iran's revenge will come via Hamas and Hezbollah.

[SOTB]

I would like to see the Israelis do what we are unable to understand needs to be done. But when they do, I also don't want us leaping to our feet and proclaiming that we have to defend Israel from every possible aggressor in the region. I believe the Israelis are like most countries on this planet (ours included), and they do what is in their best interests -- not their friends' (read = allies'). The Liberty incident is important to recall -- no, I have not the slightest belief they were unaware it was a US ship. No, I won't debate it. They have also spent a huge amount of resources spying on the US -- but then, as I allude to above -- I am sure we spend a lot of resources spying on them, too. So I am not casting judgement, simply defining parameters to which we should feel compelled to offer assistance when they have retaliatory strikes from neighbors using chem and bio weapons, so as to compete with Israel's nukes.

I do see the logic in providing them assistance over the muslim nations in the region, and need no convincing there. To ME, assistance probably does not mean troops.

Long rant short, I'd like to see the Israelis nuke Iran....

[grog18b]

I'm surprised it has not happened yet. Israelis are getting soft...

[smp52]

This artcile highlights (http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/30/news/international/Iran_oil/index.htm?cnn=yes)how embargoing Iran won't work either. If Japan and China are large importers of Iranian crude, it will effect our economics.

We have to figure a way out to let Iran shoot itself in the foot (or give them a nudge towards that direction) and green light Israel do to what it wants. Politically speaking, an embargo or military action in the current environment aren't feasible. The first needs consensus that won't come, the second with the current administration isn't going to happen (especially since the last administration didn't do it either).

I would like to see the Israelis do what we are unable to understand needs to be done. But when they do, I also don't want us leaping to our feet and proclaiming that we have to defend Israel from every possible aggressor in the region. I believe the Israelis are like most countries on this planet (ours included), and they do what is in their best interests -- not their friends' (read = allies'). The Liberty incident is important to recall -- no, I have not the slightest belief they were unaware it was a US ship. No, I won't debate it. They have also spent a huge amount of resources spying on the US -- but then, as I allude to above -- I am sure we spend a lot of resources spying on them, too. So I am not casting judgement, simply defining parameters to which we should feel compelled to offer assistance when they have retaliatory strikes from neighbors using chem and bio weapons, so as to compete with Israel's nukes.

I do see the logic in providing them assistance over the muslim nations in the region, and need no convincing there. To ME, assistance probably does not mean troops.

Long rant short, I'd like to see the Israelis nuke Iran....

I concur with letting those more threatened that us do what they need to. I'm sure Saudis aren't thrilled with Iranian nukes, either. Only assistance we need to provide is veto any security council measure that the Russians/Chinese will most certainly propose if this goes down. Israel has to be ready to take a major hit in trade revenues and be shunned more than they are. India is competing with China for Iranian oil and procures more defense products from Israel than anyone else now. IF they are smart, they will pull out of settlements concurrently and turn the west bank into the buffer zone it was originally meant to be.

I'm surprised it has not happened yet. Israelis are getting soft...

Or they may be willing to risk a MAD type stalemate....and if that is the case, then the only outcome is Iran will be another nuclear state with the associate power that comes with nukes.

[Local]

Or they may be willing to risk a MAD type stalemate....and if that is the case, then the only outcome is Iran will be another nuclear state with the associate power that comes with nukes.

This only works when your enemy isn't willing to risk destruction.

Iran is not the soviet union.

[smp52]

This only works when your enemy isn't willing to risk destruction.

Iran is not the soviet union.

Sure, but I think Iran isn't willing to risk destruction. The ones in power want to stay there, this was evident from the recent elections in Iran that they're afraid their grasp on power will slip.

I think they have correctly calculated that the west is weak and fragmented, as such, the risk of their own destruction is low. Israel has serious challenges ahead of them in attacking Iran. While they're crazy, they aren't crazy enough to be bad businessmen. Everything done so far shows good chess playing; the west hasn't. They may be willing to take a few hits, but all out destruction of their country isn't one they will risk IMHO. Saddam was, and he paid dearly for it.

[SOTB]

Sure, but I think Iran isn't willing to risk destruction....Define "risk." Define "destruction." What I mean is that we may be unable to understand the motivations behind what an Iranian leader considers in an exchange of WMDs. Certainly, we may be at a huge disadvantage in understanding what that leader(s) might consider as acceptable losses.

Even though I consider religion to be a farce, I believe it is fairly common knowledge that there are many who disagree with my thinking. And I think there are at least some of those in disagreement with me whom are in the power-seats in Iran. Whether those people see the world ending in fire as inevitable, or whether they believe that they are the second coming of their deity and that they can pull off a WMD-exchange and that Allah is gonna cover their asses -- the end result may still be that they are willing to push the proverbial buttons and have nukes launching.

I believe that Pakistan demonstrates clearly what we are worried about. There was a time that while we were not ecstatic that Pakistan had nukes, we at least considered that the leadership was likely to not wander off on a religious crusade and start torching infidels under nuclear flames (or at least this was the impression I had of the situation). I think that when the govt recently was undergoing some serious changes, that a number of people were worried that perhaps this thinking might not hold water any longer. Certainly I have read of worries amongst our senior DOD leadership that if things were to go south with regards to political leadership in Pakistan, that perhaps their handful of nukes could wind up in the hands of the wrong people. My point to all of this is that when you have cave-dwelling camel fuckers holding the keys to igniting some of the world's most powerful weapons, the logic that a Westerner --- or even a Russian -- might use to consider such a war, may not even translate to something remotely close to what one of these people think.

Iran with nukes is not -- IMO -- simply N. Korea now having nukes (which even that situation isn't great, by any means). I don't think we are looking at simply a nuclear stalemate -- with the Iranians unwilling to assert their nuclear might. On-the-contrary, I believe it might not be long before they begin to remind the Middle East that Iranians are not Arabs. And that they have nukes and the other guys don't. While I could care less, at all, in the slightest, that the Iranians nuked Mecca (oh the irony) -- I do think that the leap from nuking the infidel Saudis isn't so great to sticking it to the Great Satan -- especially if you think that the US is possibly unwilling to retaliate with similar weaponry.

What slays me is that every administration for the past decade has been aware of Iranian aspirations. They are all at fault for not doing the right thing. We are not going to be happy campers with the Iranians having nuke capabilities. Just in their own AO, imagine a Cole incident with a nuke payload -- can you say "hey, where is our carrier?"

Bomb, bomb, bomb -- bomb, bomb, Iran (tune the tune of Barbara Ann)....

[Local]

SOTB hit it right on the head. Our definitions of acceptable are much different than theirs.

I think the Iranians would use it if they had it, or worse, give it to one of their proxies.

The Iranians might gamble we wouldn't respond in kind if we couldn't absolutely prove who snuck one into a tanker ship that made its self into an NYC harbor.

[smp52]

Whole post

Definite food for thought, for me. Thanks on an excellent post.

[poison]

Obama’s French Lesson
Sarkozy could not conceal his astonishment at Obama’s naïveté.

By Charles Krauthammer

“President Obama, I support the Americans’ outstretched hand. But what did the international community gain from these offers of dialogue? Nothing.” — French president Nicolas Sarkozy, September 24

When France chides you for appeasement, you know you’re scraping bottom. Just how low we’ve sunk was demonstrated by the Obama administration’s satisfaction when Russia’s president said of Iran, after meeting President Obama at the U.N., that “sanctions are seldom productive, but they are sometimes inevitable.”

You see? The Obama magic. Engagement works. Russia is on board. Except that, as the Washington Post inconveniently pointed out, Pres. Dmitry Medvedev said the same thing a week earlier, and the real power in Russia, Vladimir Putin, had changed not at all in his opposition to additional sanctions. And just to make things clear, when Iran then brazenly test-fired offensive missiles, Russia reacted by declaring that this newest provocation did not warrant the imposition of tougher sanctions.

Do the tally. In return for selling out Poland and the Czech Republic by unilaterally abrogating a missile-defense security arrangement that Russia had demanded be abrogated, we get from Russia . . . what? An oblique hint, of possible support, for unspecified sanctions, grudgingly offered and of dubious authority — and, in any case, leading nowhere because the Chinese have remained resolute against any Security Council sanctions.

Confusing ends and means, the Obama administration strives mightily for shows of allied unity, good feeling, and pious concern about Iran’s nuclear program — whereas the real objective is stopping that program. This feel-good posturing is worse than useless, because all the time spent achieving gestures is precious time granted Iran to finish its race to acquire the bomb.

Don’t take it from me. Take it from Sarkozy, who could not conceal his astonishment at Obama’s naïveté. On September 24, Obama ostentatiously presided over the Security Council. With 14 heads of state (or government) at the table, with an American president in the chair for the first time ever, with every news camera in the world trained on the meeting, it would garner unprecedented worldwide attention.

Unknown to the world, Obama had in his pocket explosive revelations about an illegal uranium-enrichment facility that the Iranians had been hiding near Qom. The French and the British were urging him to use this most dramatic of settings to stun the world with the revelation and to call for immediate action.

Obama refused. Not only did he say nothing about it, but, reports Le Monde, Sarkozy was forced to scrap the Qom section of his speech. Obama held the news until a day later — in Pittsburgh. I’ve got nothing against Pittsburgh (site of the G-20 summit), but a stacked-with-world-leaders Security Council chamber, it is not.

Why forgo the opportunity? Because Obama wanted the Security Council meeting to be about his own dream of a nuclear-free world. The president, reports the New York Times, citing “White House officials,” did not want to “dilute” his disarmament resolution “by diverting to Iran.”

Diversion? It’s the most serious security issue in the world. A diversion from what? From a worthless U.N. disarmament resolution?

Yes. And from Obama’s star turn as planetary visionary: “The administration told the French,” reports the Wall Street Journal, “that it didn’t want to ‘spoil the image of success’ for Mr. Obama’s debut at the U.N.”

Image? Success? Sarkozy could hardly contain himself. At the council table, with Obama at the chair, he reminded Obama that “we live in a real world, not a virtual world.”

He explained: “President Obama has even said, ‘I dream of a world without (nuclear weapons).’ Yet before our very eyes, two countries are currently doing the exact opposite.”

Sarkozy’s unspoken words? “And yet, sacre bleu, he’s sitting on Qom!”

At the time, we had no idea what Sarkozy was fuming about. Now we do. Although he could hardly have been surprised by Obama’s fecklessness. After all, just a day earlier in addressing the General Assembly, Obama actually said, “No one nation can . . . dominate another nation.” That adolescent mindlessness was followed with the declaration that “alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War” in fact “make no sense in an interconnected world.” NATO, our alliances with Japan and South Korea, our umbrella over Taiwan, are senseless? What do our allies think when they hear such nonsense?

Bismarck is said to have said: “There is a providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children, and the United States of America.” Bismarck never saw Obama at the U.N. Sarkozy did.

— Charles Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist. © 2009, The Washington Post Writers Group


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[CarnageWhiskey]

Mr. Krauthammer is usually right on the money with foreign policy issues.
Thanks for posting.

[poison]

Containing a Nuclear Iran - Fareed Zakaria

It is time to clarify the debate over Iran and its nuclear program. It's easy to criticize the current course adopted by the United States and its allies, to huff and puff about Iranian mendacity, to point out that Russia and China won't agree to tougher measures against Tehran, and to detail the leaks in the sanctions already in place. But what, then, should the United States do? The critics are eager to denounce the administration from the sidelines for being weak but rarely detail what they would do to be "tough." Would they attack Iran today? If not, then what should we do? It is time to put up or shut up on Iran.

There are three basic options that the United States and its allies have regarding Iran's nuclear program. We can bomb Iran, engage it diplomatically, or contain and deter the threat it poses. Let me outline what each would entail and then explain why I favor containment and deterrence.

Iran's nuclear ambitions are a problem. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is a danger, and the Iranian regime's foreign policy—which has involved support for militias and terrorist groups—make it a destabilizing force in the region. The country has a right to civilian nuclear energy, as do all nations. But Tehran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA says Iran has exhibited a pattern of deception and non-cooperation involving its nuclear program for 20 years—including lying about its activities and concealing sites. In that context, it makes sense to be suspicious of Iran's intentions and to ask that the IAEA routinely verify and inspect its facilities. Unless that can be achieved, Iran should pay the price for its actions. Washington's current strategy is to muster international support to impose greater costs, while at the same time negotiating with Iran to find a solution that gives the world greater assurance that the Iranian program is purely civilian in nature.

It is an unsatisfying, frustrating approach. The Russians and Chinese want to trade with Iran and will not impose crippling sanctions. (Nor would India or Brazil, nor most other major developing countries.) Even if there were some resolution, it would depend on inspections in Iran, and the Iranians could probably hide things from the inspectors and cheat. They do occasionally make concessions, including significant ones last week—to open the newly revealed Qum facility to inspectors and to send uranium to Russia for enrichment (which Tehran announced just as columnists were declaring that negotiations were sure to lead to nothing). But there will be setbacks as well. The cat-and-mouse game will continue.

One way to get instant gratification would be military force. The United States or Israel could attack Iran from the air. To be effective, such an attack would have to be large-scale and sustained, probably involving dozens and dozens of sorties over several days. The campaign would need to strike at all known Iranian facilities as well as suspected ones. Such an attack would probably not get at everything. Iran's sites are buried in mountains, and there are surely some facilities that we do not know about. But it would deal a massive blow to the Iranian nuclear program.

The first thing that would happen the day after such an offensive begins would be a massive outpouring of support for the Iranian regime. This happens routinely when a country is attacked by foreign forces, no matter how unpopular the government. Germany invaded Russia at the height of Stalin's worst repression—and the country rallied behind Stalin. The Iranian regime itself was in deep trouble in 1980, facing internal dissension and mass dissatisfaction, when Saddam Hussein attacked, throwing a lifeline to the mullahs. Recall that George W. Bush's approval rating on Sept. 10, 2001, was about 40 percent. After 9/11, it quickly climbed to 93 percent. The -Iranian dissident Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeini said to me, "If there were an attack, all of us would have to come out the next day and support the government. It would be the worst scenario for the opposition." Last week opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi warned that tightening sanctions would hurt ordinary people and turn them against the United States, not the regime.

The Iranians would respond in the wake of such an attack. In fact, they have probably been preparing a series of "asymmetrical" measures, which would involve activating militias they fund and arm in Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps also in Lebanon and Gaza. Those who argue that Iran is a sinister and powerful force manipulating terror groups across the region have to accept that Tehran will then be able to raise the temperature everywhere it has influence. I don't actually believe Iran is all that powerful, but it does have its allies, and they will almost certainly destabilize parts of Afghanistan and Iraq, which will mean a higher death toll for American soldiers and a political setback in those countries.

Then there is the political fallout. The reaction of the "Arab street" is often exaggerated, but an American or Israeli military attack would clearly put pro-American forces on the defensive in the Islamic world, delight groups like Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, and give terrorists a great new recruiting tool. Whatever the explanations offered by Washington, this would be the third Muslim country that America would have invaded in the eight years since 9/11, something that could easily be construed as a pattern.

The gain from an attack, on the other hand, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates points out, would be to delay, not end, the Iranian program, perhaps by a few years but no more. The regime has oil money, and with heightened national support and resolve, it could quickly rebuild most of its facilities. That's why the military option is just not worth the costs. And pretending that we are going to attack, when it is not a real option, is a hollow threat. You can posture as a columnist but not as the president of the United States.

There is an entirely different approach that some have advocated for a while. This strategy—engagement—is rooted in the belief that the United States has never really understood Iran's concerns and never negotiated in good faith with the regime. It argues that Iranians have legitimate security fears: there are tens of thousands of U.S. troops on either side of its border; Washington makes no secret of its desire for regime change; the CIA funds groups seeking to overthrow the government; and so on. When Iran has made gestures, such as suspending nuclear enrichment for two years, Washington has not reciprocated. American support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War remains a source of justifiable bitterness among Iran's leaders, many of whom fought in that conflict.

So, the feeling goes, Washington needs to make a much more active effort to engage the Iranians, listening and responding to their concerns, allaying their suspicions, ending "regime change" policies and offering the real prospect of recognition to the Islamic Republic and normal relations with the United States. If we lessen their fears and concerns, in this view, Tehran's leaders will be more likely to cooperate on the nuclear front.

There is something to this line of thinking. The Iranians do have some legitimate security concerns. They live in a neighborhood surrounded by nuclear powers—Israel, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. The Bush administration did needlessly alienate Iran right after Tehran had cooperated with Washington to oust the Taliban and set up the Karzai government in Kabul. And it ignored any gestures or concessions made by the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, further undermining an already weak president.

But the fundamental analysis is flawed. I do not believe the Iranian regime, at its core, wants normalized relations with America. Isolation from the West and hostility toward the United States are fundamental pillars that prop up the current regime—the reason that this system of government came into being and what sustains it every day. This is not simply a matter of ideology— though that is important—but economics. Those who rule in Tehran have created a closed, oligarchic economy that channels the country's oil revenues into the coffers of its religious foundations (for compliant clerics) and the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard. They benefit from a closed economy that they can manipulate. An opening to the world, which would mean more trade, commerce, and contact with the United States, would strengthen Iran's civil society, its trading class, its students, its bourgeoisie, and thus strengthen opposition to the regime.

The rulers of Iran do not want to open up to the world, except on their terms and in targeted ways that increase their own wealth and power. People sometimes speak about a "China option" for Iran, in which Tehran would engage the world economically but remain politically repressive. But China genuinely opened up its economy and society to the outside world and brought market forces to bear, empowering new groups and creating a large economy outside the purview of the government. What Iran probably seeks out of this engagement is a "Russia option," in which the regime gains greater wealth and power by trading with the West, but retains a viselike control over Iran's economy and society.

The United States has apologized for its role in the 1953 coup; it has reached out to Iran; it has offered wide-open talks. Each time, Iran has rebuffed the outstretched hand, claiming that the timing was bad, or the words used were wrong, or the offer wasn't big enough. If it is true that Washington has been wary of simply getting into talks with Tehran, the reverse is more evidently true. And until the government of Iran makes a decision that it is interested in a rapprochement, no set of words or gestures, however clever, is going to break the logjam. If Mao had not wanted to break with the Soviet Union and make peace with the United States, Ping-Pong diplomacy and even Henry Kissinger's negotiating prowess would not have produced the breakthrough of 1972.

So what does that leave? In fact, we are already moving toward a robust, workable response to the dangers of an Iranian nuclear program—one that involves sustained containment and deterrence. Iran's rise has aroused suspicion in the Arab world. Many countries in the region are developing closer ties with the United States, including military ones. In the West, European nations worry about nuclear proliferation and are irritated with Iran's deception and obstructionism. They have gotten tougher over the years in combating Iran and its proxies, and they are getting tougher at implementing some of the financial sanctions that target Iran's elites. Even Russia and China, which have tried to maintain their ties with Iran, are conscious that they cannot be seen to be utterly unconcerned about proliferation and the defiance of U.N. resolutions. So they've allowed for some actions against the Iranian regime (and according to some reports were critical to the outcome of last week's talks in Geneva).

All this means that Iran has become something of an international pariah, unable to operate with great latitude around the world. The country is in a box and, if well handled, can be kept there until the regime becomes much more transparent and cooperative on the nuclear issue. To do so, we should maintain the current sanctions but should not add broad new ones like an embargo on refined-gasoline imports. Any new measures should target the leadership and factions like the Revolutionary Guards specifically. And we should think more broadly about other ways to pressure the regime. There should be a structure within which those countries that are worried about the threat posed by Iran can meet and strategize. We should work to further align the interests of moderate Arab states with those of Israel, which could be one of the strategic boons of the circumstance. It's clear that Iran fears this potential alliance, which is why Ahmadinejad has worked so hard to present himself as the chief spokesman for the great Arab cause of Palestine. By spouting his nonsense about the Holocaust and professing his support for the Palestinians, he's trying to make it harder for leaders in Saudi Arabia to effectively take Israel's side in opposition to Tehran.

At the same time, we must stop exaggerating the Iranian threat. By hyping it, we only provide Iran with "free power," in Leslie Gelb's apt phrase. This is an insecure Third World country with a GDP that is one 40th the size of America's, a dysfunctional economy, a divided political class, and a government facing mass unrest at home. It has alienated most of its neighboring states and cuts a sorry figure on the world stage, with an international embarrassment for a president. Its forays in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza have had mixed results, with the locals often growing weary of the Iranian thugs who try to control them.

The country does not yet have even one nuclear weapon, and if and when it gets one—something that is far from certain—the world will not end. The Middle East has been home to nuclear weapons for decades. If Israel's estimated -arsenal of 200 warheads, including a "second-strike capacity," has not prompted Egypt to develop its own nukes, it's not clear that one Iranian bomb would do so. (Recall that Egypt has fought and lost three wars against Israel, so it should be far more concerned about an Israeli bomb than an Iranian one.) More crucially, Israel's massive nuclear force will deter Iran from ever contemplating using or giving away its own (hypothetical) weapon. Deterrence worked with madmen like Mao, and with thugs like Stalin, and it will work with the calculating autocrats of Tehran. The Iranian regime has amply demonstrated over the past four months that it is interested in hanging on to power at all costs, jailing mullahs and ignoring its own clerical elite. These are not the actions of religious rulers about to commit mass suicide.

We should not fear to negotiate with these rulers. We talked to the Soviet Union even as we implemented a far more extensive policy of containment toward Moscow. But talks should not involve a final normalization or sanctification of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unless there is a Gorbachev-like reversal of Iran's basic approach to the world—a Persian glasnost and perestroika—there should be no reciprocal integration into the Western world.

The ultimate solution to the problem of Iran will lie in an Iranian regime that understands it has much to gain from embracing the modern world. That doesn't mean Iran would forswear its efforts to be a regional power—all the losing presidential candidates in Iran endorsed the country's nuclear program—but it does mean that Iran would be more willing to be open and transparent, and to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. It would view trade and contact with the West as a virtue, not a threat. It would return Iran to its historic role as a crossroads of commerce and capitalism, as one of the most sophisticated trading states in history, and a place where cultures mingled to produce dazzling art, architecture, poetry, and prose. This Iran would have its issues with the West, but it would not be a rogue regime, funding terrorists and secretly breaking its international agreements.

Can the West do anything to help the current regime evolve into something more open, modern, and democratic? The change has to come from within—I am not a big believer in the idea that direct American actions can magically promote reform within Iran. But we should not do anything to preclude internal evolution or more dramatic change in that country. The country is clearly deeply divided, and these divisions are not going to disappear. The British intellectual Timothy Garton Ash, who chronicled the velvet revolutions of 1989, notes that "there is a physics of diplomacy, but there is also a chemistry of politics. And ultimately, it is the chemistry of politics inside Iran, the actions and reactions within that country, that could surprise us all." One day, Iran could well take its place as a dynamic country with a regime that wants to live in the modern world. Until then, we should pursue a strategy toward the Iranian regime that preserves a cold peace.


interesting perspective.

[18Dwife]

It's the dye in her hair treatment, it's seeped into her gourd and made her daft.


Nah don't blame it on the color .
she is just a cunt plain ,and simple :rolleyes:

[poison]

Two Leaks and the Deepening Iran Crisis

Quote:
By George Friedman

Two major leaks occurred this weekend over the Iran matter.
In the first, The New York Times published an article reporting that staff at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear oversight group, had produced an unreleased report saying that Iran was much more advanced in its nuclear program than the IAEA had thought previously. According to the report, Iran now has all the data needed to design a nuclear weapon. The New York Times article added that U.S. intelligence was re-examining the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007, which had stated that Iran was not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon.

The second leak occurred in the British paper The Sunday Times, which reported that the purpose of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s highly publicized secret visit to Moscow on Sept. 7 was to provide the Russians with a list of Russian scientists and engineers working on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

The second revelation was directly tied to the first. There were many, including STRATFOR, who felt that Iran did not have the non-nuclear disciplines needed for rapid progress toward a nuclear device. Putting the two pieces together, the presence of Russian personnel in Iran would mean that the Iranians had obtained the needed expertise from the Russians. It would also mean that the Russians were not merely a factor in whether there would be effective sanctions but also in whether and when the Iranians would obtain a nuclear weapon.

We would guess that the leak to The New York Times came from U.S. government sources, because that seems to be a prime vector of leaks from the Obama administration and because the article contained information on the NIE review. Given that National Security Adviser James Jones tended to dismiss the report on Sunday television, we would guess the report leaked from elsewhere in the administration. The Sunday Times leak could have come from multiple sources, but we have noted a tendency of the Israelis to leak through the British daily on national security issues. (The article contained substantial details on the visit and appeared written from the Israeli point of view.) Neither leak can be taken at face value, of course. But it is clear that these were deliberate leaks — people rarely risk felony charges leaking such highly classified material — and even if they were not coordinated, they delivered the same message, true or not.

The Iranian Time Frame and the Russian Role

The message was twofold. First, previous assumptions on time frames on Iran are no longer valid, and worst-case assumptions must now be assumed. The Iranians are in fact moving rapidly toward a weapon; have been extremely effective at deceiving U.S. intelligence (read, they deceived the Bush administration, but the Obama administration has figured it out); and therefore, we are moving toward a decisive moment with Iran. Second, this situation is the direct responsibility of Russian nuclear expertise. Whether this expertise came from former employees of the Russian nuclear establishment now looking for work, Russian officials assigned to Iran or unemployed scientists sent to Iran by the Russians is immaterial. The Israelis — and the Obama administration — must hold the Russians responsible for the current state of Iran’s weapons program, and by extension, Moscow bears responsibility for any actions that Israel or the United States might take to solve the problem.

We would suspect that the leaks were coordinated. From the Israeli point of view, having said publicly that they are prepared to follow the American lead and allow this phase of diplomacy to play out, there clearly had to be more going on than just last week’s Geneva talks. From the American point of view, while the Russians have indicated that participating in sanctions on gasoline imports by Iran is not out of the question, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did not clearly state that Russia would cooperate, nor has anything been heard from Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the subject. The Russian leadership appears to be playing “good cop, bad cop” on the matter, and the credibility of anything they say on Iran has little weight in Washington.

It would seem to us that the United States and Israel decided to up the ante fairly dramatically in the wake of the Oct. 1 meeting with Iran in Geneva. As IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei visits Iran, massive new urgency has now been added to the issue. But we must remember that Iran knows whether it has had help from Russian scientists; that is something that can’t be bluffed. Given that this specific charge has been made — and as of Monday not challenged by Iran or Russia — indicates to us more is going on than an attempt to bluff the Iranians into concessions. Unless the two leaks together are completely bogus, and we doubt that, the United States and Israel are leaking information already well known to the Iranians. They are telling Tehran that its deception campaign has been penetrated, and by extension are telling it that it faces military action — particularly if massive sanctions are impractical because of more Russian obstruction.

If Netanyahu went to Moscow to deliver this intelligence to the Russians, the only surprise would have been the degree to which the Israelis had penetrated the program, not that the Russians were there. The Russian intelligence services are superbly competent, and keep track of stray nuclear scientists carefully. They would not be surprised by the charge, only by Israel’s knowledge of it.

This, of course leaves open an enormous question. Certainly, the Russians appear to have worked with the Iranians on some security issues and have played with the idea of providing the Iranians more substantial military equipment. But deliberately aiding Iran in building a nuclear device seems beyond Russia’s interests in two ways. First, while Russia wants to goad the United States, it does not itself really want a nuclear Iran. Second, in goading the United States, the Russians know not to go too far; helping Iran build a nuclear weapon would clearly cross a redline, triggering reactions.

A number of possible explanations present themselves. The leak to The Sunday Times might be wrong. But The Sunday Times is not a careless newspaper: It accepts leaks only from certified sources. The Russian scientists might be private citizens accepting Iranian employment. But while this is possible, Moscow is very careful about what Russian nuclear engineers do with their time. Or the Russians might be providing enough help to goad the United States but not enough to ever complete the job. Whatever the explanation, the leaks paint the Russians as more reckless than they have appeared, assuming the leaks are true.

And whatever their veracity, the leaks — the content of which clearly was discussed in detail among the P-5+1 prior to and during the Geneva meetings, regardless of how long they have been known by Western intelligence — were made for two reasons. The first was to tell the Iranians that the nuclear situation is now about to get out of hand, and that attempting to manage the negotiations through endless delays will fail because the United Nations is aware of just how far Tehran has come with its weapons program. The second was to tell Moscow that the issue is no longer whether the Russians will cooperate on sanctions, but the consequence to Russia’s relations with the United States and at least the United Kingdom, France and, most important, possibly Germany. If these leaks are true, they are game changers.

We have focused on the Iranian situation not because it is significant in itself, but because it touches on a great number of other crucial international issues. It is now entangled in the Iraqi, Afghan, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese issues, all of them high-stakes matters. It is entangled in Russian relations with Europe and the United States. It is entangled in U.S.-European relationships and with relationships within Europe. It touches on the U.S.-Chinese relationship. It even touches on U.S. relations with Venezuela and some other Latin American countries. It is becoming the Gordian knot of international relations.

STRATFOR first focused on the Russian connection with Iran in the wake of the Iranian elections and resulting unrest, when a crowd of Rafsanjani supporters began chanting “Death to Russia,” not one of the top-10 chants in Iran. That caused us to focus on the cooperation between Russia and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on security matters. We were aware of some degree of technical cooperation on military hardware, and of course on Russian involvement in Iran’s civilian nuclear program. We were also of the view that the Iranians were unlikely to progress quickly with their nuclear program. We were not aware that Russian scientists were directly involved in Iran’s military nuclear project, which is not surprising, given that such involvement would be Iran’s single-most important state secret — and Russia’s, too.

A Question of Timing

But there is a mystery here as well. To have any impact, the Russian involvement must have been under way for years. The United States has tried to track rogue nuclear scientists and engineers — anyone who could contribute to nuclear proliferation — since the 1990s. The Israelis must have had their own program on this, too. Both countries, as well as European intelligence services, were focused on Iran’s program and the whereabouts of Russian scientists. It is hard to believe that they only just now found out. If we were to guess, we would say Russian involvement has been under way since just after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, when the Russians decided that the United States was a direct threat to its national security.

Therefore, the decision suddenly to confront the Russians, and suddenly to leak U.N. reports — much more valuable than U.S. reports, which are easier for the Europeans to ignore — cannot simply be because the United States and Israel just obtained this information. The IAEA, hostile to the United States since the invasion of Iraq and very much under the influence of the Europeans, must have decided to shift its evaluation of Iran. But far more significant is the willingness of the Israelis first to confront the Russians and then leak about Russian involvement, something that obviously compromises Israeli sources and methods. And that means the Israelis no longer consider the preservation of their intelligence operation in Iran (or wherever it was carried out) as of the essence.

Two conclusions can be drawn. First, the Israelis no longer need to add to their knowledge of Russian involvement; they know what they need to know. And second, the Israelis do not expect Iranian development to continue much longer; otherwise, maintaining the intelligence capability would take precedence over anything else.

It follows from this that the use of this intelligence in diplomatic confrontations with Russians and in a British newspaper serves a greater purpose than the integrity of the source system. And that means that the Israelis expect a resolution in the very near future — the only reason they would have blown their penetration of the Russian-Iranian system.

Possible Outcomes

There are two possible outcomes here. The first is that having revealed the extent of the Iranian program and having revealed the Russian role in a credible British newspaper, the Israelis and the Americans (whose own leak in The New York Times underlined the growing urgency of action) are hoping that the Iranians realize that they are facing war and that the Russians realize that they are facing a massive crisis in their relations with the West. If that happens, then the Russians might pull their scientists and engineers, join in the sanctions and force the Iranians to abandon their program.

The second possibility is that the Russians will continue to play the spoiler on sanctions and will insist that they are not giving support to the Iranians. This leaves the military option, which would mean broad-based action, primarily by the United States, against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Any military operation would involve keeping the Strait of Hormuz clear, meaning naval action, and we now know that there are more nuclear facilities than previously discussed. So while the war for the most part would be confined to the air and sea, it would be extensive nonetheless.

Sanctions or war remain the two options, and which one is chosen depends on Moscow’s actions. The leaks this weekend have made clear that the United States and Israel have positioned themselves such that not much time remains. We have now moved from a view of Iran as a long-term threat to Iran as a much more immediate threat thanks to the Russians.

The least that can be said about this is that the Obama administration and Israel are trying to reshape the negotiations with the Iranians and Russians. The most that can be said is that the Americans and Israelis are preparing the public for war. Polls now indicate that more than 60 percent of the U.S. public now favors military action against Iran. From a political point of view, it has become easier for U.S. President Barack Obama to act than to not act. This, too, is being transmitted to the Iranians and Russians.

It is not clear to us that the Russians or Iranians are getting the message yet. They have convinced themselves that Obama is unlikely to act because he is weak at home and already has too many issues to juggle. This is a case where a reputation for being conciliatory actually increases the chances for war. But the leaks this weekend have strikingly limited the options and timelines of the United States and Israel. They also have put the spotlight on Obama at a time when he already is struggling with health care and Afghanistan. History is rarely considerate of presidential plans, and in this case, the leaks have started to force Obama’s hand.

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Iran FM accuses US in nuke scientist disappearance
AP

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By ALI AKBAR DAREINI, Associated Press Writer Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press Writer – 1 hr 7 mins ago

TEHRAN, Iran – Iran accused the United States on Wednesday of involvement in the disappearance of one of its nuclear scientists during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, raising a new mystery at a time when the West is trying to determine the extent of Iran's nuclear program.

Shahram Amiri vanished during a pilgrimage to the kingdom more than four months ago and so far Saudi Arabia has not responded to requests for information on his whereabouts, Iranian officials say. But in complaints about his disappearance, Iranian officials have avoided even mentioning that Amiri was involved in nuclear research — a sign of the sensitivities surrounding the case.

His disappearance came months before the revelation of a second uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom that the United States accuses Iran of building secretly, a claim Tehran denies. The timing has raised speculation that Amiri may have given the West information on it or other parts of Iran's nuclear program.

Iran's announcement of the disappearance also comes as it has entered landmark nuclear negotiations with the United States and other world powers, talks that have somewhat eased rising tensions between the two sides. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Wednesday praised last weeks negotiations in Geneva, calling them "positive" and saying that have "led to a better dialogue."

The United States and some of its allies accuse Iran of secretly seeking to develop nuclear weapons, a claim Iran denies, saying its program is intended only to produce electricity.

Amiri worked as a researcher at Tehran's Malek Ashtar University, which is believed to be run by the elite Revolutionary Guard military corps. The university has been cited in the past by the U.N. for experiments connected with the nuclear program.

Relatives cited in Iranian media said Amiri was researching medical uses of nuclear technology at the university and that he was not involved in the broader nuclear program.

One Iranian news Web site, however, claimed Amiri had worked at the Qom facility and had defected in Saudi Arabia. The Web site, Jahannews, which is connected to Iranian conservatives, gave no source for the report.

Amiri's wife and other relatives have demonstrated in recent weeks in front of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, demanding to know his fate. His wife said he traveled to Saudi Arabia on May 31 for Omra, an Islamic pilgrimage, and that the last she heard from him was in a June 3 phone call, according to the semiofficial ISNA news agency.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Wednesday that Amiri had been arrested and accused the United States of a role.

"We've obtained documents about U.S. involvement over Shahram Amiri's disappearance," Mottaki said, according to the semiofficial Fars news agency.

"We hold Saudi Arabia responsible for Shahram Amiri's situation and consider the U.S. to be involved in his arrest," Mottaki said, quoted by the official IRNA news agency.

Iran has asked Saudi Arabia for information on Amiri's whereabouts but has received no reply, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hasan Qashqavi said earlier this week.

There was no immediate comment from Saudi officials. In Washington, State Department spokesman Ian C. Kelly said he had no information about the matter. "The case is not familiar to us," Kelly said.

The Arab newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, which is owned by Saudi businessmen, reported last week that Mottaki made a formal complaint to U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon about the disappearances of Amiri and several other Iranians in recent years, some of whom it feared may have provided nuclear information to the West. Qashqavi this week denied the complaint made any mention of the nuclear issue.

Also on the list Mottaki handed over was Ali Reza Asghari, a retired general in the elite Revolutionary Guard and a former deputy defense minister, who disappeared during a private visit to Turkey in December 2007. Iran accused Western intelligence services at the time of possibly kidnapping the official, though other reports have said he may have defected.

Another Iranian on the list was a man identified only by his last name, Ardebili, who was reportedly arrested in the Caucasus nation of Georgia recently. Qashqavi said Monday that Ardebili was a businessman and accused Georgian authorities of arresting him and handing him over to the United States. Asharq Al-Awsat identified him as a nuclear scientist, but gave not sourcing for the claim. A Georgian government spokesman in Tblisi refused to comment.

Last month, Iran revealed that it was building the new enrichment facility outside Qom, bringing U.S. and European accusations that it had been hiding the project. Tehran denied it sought to deceive the U.N. nuclear watchdog, saying it revealed the site earlier than required under its deals with the agency. The agency disagrees.

After last week's talks in Geneva, Iran agreed to allow U.N. inspectors into the Qom facility on Oct. 25. It also is discussing a proposal to send some of its enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment to use in a research reactor in Tehran. The uranium would be enriched to a level of 20 percent for the reactor, up from the around 5 percent Iran has succeeded in reaching.

Ahmadinejad on Wednesday said several nations — including the United States — had told Iran they were prepared to provide the further enriched uranium.

"The United States has expressed readiness to provide 20 percent (enriched uranium) to Iran. We buy fuel from any country offering it. The U.S. can be one of the sellers," IRNA quoted him as saying.



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