FIBUA

[TonyM]

Looking for input on FIBUA. Our unit is just getting into it and there's no standards from one platoon to the next. What are your curent SOP's/ tactics practiced for FIBUA? Ours are very out-dated, EG:"2 man stack for room clearing, first one gains access and throws in a frag. Second man follows after detonation, firing burst". Well that worked fine on European /WWII buildings made of stone or brick, but now things are mostly wood frame or similar and that kind of tactic will probably result in a lot of "own goals". The Brits are now looking at 3-4 man entry with shoot/no-shoot and t-flash. Sounds OK, but I think you would need to train fairly extensively with that. How about stairwells, halls, etc? What type of loadout would you suggest for a 4 man team?. I've also posted this over on the Ranger board to see what they say.

[garett]

I've only done FIBUA once and it was a failure in my book. FIBUA is something that must be practised over and over. Its like drill really. It doesn't seem to be something that the militia is too big on in LFAA from what I've heard and seen, other then certain units (PLF, Newfies) that get to go to Florida to do it . Its pretty useless to do it in the facilities that exist except the new village in Gagetown which I've seen a bit of but from what I've heard no one is allowed near it. I guess they don't want us to use it so it will last a long time. It takes a lot to run a FIBUA exercise the right way; a T-flash a room, firing is done mainly in automatic. That adds up, and we don't really have the budget.I've only done FIBUA once and it was a failure in my book. FIBUA is something that must be practised over and over. Its like drill really. It doesn't seem to be something that the militia is too big on in LFAA from what I've heard and seen, other then certain units (PLF, Newfies) that get to go to Florida to do it . Its pretty useless to do it in the facilities that exist except the new village in Gagetown which I've seen a bit of but from what I've heard no one is allowed near it. I guess they don't want us to use it so it will last a long time. It takes a lot to run a FIBUA exercise the right way; a T-flash a room, firing is done mainly in automatic. That adds up, and we don't really have the budget.

[recce_o]

I'm going to talk out of my ass here because the Canadian army has provided me with absolutely no FIBUA training. Everything I know is self taught or picked up informally from the BTDT's. With that proviso, I proceed...

It doesn't take a mock city to be able to start developing close quarters combat skills. At its most basic level CQC can be broken down into a limited number of drills: gain entry, clear hallway, clear stairway and enter and clear a room. To perfect these drills takes a lot of time and all you need is a room, stairway and hallway, which are available anywhere.

The problem is that OC's plan FTX's where the troops are faced with having to take a series of villages without allowing the troops any time to practice the basic building block drills that are required for the assault team to function effectively.

As for tactics, check out:
http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-10-1/toc.pdf

Pay particular attention to appendices F and K.

[TonyM]

I can't agree with you more, Recc_O. It seems that all the drills are different from section-section, plt-plt, coy-coy, unit-unit. Recently we had some of the Westies here using our "FIBUA village" (area of the camp being torn down) and they seemed very up to date and switched on. Even had their RSS WO out there teaching. We'll be out there this weekend and I'm expecting a bit of a cock-up. Maybe I can just go as enemy force, seems to be the best way of learning.

[jeff]

There has been a huge push for CQC training here in the US. It is the future of combat. My unit has new SOPs and a 4 week training regime that kicks ass. It is of course only the beginning. 4 weeks is hardly enough to establish SOPs at the team level but it makes everyone proficient in the base-line skills.

[Enfield]

My new unit out West here is doing FIBUA all year - I'm excited to give it a shot.
Are our tactics really that out of date? Ok, sure, the advanced stuff willl come with practice, but I think cleraing rooms, hallways, stairs, and entering buildings is pretty clear. All we need is the practice - remember those first few section attacks back in training?
Our SOP's might be WW2 issue, but hell, I can guarantee the Canadian Army cleared more buildings in NW Europe than every other Western Army since. But that said, with new weapons and capabilities, we do need to evolve the tactics. I think the biggest problem will be integrating the individual drills to a platoon or company formation in a fluid situation with an opposing force. I saw a documentary where a company of US Marines attacked (simulated, of course) an office tower. Half of the casualties were friendly fire, and even for troops that practice this stuff a lot, there was still room for improvement.

Aren't section attacks being revised? I heard in the UK there's no more 3 pace bound, it's all done from the ground. Or something to that effect,

Enfield

[TonyM]

Section attacks as performed by us are a form of attrition warfare, not maneuver warfare. The best write up I've seen identifying this (my opinion RIDICULOUS) form of training is RCR Captain Michael O'Leary. He wrote an article for the Infantry School mag that exposed the section attack (and battle drills) for what they are. I'll try to find it and post here.

[Reverend B]

Let us not forget, though, that a section attack will not go in alone. It is simply the smallest manoeuvre force that we train in. All the "Gagetown" officers do not realize that you would be advancing behind the armour that is lighting up the positions that the pilots and arty have already laid down a tonne of ordinance. Let us not forget about our own weapons dets that are "walking" us in.
When it comes to FIBUA, we are a lost crowd. When the Westies where up, they had some slick moves. Unlike us, they are allowed to deviate from the Canadian pam. Troy (unlike us, they don't get the threat of a charge for calling people by there first names) works in the prison ERT teams doing cell-extractions and the like. Not only does he have the knowledge, he has the experience. Hmmmm....maybe the whistleheads should get out at the troop level and see just how fucked things are, instead of protecting there own asses. I always have a spot for a Bravo C-9.

[TonyM]

Ha! Right on Rev, but a more likely scenario is we won't need any NVG's because of the brightly burning armour hulks marking our path of advance. The way I've seen training go, the officers use a section like a canary in a coal mine. "Advance through that field, Sgt Killem, see what we (meaning your guys) can scare up". Good tactics. Train like you fight. They always say "You'd never go in alone, we would have supporting arms all the way". Due to our lack (I really mean never, but I do have hope) of practicing any supporting arms scenarios, choose which is more likely:

1) Officer calls up artillery and or CAS with pin-point precision while we roll up the enemy behind a curtain of fire, death and destruction.

2) Enemy dies of laughter watching us getting killed by our own people / allies.

[Cree Warrior]

In regards to FUBUA training, if you want the most advanced SOP's look in the MOUT site here in specialoperations.com somewhere.
There is a new chapter they are adding to the Ranger handbook which is entirely CQB based on lessons leaned in Somalia. Most of it originates from SFOD. You can download it and print it out.
All CQB SOP's are just that SOP's. They are not doctrine. Therefore you can use whichever SOP's you find work the best. My unit just finished training in the CQB style within the Ranger Handbook chapter. We spent one full day going over reflexive shooting, walking and turning while firing, controlled double taps, four man stack, points of domination, hallway, room and stairwell clearing etc..
The guys picked it up well and can now practice this stuff anywhere. Even at home.
I have the advantage of having done most of it before in the US, but it is not as difficult as one would think. (Jeez if I can learn it then anyone can).

The Canadian FIBUA SoP's taught in the Infantry school are insane and borderline illegal. I cant think of one place where we could be deployed where there may be civies on the battlefield. Especially in peacekeeping. To go into a building and unload a sack of grenades into a hole made by a Carl G then run through and dump a magazine into anywhere someone (most likely a little kid) could be hiding is FU#@ing stupid!

More of that damn cold war mentality I guess.

Sua Sponte

[garett]

Any where on the net where I can find the new Ranger FIBUA SOPs.

[Cree Warrior]

try this out,
http://www-benning.army.mil/rtb/RANGER/hdbook/Chapter14.htm

Sua Sponte

[TonyM]

Cree-

I found that Ranger page earlier. Printed it out and brought it in. I explained that there's no way we (th mo) should even think about wasting time building a FIBUA SOP from scratch when the Rangers have probably poured millions into developing theirs. No sense re-inventing the wheel, etc. No go. Guess I'll have to wait for the official CF version, with all it's accumulated pc crap ("Please open the door, Canadian Non-Gender Specific soldier, or I'll COCK MY WEAPON")

I do believe I'm getting bitter, not better...

[Reverend B]

I agree. This "new Canadian" pam is a frikkin' joke. It is pretty much a carbon copy of an old yank pam, except the canuck version is lacking illistrations or pictures. The Ranger pam is slick in those departments. I am tired of beating my head off the wall with the whistle-heads and other sNCO's that think that they have to satisfy the higher. Fuck 'em. Satisfy the troops, make sure that you feel safe with there level of compitance. They are the ones that may have to one day cover your back in a theater....the ruperts won't be there. Check out: http://call.army.mil/call/mout/moutactd/hb1/chap3.htm
---it is pretty much a copy of the Ranger pam, but it has nifty colour pictures for us of the nintendo generation.
The Reverend

[Enfield]

A couple things...
Why does FIBUA have to have changed so much since WW2? The average Canadian regiment fought through more cities, against a tougher enemy, and cleared more rooms and streets than any other unit in the world has since. I'd rather listen to the guys that fought in Ortona and Stalingrad (or Grozny last year for that matter)than just about anybody else. Just trying to say that there's more place's to go for SOP's than the Rangers (and no offense to them, don't bite my head off Cree Warrior =o) ).
Where exactly does that weakness lie in our current SOPs? In the basic room/hall/stairway clearing? Or in the coordination of an entire platoon/company attack? Looking through that Ranger info that was posted, there was a lot of stuff there that we haven't even begun to look at. Could simple practice fix it, or are really that messed up?
Strange how 10 yars ago the rest of NATO realized FIBUA/MOUT was important... and the CF's just catching up.

Enfield

PS Maybe they should just set up "Rogue Spear" in the junior ranks mess...

[Reverend B]

Why has FIBUA changed so much? Change in technologies; change in conflicts, and of course, an educated change in tactics to help save lives of you and your buddies. Sure, I would like to talk to the vets of current conflicts, but around here, they sure as hell are not just falling out of the sky. Also, I am trying to train my troops in a variety of situations with differing ROE's. I could teach a section of monkeys how to frag a room and enter it shooting. We also have different types of buildings around here, with drywall and lumber instead of brick. That changes things slightly, also. I am sure that there are also a lot of other places to go, but it is the availability of acquiring documentation that is the hindrance, and some of us have other thing to do than spend a lifetime searching for the stuff. Why the Ranger pams? Because they are well done and easily acquired, and give us a base that we can work off of.

[wcollar]

From Jane's Weeklyu, dealing with developments here in the States.

US Army Refines Urban Combat Training

By Scott Gourley, JDW Correspondent, California

The US Army 'transformation' process taking shape within the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is driving a range of changes in traditional Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Leaders, Materiel, and Soldiers (Jane's Defence Weekly 11 October). Within the training arena, a key change involves the introduction of new urban fighting skills and training-range facilities.

"This new IBCT [aims to] focus on deploying into a [Military Operations in Urban Terrain] MOUT environment, which is built-up areas and cities, and close complex terrain, which is dense woods and thick jungle," explains infantry Capt Tom Mangine. Part of the army's IBCT at Ft Lewis, Washington, Capt Mangine's company is helping to spearhead this new training direction.

"We're engaging targets at a lot closer range than we ordinarily would," he adds. "The emphasis, especially what we learned from Panama, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, [is] that as you enter these MOUT environments, target range drops down to 0m-25m. With a new system developed by the Ranger Regiment called CQM, Close Quarters Marksmanship, it puts the emphasis on a soldier having to bring his weapon to bear, identifying the target and engaging it. And then continuing to engage it until it's down."

To emphasise these skills, the IBCT companies are conducting live-fire training on new firing facilities at Fort Lewis' Range 29. Here soldiers learn to handle their weapons from various engagement angles. The processes include rapid-fire drills where the soldier must keep his eyes on the target, dropping the weapon magazine, loading a new magazine and then bringing the weapon to bear.

"At these short ranges, at these difficult angles, you're not going to have a lot of time to identify, acquire your target and develop a good sight picture. A soldier has got to learn to do that stuff quickly. He's got to keep his eyes focused and looking out at the target," says Capt Mangine.

Skills developed under CQM training are then transferred to Close Quarter Battle (CQB), which focuses on entering and clearing buildings and rooms. As with CQM, IBCT participants credit the 75th Ranger Regiment with developing the room-clearing techniques. "The Ranger Regiment has published a Training Circular which this battalion has taken on as doctrine," Capt Mangine says.

One tactical principle emphasised during CQB involves "a stack", a drill based on a fire team entering and clearing a room. Although designed for a four-person fire team, realities of the battlefield mandate the flexibility to operate with as few as two, but never more than four.

The skills developed on Range 29 are perfected in a new 'shoot house' at Range 27, where soldiers learn to clear the rooms inside a building. Based on several rooms opening off a central corridor, with both corner-fed and centre-fed doorway designs, the facility is used to represent an apartment or police barracks environment.

As well as the Range 27 'shoot house', there is funding for the construction of an additional live-fire urban shooting facility that will reportedly resemble an office or government building.

The room-clearing skills are then expanded on newly constructed facilities at Range 28, a 'close orderly block' construction to simulate a city-centre area. In addition, construction is nearing completion on nearby Range 31, where the urban setting is reportedly being designed to simulate residential or suburban aspects of the MOUT environment, including a Y-shaped intersection and roundabout. With the 'shoot house' designed to optimise multiteam or squad-level training, the street training facilities on Ranges 28 and 31 are designed for two squads, moving one down each side of a street.

"Once contact is made, the soldier is taught, regardless of where he is, to seek cover, report and return fire - almost simultaneously. In a MOUT environment ... the best place to seek cover is inside a building. So what has to happen? The soldier now on the street needs to apply the principles of entering and clearing a room by quickly figuring out which room he's going to enter with his two- to-four-person element; clear that room; set up his best cover and concealed position; establish a base of fire; engage the enemy; and allow the commander of that element to manoeuvre his forces," explains Capt Mangine.

"Most of these rooms are kept generic with the doors open. It's part of the crawl-walk-run concept of training: you start off at the very low level and then you increase the level of difficulty. We'll start closing the doors. We'll barricade some of the doors. They'll have to work in some of the breaching techniques. On [Range] 28 we'll throw in some plywood furniture to make it more difficult for a soldier to get to his point of domination. They look pretty sharp now but if you throw in there a 100lb [45kg] futon in the soldier's way - the first time that he sees that you don't want it to be in combat.

"At the CQM range we teach soldiers how to shoot standing up; how to do left turn, right turn; how to shoot while moving and while walking; and other different types of engagements," explains Sgt 1st Class Robert Swift. "In close quarter we train them to shoot what we call 'controlled pairs'. We shoot two rounds at a target. We teach them the two rounds because most of the people we will be fighting will have some kind of body armour. The first round breaks the composition of the body and the second round is the one that will do the damage and break through. That's why we teach them in controlled pairs, what we call 'the double tap'."

Sgt Swift explains that training differences between CQM and traditional rifle marksmanship includes eliminating the "breathing part" where soldiers are traditionally taught to squeeze the trigger during the natural pause between inhaling and exhaling.

"But in Close Quarter Battle, it's so fast and fluid at close quarters that if a soldier is sitting there thinking about his breathing and when to squeeze the trigger, he might get killed. So I tell these guys 'That's one of the things you have to blow off in Close Quarter [Battle]'. You just get that sight picture and shoot as fast as you can," he says.

He adds that another difference between traditional combat and CQB training involves preferred exposure to the enemy. While soldiers have traditionally been taught to aim and fire while exposing their narrow side profile to the enemy, modern body armour plates provide the most ballistic protection to the front and rear of a soldier's torso. This prompts a preferred engagement profile where the shooter "squares up" and directly faces the enemy.

In a four-person stack, Sgt Swift explains that the number-one soldier is the team leader, a design he notes is quite different from room-clearing techniques used by special operations forces.

"Our number-one man is our smartest guy. He's our team leader and the soldiers are trained to follow their team leader. So that's why we lead with the number-one man," Sgt Swift says.

Another key feature of urban combat training involves "points of domination", where soldiers dominate a room with their bodies, weapons and sectors of fire. Once the threat is eliminated and the room is under control, the training shifts to a series of specific "fundamentals". These sequential actions include: search of the dead; search of the living; search of the room; status reporting to higher headquarters; and evacuation of the room.

Acknowledging some similarities between new IBCT MOUT expertise developed within special operations units like the 75th Ranger Regiment, Sgt Swift notes that "the doctrine is the same. The fundamentals are the same. Maybe we don't have the equipment for the dynamic entries that the rangers have, because they've got the helicopters ... but we can drive up to a building with our light-armoured skin vehicles versus flying in by helicopter and fast-roping in front of the door. We apply what we've learned from the Ranger Regiment and we also apply our assets".

[Enfield]

Just finished my first FIBUA ex. It was rather impressive actually - 3 regiments, 160 troops, and a very large 3 story (plus basement) dormitory style builing (old asylum).
I have to commend the officers that planned this, they put a lot of work into it. We had one day of practice in the building, an dthen on th second day we launched a company assault against it - a platoon of recruits and QL2's played enemy force, and the inside was booby trapped and fortified.
Well, our tactics and SOPs are.. well, rough to say the best. End result, the majority of casualties were friendly fire. Grenades kept bouncing out of rooms, and the MG's (C9 & 6) pretty much shot each other up giving cover fire down the hallway. We won, but it wasn't as good as it should be.
Was it the fault of the Cdn SOP's? I have no idea, but by the way we're changing procedures and the differences between regiments in tactics, it seems to me (the basic rifleman) that there is no known standard. We need more basic, dynamic practice and the fundamentals.
Some of the guys that did FIBUA (low intensity training, not the Total War we're practising for) with Reg Force and JTF before going on tour have said that what we're doing is completley different.

I also found that exactly what gear we need, don't need, is not known. Each regiment had different ways to carry gear - no butt packs, backpacks, drop webbing once inside, etc, etc. I do think that we can do without Swiss Seats and rappel rope, and carry as many grenades, ammo, and satchel charges as humanly possible.
Anyway, tactics changed with almost every practice and run-through - which is good in that it show sthat we're learning and adapting, but I'm wondering where the standards/CF SOP's are?
Just wanted to post this as a comment on our level of FIBUA.
Two things: First, the officers and SNCO's that planned it did a great job, and it shows that the're interestd in getting us trained in this. Good sign!
Two, we used an old asylum in Vancouver (New Westminster). What about coodrinating with local Police/Fire Dept? Some big city police tactical teams have facilities to pratice in, why not see if we could use them? Maybe get some training (for fun and interest)
in on MP5's and handguns? Let them try out our weapons in return, at the range maybe.
And fire dept's usually have sturdy buildings to train in, as well as ladders, how about trying to use them to train?
Just some ideas.. I think with practice, we can get it, but we need to practice in realistic and varying environments, which are hard to come by.

Enfield

[This message has been edited by Enfield (edited 11-20-2000).]

[Cree Warrior]

Okay I wont get mad.... The reason you look to outside units for guidance in FIBUA, MOUT training is basically becasue other units, armies are taking it seriously. The last time the Canada took FIBUA seriously was WW2. Not to put down those lessons learnt in Ortona, it was after all L EDMN R that did most of the hard shit there. However, other armies have kept training since then. It would be like saying, "well we want to pt together a hockey team, so lets look back to the training and tactics used by the Montreal Canadians in their hayday in the beginning of the twentieth century." Uh, I dont think so.
Canada needs to scale our FIBUA SOP's as do the Brits and the US; 1) Full Intensity (WW3) kill all, max colateral damage etc, 2) Precision, (peacekeeping) selective targets etc. 3) Surgical (JTF stuff)
Right now all we train for is WW3.

Sua SPonte

[Reverend B]

In reply to Enfeild, yes, it was a good exercise, but it could have been better....it can always be better. There should have been engineer/pioneer support. The wire should have been blown and safe areas through the mines the same. There should have been multi-stage assaults through multiple entry points. Obviusly, we couldn't breech the walls themselves for reasons of not damaging the buildings, but that is how the lodgement should be gained. When I asked 'why' we didnt't have multiple, co-ordinated assaults, I was told that the OC didn't want 'blue-on-blue', something that could easily be avoided with REHERSALS and proper planning at higher levels. That building, if properly planned and reheared, would have been taken in less time with fewer casualties. I only hope that the officers will listen to NCO recomondations, and take that into consideration, but most likely, they won't. Like Cree Warrior said...time to get out of the past. I like to think that any assault on anything is like sucker-punching someone that is pissing you off. You hit him hard from an angle that they least expect, and follow him to the ground with multiple strikes to critical points. You want him down and out, fast. Perhaps it would be cowardly in a pub situation, but in a war situation, call me a coward all you want when you are holding your guts in crying in a pool off your own piss. That is my theory. Running like mad around minefeilds and wire and feeding everyone through a single breech point is insane. Good for skills at a soldier level, but those above us had better learn to do better planning to save OUR lives.

[TonyM]

My thoughts on that ex:
Too scripted and generaly a waste of time and money. We got to practice in the building all day Sat (by ourselves, not with any other units) for the Sunday morning "assault". Nothing new here, same scenario as always. Why do we consistantly do this? The whole ex could have been set up like a real mission. Have all the units given thier taskings, floor plan, maps, photos, etc prior. We could have done rehersals & planning, practice team tactics & SOP's for over a month prior to going at our own units (just like real life?). Friday night would be the O's getting together for final planning, recce teams go out, Sat assault, Sun critique. Very unrealistic the way we did it and I didn't learn a thing. Practicing tactics is something that can be done at the unit level, ex's should be a time to "bring it all together" and go full bore. That's how you learn if your tactics work. If we had assaulted that building "cold" and all got "wiped out", I would have learned a lot more. As it was I knew all the rooms, good hiding spots, internal/external fire arcs, etc. I really want to know who's benefiting from this kind of mindless crap.

[Reverend B]

Yup. You are right. For the most part it was a waste of time. I had to get a floorplan from a private from another unit because our 'O' treated it like a big secret. We could have practiced and rehersed for a long time until it was scond nature, like it should be done. Going in 'cold' would have been better. Once the assault went in on Sun. Everyone knew just about exactly what to expect, and from where. Doing an 'administration' move in front of the building that we where going to assault, and then all of a sudden take it seriously was wrong. Extremely poor prep and planing on the 'O' side of things. (but don't tell them that, it may hurt their feelings!)

[Enfield]

TonyM, Reverend B,
Good comments - you raised a few thing si never really thought of. I was more concerened with the smaller, individual skills than the big picture. But your right. We should have assaulted the building cold. A day of practice, and then giving out detailed maps was just to unrealistic.

For me, the biggest problem was the individual soldier skills. Friendly Fire would have killed far to may soldiers. There is no standard SOP for the most basic things, like room clearing or necessary gear.
And there is defintley a problem between a lack of imagination on the captain's part and being unable to damage the building. We were charging bunkered C6's, and moving across narrow hallways covered by mutiple C7's. We should have been - gasp, shock - going in the back door, or blowing our way from room to room. Comms sucked, thanks to our radios, and iunformation was not passed between platoons - my sectio had to yell to the platoon that was smoving up that there were mines by the razor wire, they hadn't already been briefed (by the multiple officers and SNCO's that were standing around and knew they were there) before charging in.
They said we took the building. Well, maybe we did, but it was close, and there would have been far to many casualities. But I still believe it was a good ex and everyone learned from it.
Cree Warrior - Strangely enough, my unit is claiming to have been the one that invented FIBUA at Ortona. And I was just posing that question to act as devil's advocate, and to ensure we weren't throwing out old but valid SOPs. But I agree that we do need new tactics and methods. The simnple difference between a Lee-Enfield and a C7 demands it.

Enfield

[Reverend B]

Hey, don't get me to wrong.For individual soldier skills, it was OK.But inter and intra unit SOP's should have been fabricated. To have GPMG's firing from the end of a hall past troops moving from room to room is only asking for friendly fire casaulties. We could argue tactics 'till we are both blue in the face. I only hope that there where things that the 'O's learned. That is what training is all about. Make the mistakes now, not later when they will count. I think that the meaning of 'exercise' is lost sometime in the senior levels.

[Skip]

I have something to add here regarding FIBUA tactics. In many SWAT teams there is a support section that moves into the building about 1 room behind the entry team. This is something that should be incorporated into military thinking. At platoon level that would be the platoon officer, medic and comms

At company level most of that support should perform support tasks as Tracy has stated on other boards.

As infantry bods, what is your reaction to a support team, and what should it consist of?

[TonyM]

No Comms? This was the first time our plt had full comms. I was able to get a hold of a freq fill box and got all our LARs programmed. Worked great (for a change) while stacked up outside, I was able to monitor other plt progress in the building, coy and bn. No one was more surprised than me it actually worked. Now that led to another problem, WAY too much chatter on the radio. Most times by the time I was able to pass along a report, the situation had changed. And I still hate that stupid headset/boom mic.

[enderr]

critics....our fibua tactics aren't that bad. I've been able to do fibua with my own unit in kentucky, and meaford.. And the results aren't too disastrous. Tactics haven't changed too much since 1944, and when put to use they worked fairly well.. The problem is that units have other requirements in the annual training cycle and fibua, however essential requires experienced troops and nco's who know what they're doing. And the fibua houses in pet and meaford, and kentucky are pretty lame to the setup the brits have in salisbury. Those who've been there know what i'm talking about...when i first saw it i started drooling. As well, Canada needs training simualators like miles, or isawes.

[Skip]

This all reminds me of a great story. A few years back I was medic for an armoured company FTX on Salsbury plain, finishing in the FIBUA village.

When we got to the village the simple task was to snatch several enemy commanders who were hiding amoungst civilians.

At about 2.30am we hit the village and the attack sections prepared to enter the buildings. I was at the end of the first stick.

The entry man pulls back on his ram, yawns and as he does - mutters "this is very realistic, they've even got newspapers on the doorstep."

Forgetting it, he swings the ram, and the drops his jaw as he realises that there are cars in most driveways, and then someones alarm clock goes off.

Very realistic..

The roads in the FIBUA village are all named after areas in Germany etc and the idea being it is impossible to confuse it with the local village, must be all the European integration.

Well I pissed my sides afterwards anyway..

[Royal Highland Fusilier]

*bump*

And a question.

Is there a new FIBUA pam or something? Because now I've been taught two different methods of room clearing.

[garett]

Yeah they've been working on a new one for awhile now. Theres an RCR WO at the Infantry School who is putting it together. He went down to the US to see how the USMC does it and over to the UK to see how the Brits do it. I'm not sure if the official release is out yet.

[Royal Highland Fusilier]

There was an airmobile assault on new Fib village at Pet during this year's CAC.

The new fib village is pretty cool. They have a lot of buildings being built, in addition to ones complete. (Needs furnitures and extra stuff, however to simulate real houses)
Also, the assaulters got to play with new simunition rifles, which has shorter barrel, kinda like carbine. Very good ease of movement.

Part of the work up training, we were introduced to some sort of new NATO standard Fib tactics. Probably the most useful part was the linkman, who basically stands near the entry and guides people into the building. He also uses some sort of colour markers to indicate status of building.
-Red: Building is not cleared of hostiles. Indicates entry point to this house and the only secure entryway.
-Green: Building is clear of hostiles. Indicates entry point to this house and the only secure entryway.
-Blue: Booby traps inside building
-Yellow: Friendly casualties in the building.
I may have mixed up blue and yellow.

Admittly we only saw section level tactics as demonstration, but it was gay.

This is what I remember.
-Two C9s are detached for support. (Apparently usually the section 2i/c trades his rifle with a gunner so that he can act as support commander) They open up to try to suppress the enemy.
-Smokes tossed as close to objective building to cover breaching team which has mousehole charges or other equipment. Runs back like hell.
-Bang goes the charge and first two guys runs in to try to gain lodgement.
-After lodgement is gained, the first assault team calls up sect comd and the linkman. Linkman does his flag thing.
-Sect comd decides where he wants to go and calls up his next assault team. They come in a tries to clear the room.

And I'm assuming after that next sect is called up and so on.

The thing is, I was always taught that especially in Fib, maximum speed, aggression and communication was the key. And most of the NCOs in my unit agreed that the new tactics sucked, because of the long lull between the breachers and the rest of the assault moving up. After the breaching charge goes off, but the first breaching team gets whacked, the enemy has too much time to prep for next breaching team to try to gain lodgement. I was also told that the a lot of casualties occur while trying to gain lodgement so giving the enemy time to prepare for guys trying to gain lodgement sounds silly to me.

So, this is what my company (Argylls and RHFC) did.

-Whoever is in support start hammering the objective house.
-Smokes are tossed, breaching charge goes off. First two guys goes to try to gain lodgement. The rest of the section waits about 5 secs then runs towards the breach. The linkman does his flag thing.
-If the first team does manage to gain breach, they wait just long enough for other members of the sect to get in and they just plow in to next room/hallway without needing direction from sect comd. Sect comd takes control directing more guys into the direction of where the first team went, going with the rest of the sect, of course.
-When taking the room, usual description of the room communication occurs. Sect comd directs next team to whichever room/direction/hallway to go.
-The team that took the room communicates to each other who's going to stay to secure the room. He moves to position to best secure the room if necessary. The other stacks back up with the rest of the assaulters. When the guy securing a room *knows* that all entries to his room is secure (friendlies are in adjacent entries), he takes initiative to rejoin the stack of assaulters. Also, when the assaulters reach a dead end of the house, they rejoin the other stack of assaulters clearing in another direction.
-Sometimes someone else, maybe the pl comd or another sect comd or anyone starts clearing the house in another direction, because they saw an enemy or something so two or more simultaneous clearing may occur. Also, keep a guy at key points at the house to direct troops to the direction of where the room clearings are happening.
-When suspecting that the guys in the room beside is friendly but you aren't sure, yell out 'link up, link up, link up'. If you get a reply of 'link up, link up, link up,' you can be pretty sure that the other guys are friendlies. Try to give a thumbs up as additional indicator.
-When it is pretty sure that the house is secure, someone in charge, at least a sect comd yells out 'dominate, dominate, dominate!' and everyone disperses to all rooms in the house to check for friendly casualties, intel, leftover enemies hiding, etc.
-When the house is secure, someone in charge yells out, 'out, out, out' which means everyone exits the house or prepare to assault another house at the direction of whoever is in charge. Linkman changes the flag to green to indicate that the house is clear. When you're the last man going in a direction, ensure to inform the guy who's securing a room that you're the last man, so that he may rejoin the rest of the body.

The thing about this method is that it takes a lot of communication and everyone taking intiative and leadership, since we all know that Fib fucks up chain of command pretty good.
Basically what happened often is that if you're the first guy to next room/hallway and you get a tap on your shoulder and someone telling you to take the next room, you go. A lot of initiative is required from everyone, from a buck private and up.
But I think this way ensures maximum speed and aggression through the objective house.
If you also hear 'need more men' or something to that effect while you're reinforcing, go to that direction as the assault in that direction needs more guys to help.

I also learned a new tactic when clearing hallway/unknown room which is that the first guy turns corner, takes a step or two, then kneels. His partner turns and stands right behind the first guy so that there is now two rifles pointing at the direction. At a T junction, one team goes left and one team goes right simultaneously.

Gone is the days of tossing a grenade then charge in full auto. Everything is now double tap. Grenades are only used when it is assured that the walls can stand a grenade blast. Also, kneeling is discouraged as it slows down momentum of the assault so take up standing firing position whenever possible, unless you're the guy keeping the room secure.
Few other basic things needed to be reinforced, like don't stand near windows or leave barrel of rifle exposed so that the enemy might seen it.

Another key point to remember is that when you have to climb up ladder, a window or a ledge to gain entry as the breacher, remember to sweep the room first to try to see if enemy is there and hope that you don't get whacked.

That's about all I remember.

The actual coy assault was pretty fucked up. I was on support with a C9 so I didn't get to go into the houses. I wanted to be on assault. Oh well.
Apparently there was a miscommunication between the engineers who were suppose to breach the concertina wires and the lead sect of breachers so the lead sect charged in while the bangalores didn't go off, so they all got whacked. And the things went downhill from there.

Probably the key thing was that people keep forgetting to keep a guy in a room to ensure it's secured, so that guys keep clearing the same room all over again. Lack of communication meant that no one had really any direction of what's going on and apparently the pl comds and the coy comd got whacked pretty early in the assault so there's a bit of problem there.

It could have been better, as the staff did stupid things, like calling people dead because they were in front of a window. (But they weren't shot) The staff didn't ensure that the dead people stay dead so guys who were suppose to be dead went in again.
Rumour goes that some enemy force guys didn't have MILES vest on (C6s and C9s had MILES). And there was not enough MILES gear to go around, nor enough time to properly zero so I doubt the support wpns were effective. And there was not enough C6 blanks. I think each of the 5 C6s in the wpns det had like maybe belt and a half.

Good idea, but bad execution is my judgement.

[Marauder]

For the rehearsals, the section ICs and 2ICs (all CPLs) got together and we decided the best way to handle this was to make sure everyone knew how to properly clear the room and how to secure it, since we have done previous FIBUA exs and had some rudimentary SOPs established (nothing concrete, everyone wants to "improve" shit or use their personally prefered method, c'est la vie) and we knew that C&C breaks down quick and that chances are the fuckies you start stacking with aren't the ones you clear your last room with. As we predicted, the whole thing went strolling merrily along into Jugfuck Junction once the first support weapons opened up. First, those piece of monkey shit helmets cut effective communication by half, and visibility by at least 80% by fogging up the second you break a sweat. So first off, you lose effective hearing, speech, and especially vision. Then most of the coy officers became uneefective for any number of reasons. Hell, our CSM left the CCP to link with our platoon warrant to start directing traffic in our target building. Basically, it ended up that we started grabbing whatever guys weren't casualties and we starting stacking, taking the initiative, and clearing the buildings. Our platoon almost had the whole fucker cleared too, with the two hours we had allotted from the jumpoff point, when the call came for everyone to haul ass back to the LZ for extraction via the Griffons (which ended up mostly administrative, with fucking cameracrews and a whole gaggle of civvie employer types rubbernecking the whole process).
I am proud to say that my coy got an official "Atta-boy!" from the helo jocks and more importantly, the flight engineers, for our conduct in emplaning and deplaning the birds on both ends of the assualt. Apparantly, a few chalks from 32 and/or 33 LIB got left on the LZ 'cuz their drills were so past numpty-fucked.
As for the rest of the ex, well... let's say digging trenches in 36 degree heat and then sitting and baking in flak jackets for 4 hours waiting for some armoured dickhead who rolled an Iltis out in the impact area to get towed wasn't the highlight of my four weeks in Pet.

[Royal Highland Fusilier]

^Just glad we didn't have to dig at Meaford.
I didn't mind the flak jacket too much during the defensive. I enjoyed shooting stuff down. Kinda cool to see what combined arms is capable of.
Rather amazed that there were Coyotes along with Cougars.
And rumour goes there was a regiment of arty. There was a lot of shells falling though.

What annoyed me was that I didn't get a MILES gear for my C9 during fib assault, but I had 6 boxs of blanks.
I ended up being not much more than a noisemaker.
And cleaning a C9 after that many blanks sucks, lol.

[Prometheus]

I've heard with the C9 and miles gear it's not very effective because you don't shoot that many laser shots per burst. Something like the gear doesnt read it so if you for example fire a 10 round burst your only firing 3 or 4 laser shots.

[excoelis]

My .02 cents on a ressurected thread.

Just to confuse matters more we renamed it OBUA (Operations in Built Up Areas).

Our MO: Train-the-Trainer approach. MLC-4 for the some Junior/Senior NCOs on advance party to Ft. Drum. Then train the troopies and set 'em loose in the MOUT site.

Good point from Cree Warrior on the whole High Intensity, Precision, Surgical approach. Obviously we need to progress with our tactics, understanding that each Theater of Operations presents differing and unique challenges. To win the day we must be flexible enough, and have the equipment necessary, to deal with the threat - and still stay within the applicable ROEs. Hopefully the CofC is prepared for these challenges and during battle procedure you can re-kit your troops for CQC. Some of the kit made avail to us that makes business a little easier in CQC:
C8s, Shotguns, PAQ 2As/4Cs, Surefire light kits w/ IR filters, Demo kits, collapsible ladders, grappling hooks(not some bent up rebar on 11mm nylon), Flip-up helmet mounts for 504s, Kitesights for all C9s, Maxi-Kites for C6s, etc....

Going in with guns, 203s, and grenades blazing might not cut it. Most modern buildings are constructed in such a way that a grenade going off in the room next to you might pose a real threat to you and yours. Sometimes collatoral damage must be minimised for the operation to be considered successfull. You may find yourself in a pinch and the squirells are foraging for nuts elsewhere. Food for thought anyway.

WRT to MILES gear. Lesson learned the hard way - Due to the high profile of C79 optic - leave LOTS of time and ammo in your BP when you zero the gear to your wpns. Otherwise it's spray-and-pray when you go in blazin'. The opfor will make damn sure they are squared away;)

[Infanteer]

http://www.socnetcentral.com/vb/showthread.php?threadid=917

Here is probably one of the best threads on this site. Read what Tracy (Retired SF Warrant Officer and a SME on FIBUA) has to say.

Cheers
Infanteer

[Prometheus]

I'm surprised we in the canadian forces do not consintrate more on Fibua though im glad it seems like this attitude is slowly changing. I once heard 90% of all civilization lives within cities and towns, that to me makes fibua skills a heck of a lot more important than digging a trench and living in it for a week (Though that is still a required skill).

I think a major problem is like people here mentioned, the different standards regarding fibua training. Not very long ago it was still taught to throw a grenade in every room and hose it down with your C7. I did some fibua training with the JTF and i really liked their new standard, i was told it was fast becomming the standard for the CF but chatting with a young private about this years CAC in petawawa, it seems old habits die hard.

Friendly fire is also a big problem, troops just have to become more aware of it. I shot 5 guys from a friendly platoon because they refused to stop shooting at me when i passed the stairwell they were in and ignored me shouting the running password.
Leaders have to give their troops more room to make their own decisions. Personally i find sectionc ommanders who try and micro manage the whole battle vastly limit what a well trained section can do because they are always stopping and waiting for orders from one individual when they can use their own brains and do their thing. There still needs to be a measure of control, troops running around doing their own thing is wrong but more initive is needed by the privates/corporals.

Lastly i would say half ass admin/tactical excersises. The lazy part of me thinks it's great to live in administrative hides and i like to relax just as much as the next guy but when your trying to play for real and you have 'out of play' players walking around all the time getting in the way OR time outs half way through the mission it really takes away from the experience. I think it's bad training to stop right after an attack (or even half way through one!) and debrief everyone on what went wrong, what was good and all that. People should do their thing, make their mistakes and learn about it after the whole ex is done. And bystanders/out of play players (even ref's to an extent) should stay out of the way.